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Abstract 
This study examines and evaluates critically four novels 
by Saul Bellow: Dangling Man, The Victim, Herzog and Mr Sammler's 
Planet. The emphasis is on the tension between certain aspects 
of modernity to which many of the characters are attracted, 
and the latent Jewishness of their creator. Bellow's Jewish 
heritage suggests alternate ways of being to those advocated 
by the enlightened thought of liberal Humanism, for example, 
or by one of its offshoots, Existenti'alism, or by "wasteland" 
ideologies. 
Bellow propounds certain ideas about the purpose of 
the novel in various articles, and these are discussed briefly 
in the introduction. His dismissal of the prophets of doom, 
those thinkers and writers who are pessimistic about the 
fate of humankind and the continued existence of the novel, 
is emphatic and certain. His alternative to apocalyptic 
thinking and writing presents a view both of li and of 
the role of the novelist in the twentieth century. 
Chapter one considers the plight of Joseph, the protagonist 
of Dangling Man. In writing his first novel, Bellow set 
out to prove his American assimilation, and thus Joseph is 
a prototype of the alienated man (then in literary vogue) 
in an American, not a European context. His Existential 
traits suggest comparisons with Sartre's Roquentin and Camus's 
Meursault. But even in this early work, Bellow's Jewishness 
disallows a total commitment to certain aspects of modern 
life. For example, Joseph's community consciousness and 
ii 
his awareness of a social responsibility offset and oppose 
his complete alienation. 
The Victim is closely examined in chapter two. Like 
Joseph, Asa Leventhal embodies the thinking and behaviour 
of one who inhabits a moral and spiritual wasteland, but 
this is only a partial consideration of his characterisation. 
Confronted with anti-Semitism, Leventhal begins a painful 
exploration of his identity. The moral growth which results 
suggests an interpretation of self that has more in common 
with the Jewish definition of man than that of Existentialism. 
Chapter three considers both the ideas and the 
characterisation which imbue Herzog with a vibrant force. 
Moses Herzog seems to epitomise the modern intellectual, 
suffering an emotional and intellectual breakdown, but is 
he not "cured" by administering to himself certain pragmatic 
tenets of Judaism? His moral development and his awareness 
of a spiritual dimension indicate an instinctive adherence 
to the temporal laws and the faith which governed his Jewish 
forebears. It can also be argued that his opposition to 
so many of the writers and thinkers who have influenced life 
in the twentieth century is grounded in the philosophical 
tenets of Judaism. 
Chapter four will focus on the role of Arthur Sammler 
who, in Mr Sammler's Planet, enjoys the intellectual and 
moral freedom of the enlightened liberal until Hitler brands 
him Jewish. Sammler's re-evaluation of certain aspects of 
Enlightenment thinking which have had dire social and 
political consequences encourage him to turn. towards the 
Christian mystic, Meister Eckhardt. But to transcend his 
humanity is not the final answer for Sammler. His representative 
iii 
role as survivor of the Holocaust, his feelings for Israel, 
the morality he admires (in Elya Gruner, for instance), and 
finally practises, all suggest that Sammler's answer to the 
question: "how should a good man live; what ought he to do?" 
may be expressed in the precepts of Judaism. 
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Introduction 
Bellow and the Prophets of Doom 
Writers of fiction have been taking on the role 
traditionally played by religious leaders, 
philosophers, metaphysicians. They have 
returned in deep need to the most primitive 
poetic purpose: to know; to try to know even 
when they know not; to invoke knowledge; to 
ransom the god within by peeling off their 
skin. They have been driven to asking the 
ultimate questions. And those who love fiction 
must nowadays love it partly becausf it concerns itself with final matters. 
These comments by Herbert Gold are particularly relevant 
to Saul Bellow, who voices his concern about the role of 
the novelist in the twentieth century in numerous essays 
and interviews. In "Where Do We Go From Here: The Future 
of Fiction," he states that novelists now have lithe universe 
itself to face, without the comforts of community, without 
metaphysical certainty, without the power to distinguish 
the virtuous from the wicked man, surrounded by dubious 
2
realities and discovering dubious selves." His disagreement 
with novelists such as Lawrence, Joyce, Celine, and Thomas 
Mann, who believe that a terminal point has been reached 
for humankind, is~emphatic and firmly held. 3 Interviewed 
by Gordon Harper, he asks whether lithe apocalyptic 
interpretation" is true. "The terminations did not fully 
114terminate. Civilization is still To another 
interlocutor he says that there is "a general feeling 
abroad that we cannot justify our existence. If I shared 
2 
that feeling, I shouldn't be writing novels."S 
He opposes "the intellectual vogue of 'wasteland 
ideologies, I" concerned about its pessimistic attitude 
towards life and its fect on the literary concept of 
the Self. 6 His own response to existence is hopeful and 
affirmative: "[E]ither we want life t,.o continue or we do 
not." But if we do, "we are liable to be asked how. In 
what form shall li be justified? That is the essence 
of the moral question."? This question is particularly 
relevant to the modern concept of the Self, which so often 
emphasises man's impoverished spirituality, his impotence 
and despair, while Bellow would prefer to see man "in the 
image of God, man a little lower than the angels," to 
stress his dignity and nobility.8 He agrees that 
"undeniably the human being is not what he commonly thought 
a century ago." The nineteenth-century Romantic idea of 
the Self has been annihilated by "stoicism, nihilism, 
anger, comedy, vengeful violence." But "[t]hequestion 
nevertheless remains. [Man] is something. What is he?,,9 
Bellow believes that the novel, if it is to survive 
and thrive, "requires ne~ ideas about humankind.,,10 If 
novelists have not lost faith in humankind, their writing 
is an expression of love. He affirms that if "we do care, 
if we believe in the existence of others, then what we 
write is necessary.,,11 He is confident that certain novels 
do attempt "to create scale, to order experience, to give 
value, to make perspective and to carry us towards sources 
of life, towards life-giving things.,,12 Writers who provide 
"that sense of order, those indispensable standards which 
in other ages did not originate with novelists or playwrights" 
3 
are those who uphold the moral function of art. It is 
these writers who fulfil the reading public's demand for 
"an inordinate amount of goodness," who counter the Joyces 
and Flauberts--those who "explicitly ected the moral 
purpose.,,13 That Bellow's own novels are written with 
explicit moral purpose has not gone upnoticed by numerous 
?{Qbeo-t 
critics, such as~Alter, John J. Clayton, and Irving Halperin. 14 
What Bellow is positing is a philosophical division 
between twentieth-century novelists. The writers he 
opposes belong, in the main, to what has been defined by 
Frank Kermode in The Sense of an Ending and by Zbigniew 
Lewicki in The Bang and the Whimper as the apocalyptic 
d Ot' 15t ra l lon. In his essay "The Apocalyptic Temper," 
Robert-Alter comments that "we bear with us, in ways we 
don't always realize, the spiritual freight of the past." 
He writes that the "imaginative modes" of novelists who 
write in the pre-millennialist apocalyptic tradition "are 
deeply embedded in a Christian world view, a Christian 
ethics and politics." They assume the spiritual and moral 
relevance of the New Testament Book of Revelation to the 
nightmare of twentieth-century history.16 This attitude, 
pinpointed by Alter, encourages the individual to withdraw 
completely from history, to succumb to spiritual and moral 
feteness, to entropy.17 Supposing that nothing can be 
done to avert catastrophe, people become passive about 
history and human existence. This failure to confront 
history and wrestle with its choices reduces the personae 
in apocalyptic literature to impersonal types, to hypotheses, 
whether comic-ironic (as in Thomas Pynchon's ~, John Barth's 
The Sot-weed Factor), or brutally erotic (the protagonist 
4 
in William Burroughs's The Naked Lunch}. Novelists of this 
genre, burdened with their particular "spiritual freight," 
cannot create modern heroes who are prepared to express 
individual courage, to grapple with history and challenge 
a threatening 
In contrast, low's "spiritua~ freight" is of a 
different kind. It insists that humankind confronts the 
alternatives of existence. Historically and politically, 
man is never to accept as a foregone conclusion the 
prophecies of doorn, but must strive for redemption by 
involving himself in the pursuit of justice on earth. 
The individual is to assume an active, questioning, 
decision-making stance with regard to his factual existence. 
This attitude harks back to the Old Testament prophets, 
whose task was, in Mar n Buber's words: 
• • . to confront man with the alternatives of 
decision•••• The prophetic faith involves 
the faith in the factual character of human 
existence, as existence that factually meets 
transcendence. Prophecy has in its way declared 
that the unique being, man, is created to be 
a center of surprise in creation. 18 
I thus disagree with Lesl Fiedler's argument that 
Bellow's basic spiritual and moral assumptions are grounded 
in a Christian or post-Christian tradition, as are those 
of the American-Jewish writers Nathanael West {The Day 
} and Joseph Heller ( 22).19 Instead,~~~=-~~~~ ~~~~~ 
they seem to mirror the tenets of Judaism. The "new ideas 
about humankind" are not novel as such, but rather 
explorations of an ancient idea "goodness" in a new 
environment. 
5 
Judaism versus Modernity in Bellow's Fiction 
An essentially "religious" quality in Bellow's work 
has been noted by various critics, for example John J. 
Clayton, Robert Fossum, and Keith opdahl,20 whi certain 
Jewish critics discuss the influence 9f his Jewish 
background. These include Sarah Blacher Cohen, who notes 
the depth of perspective afforded by his Yiddish wit, 
while Josephine Zadovsky Knopp stresses the importance 
of Jewish Humanism and places Judaism on trial in certain 
· 1 21o f h 1S nove s. Liela Goldman measures Bellow against 
a standard of religious orthodoxy and a traditional 
cultural background, and both Robert Alter and Daniel Fuchs 
. . ht . t h' J . h 22o ff er va1uable 1ns1g s 1n 0 1S eW1S ness. 
Alfred Kazin discusses the challenging environment 
Chicago presented to the young author, while Allan Guttmann 
stresses the "marginality," the uncertain identity of 
Bellow's role as American man-of-letters, as spokesman 
for intellectual America. (He has been labelled the 
novelist of the intellectuals by Maxwell Geismar.)23 
Earl Rovit focuses primarily on his Americanization, 
and considers him "the most significant American to come 
to maturity since World War II," while Norman Podhoretz 
illuminates his definitive portrayal of the Jew as 
American in the character of Augie March. 24 As an 
American writer, his contribution to the American novel 
has been discussed and analysed by critics too numerous 
to mention. 
Entering the critical debate, this thesis proposes 
to explore, not Bellow's Jewishness per se, nor his 
6 
Americanness, but rather, the tension that is created by 
his Jewish heritage and his confrontation with Modernity 
in America. Because of the prescribed length of this 
study, it will not be possible to examine the sociological 
and political evolution of Bellow as North American Jewish 
writer, an area which has been well .researched already 
by critics such as Leslie Fiedler and Earl Rovit. 25 My 
scope will thus be confined to a critical exploration of 
conflicting ethical and philosophical tensions, to the 
see-sawing balance between the heroes' hereditary Jewish­
ness and their acquired Western modes of thought. This 
study will not compare and contrast Bellow's thinking 
with various ideologies (as Daniel Fuchs does inter­
mittently in Vision and Revision) or trace differences 
and similarities between Judaism and other religions. 
(Josephine Knopp's introduction to The Trial of Judaism 
in contemporary Jewish Writing includes a short comparison 
with Christianity.) Its purpose, by means of a close 
critical reading of certain novels, by starting with 
textual examination and then drawing conclusions, is to 
determine the dynamic be~ween a tenuous Jewishness and 
a palpable modernity expressed through characterisation 
or action. 
Space limitations prohibit the inclusion of all 
Bellow's novels in this discussion, and I regret 
particularly the omission of The Adventures of Augie March 
and Seize the Day. Rather than to present a more 
generalised and therefore superficial criticism of Bellow's 
entire oeuvre, I have chosen to study four novels 
intensively, in order to do them justice. A chapter will 
7 
thus be devoted to each of four novels (Dangling Man, The 
Victim, Herzog, and Mr Sammler's Planet) to determine their 
balance between Judaism and Modernity. 
Bellow himself recalls "the queer hunger of immigrants 
and their immediate descendants for true Americanism," 
and how he himself planned to enter the mainstream of 
American literature in the tradition of "Sherwood Anderson, 
Theodore Dreiser, Edgar Lee Masters, and Vachel Lindsay.,,26 
Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi observes that the legacy of the 
'thirties included a "persistent liberal resistance among 
Jews and non-Jews to differentiating the Jewish experience,,,27 
while Leslie Fiedler notes that certain authors (Bellow 
among them) who were associated with magazines such as 
Partisan Review, Commentary, and Encounter felt obliged 
to maintain "the attitudes of dissent which survives the 
ideological grounds for dissent" after the general 
intellectual disillusionment with Marxism. Bellow's first 
novel, Dangling Man (1944), contains the hallmark, along 
with the virtual obliteration of a Jewish ethos, of the 
radical heritage of dissatisfaction with America. 
Bellow may reject the category of American-Jewish 
author: "I have tried to fit my soul into the Jewish­
writer category, but it does not feel comfortably 
accommodated there," but he makes it clear that it is the 
limitation of categorisation he shuns, the imposition of a 
28label, and not the Jewishness he readily acknowledges. 
(Any doubt on this score is immediately dispelled by a 
reading of To Jerusalem and.Back.) In an interview with 
D. J. R. Bruchner in 1984, he stresses the importance of 
his Jewish background to his work. He recalls reading 
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the Hebrew scriptures before he was seven, and '"I still 
do,'" he says. He talks about the "great struggle between 
the street and the home," between his orthodox religious 
family background and the chance to become an American: 
But the religious feeling was very strong in 
me when I was young and it has persisted. I 
would never describe myself as an atheist or 
agnostic; I always thought those were terms for 
a pathological state and that people who don't 
believe in God have something wrong with them. 
Just say I am a religious man in a retarded 
condition and the only way I can square myself 
is to write. 29 
Several years earlier he speaks of inheriting rich 
blood, and that much of the power of his literary imagination 
comes from the fact that "in the most susceptible time of 
my life I was wholly Jewish. That's a gift, a piece of 
good fortune with which one doesn't quarrel.,,30 
It is this "gift" that bequeaths the fundamental 
principles of morality to Bellow's novels. Yet the tenets 
of Judaism are never didactically spelt out or superimposed 
on the structure of his work. His characters, seldom 
overtly Jewish, scarcely. seem aware of Jewish law, and 
search for "axial lines," for answers to their ontological 
questions ("[h]ow should a good man live; what ought he 
to do?" "Man has a nature, but what is it?,,)31 They 
explore a variety of available alternatives: Communism 
(Joseph); Existentialism (Joseph and Asa Leventhal); 
Materialism (Tommy Wilhelm, Henderson); the life of the 
mind (Herzog, Mr Sammler); ~nly to reject them. Their 
dissatisfaction with these "truths" offered by the "real" 
world leads them to a tentative exploration of inner values; 
9 
to affirm, some hesitantly and unknowingly (Asa Leventhal), 
others more confidently (Moses Herzog, Mr Sammler, Albert 
Corde) the value of certain ethical or even spiritual 
options. 
The options they explore are by no means restric 
to Judaism. Unquestionably, they could fall within the 
perimeters of certain Islamic, Christian, or Humanist ideals. 
(A clear indication that Bellow does not limit the scope 
of his heroes to explore Jewish avenues only is evident 
in ~M~r~~~~~~~~~~, in Arthur Samm 's enthusiasms 
for the Christian theologian, Meister Eckhardt, and the 
alternative of Eastern religions suggested by the Indian 
Govinda Lal, whi in Humboldt's Gift, Charlie Citrine 
admires the ideas of Rudolf Steiner.) But perhaps the 
definition of Bellow as a Jewish writer rests, finally, 
not on the obvious surface of Jewish li (the use of Jewish 
characters, the recreation of immigrant childhood 
experience such as Aug March's in The Adventure of Augie 
March and Moses Herzog's in the inclusion of Hebrew 
words or Yiddishisms), but on certain ontological precepts 
and ethical concerns which may be discerned in various 
novels. 
Parallels may be drawn between Bellow's posing of 
a variety of philosophical questions through character 
and situation and the thinking of certain contemporary 
American-Jewish theologians. For example, Will Herberg, 
a Jewish Existentialist (and former communist), considers 
the plight of modern man and the failure of his 
"'substitute faiths. III He concludes that only a "leap 
of ith" (the leap that Joseph refuses to make in Dangling 
1 0 

Man and Herzog is surprised to find he has made} can restore 
man to God. In contrast, Abraham Heschel stresses "a leap 
of action," the performing of mitzvot, good deeds, as the 
important link with God. (In The Victim, Asa Leventhal 
is forced to adopt this approach.) Jewish Existentialists 
such as Emil Fackenheim and Jacob Petuchowski all define 
authentic existence as the life lived according to the 
covenant as it is described in biblical and rabbinic Judaism, 
and Bellow's characters measure their shortcomings by an 
identical code, as this study will attempt to indicate. 32 
In Dangling Man, for example, Joseph experiences an 
Existential emptiness, a loneliness and almost complete 
alienation, but persists in seeking the answers to his 
ontological questioning in the empirical world, not in 
a relationship with God; in rational speculation, not in 
the faith of his forefathers. Asa Leventhal in The Victim 
finds that a blind obedience to certain ideas of 
responsibility and obligation accords to him a dignity, 
hitherto unknown, and a self-respect which disperses the 
angst and rootlessness of his alienated self. The novel 
ends with a tentative qU!2stioning of "who runs things," 
with a metaphysical enquiry which is explored more fully 
in Herzog and in Mr Sammler's Planet. In both these novels, 
ith in God is unquestioned. Herzog's belief becomes 
important both tu his philosophical idea of man and to 
his own definition of self, while Sammler's "God 
adumbrations" begin, paradoxically, for the unbeliever 
while is suffering persecution, and continue as his 
main preoccupation afterwards. 
Bellow thus depicts man as lonely, a stranger in his 
11 
society, searching for a way to live in the modern world. 
Alienated from their inmost selves, the heroes strive, 
consciously or unconsciously, to end this alienation, to 
make whole the fragmented image of man by uniting the 
functional and metaphysical aspects. In order to do so, 
they investigate the consequences of possessing a conscience, 
and perhaps even a soul (l1[t]errible handicap, a soul").33 
Whether or not they succeed will be discussed in the 
forthcoming chapters. 
Two Philosophical Ideas of Man 
The novels suggest that in his characterisation Bellow 
considers two alternative ideas of man: the Jewish ideal 
of his religious background, or the Humanist conception 
of his secular education. The latter "denotes the elevation 
and setting up of man in the centre of the universe" and 
the simultaneous inclusion of "a diametrically opposite 
principle, that of man's abasement, of the exhaustion of 
his creative powers and of his general enfeeblement.,,34 
Initially Humanism exalt~d man and imbued him with confidence 
in his apparently boundless possibilities, but this 
spiritual liberation ultimately leads to his debasement. 
Robbed of his spirituality, man shares nature's defects 
(the theory of the Decay of Nature), or if he is still 
Christian-orientated, his concept of man includes the Fall 
of Man, but is bereft of the idea of salvation. 35 
Humanism plays down the idea of an almighty being, 
while in contrast, Judaism stresses faith in the One and 
Only God: "Hear 0 Israel! The Lord our God, the Lord is 
1 2 

One" (Deuteronomy 6.4). It pledges allegiance to the 
covenant, to a commitment to morality in everyday life 
as laid down in the Torah. It upholds the belief that 
man is made "in the image of God" (Genesis 5.1), that there 
is no original sin (in stark contrast to the firmly held 
Protestant affirmation thereof), that "(even] as the soul 
is pure when entering upon its earthly career, so can man 
return it pure to his Maker.,,36 Judaism maintains that 
free will is the assurance that man is the reflection of 
God, that independent choice is an exercise of conscience 
expressing an inner allegiance. 37 
May the Jewish idea of man, for which the above 
precepts are essential, be taken as the prototype for 
Bellow's characters? But what of the tension in his 
characterisation? Is it not caused by the conflicting 
modern philosophies or behaviour patterns explored by his 
heroes? In his first novel, Dangling Man (1944), for 
example, the balance is heavily in favour of the latter, 
and the author's Jewish heritage almost invisible. In 
The Victim (1947), the dynamic between two hostile ethical 
codes is evident. Here Bellow combines a Jewish intensity 
with a then prevalent European literary tendency, namely, 
the presentation of the alienated man. Thus he suggests 
the precarious marginality of the newly assimilated Jew, 
balanced between a traditional, ethical, spelt out code 
of behaviour and the vistas of modern liberated thought. 38 
He explores the relationship between Semite and anti 
Semite and the myth of the ·Jew which, in its terrible 
exploitation, served in Europe as ideological justification 
for a people's virtual extermination. The portrait of 
1 3 

Asa, a Jew, is at the same time that of an alienated 
individual, who finally destroys the anguish nurtured by 
an awareness of non-being by his assumption of responsibility 
for his fellow man (for Allbee, for his brother's family), 
and for himself, by discovering the value of certain 
Jewish ethical precepts. 
Harold Fisch notes that in Herzog (1964), Bellow 
presents "a particularization of Jewish experience in the 
mid-century. 1139 He observes that, paradoxically, the more 
Herzog faces up to his Jewish identity, the more "he seems 
to function as an image of a collective crisis," as the 
Jew as symptomatic of a general alienation. This may be 
so, but is it not Herzog's fundamental Jewishness that 
prompts his disagreement with lithe prophets of doom" who 
espouse wasteland ideologies, that forbids instinctively 
an alliance with the "reality instructors," those experts 
on survival tactics in modern America? Is the precarious 
hope held out at the end of the novel not based on an 
affirmation of Jewish values? This question will be 
considered in due course, as an integral part of the 
present study. To trace the failure of Herzog's public 
life and the private, painful growth of an ethical awareness 
is to disentangle his inherited philosophical precepts 
from certain concepts of Modernity. 
In Mr Sammler's Planet (1969), tension is implicit 
in the hero's dual roles of Holocaust survivor (he is 
branded "Jew" by the Nazis) and of erstwhi upholder of 
Enlightenment thinking. I ~ill endeavour to illuminate 
which set of ethics finally allows Sammler to face the 
future without despair. This novel marks Bellow's moving 
1 4 

beyond the American-Jewish experience to confront the most 
traumatic European-Jewish occurrence in Jewish history 
(the Holocaust) through his survivor-protagonist, Arthur 
Sammler. In addition, by resettling Sammler in New York, 
Bellow allows a fresh perspective, as it were, on the 
Jewish-American assimilation in the 'sixties. Sammler's 
judgement of the American life-style will not be considered 
from a sociological and political point of view, already 
discussed by numerous critics, but will offer a 
philosophical assessment of what Sammler considers the 
irresponsibility engendered by certain liberal ideals. 
The breadth of his philosophical perspectives, when 
compared to Joseph's, indicates to the reader the widening 
horizons of what are perhaps Bellow's own philosophical 
preoccupations. This study hopes to highlight this 
development, which is expressed through characterisation. 
Chapter One 
Dangling Man 
'''How should a good man live; what ought he to do?",1 
Introduction 
In order to enter the mainstream of American literature, 
Saul Bellow, the child of Jewish immigrants who grew up 
in the slums of Montreal and Chicago, had to establish 
his credentials with the WASP establishment. He writes 
that during the nineteen-thirties he "thought of himself 
as a midwesterner and not as a Jew.,,2 His first two novels, 
Dangling Man and The Victim, fill what he calls the "formal 
, t"SOlSh' apprent'lcesh' novels mayrequlremen f lp. 3 Both 
be placed in the contemporary tradition of alienated 
writing, the tradition he was later to decry in a Library 
of Congress Lecture in January, 1963: 
Writers have inherited a tone bitterness from 
the great poems and novels of this century, many 
of which lament the passing of a more stable 
and beautiful age demolished by the barbarous 
intrusion of an industrial and metropolitan 
society•••• There are modern novelists who 
take all of this for granted as lly proven 
and implicit in the human condition ... viewing 
modern life with a bitterness to which they them­
selves have not established clear title, and 
it is this unearned bitterness that I speak of. 
What is truly curious about it is that often 
the writer automqtically scorns contemporary 
life, He bottles its stinks artisticall¥, But, 
seemingly, he does not need to study it. 
16 
Yet a similar "bitterness" and "scornl1 for modern life 
are evident in Bellow's first novel, about which Paul Levine 
observes that: 
In its style, philosophical content, and 
hypothetical nature, Dangling Man stands in a 
unique place in our contemporary literature, 
more closely resembling a novel by Albert Camus 5 
than one by any American novelist writing today. 
Its self conscious literary quality is discussed by Robert 
Alter in After the Tradition, a quality that is not found 
in the later novels. 6 
Leslie Fiedler thinks Bellow's main protagonists 
represent the assimilated Jew who is "'in the process of 
being mythicized into the representative American,'" who 
is lI'living the essential American experience, which is 
urban, lonely, European orientated, and disenchanted with 
communism. ,,,7 It is significant that very little is told 
of Joseph's past. In later novels such as The Adventures 
of Augie March and Herzog, Bellow's own Jewish experiences 
permeate his characters' childhood or youth in a way 
eschewed by Dangling Man. Joseph and his circle are 
presented primarily as worldly intellectuals who share 
the scholarly preoccupations of their times, not as insular 
Jews. No Yiddish expressions or turns speech, no 
references to an orthodox or traditional background 
distinguish them from their gentile counterparts. 
Yet Robert Alter stresses that both Dangling Man and 
The Victim "are quite distinct both in their tone and 
intellectural purview from that fashionable literature 
of alienation" with which they are frequently linked. 8 
17 
In what way does Bellow therefore undermine the tradition 
to which he seems to be adhering? The moral tone of Dangling 
Man presupposes the Hebrew saying: Adam karov etzel atzmo, 
man is closest to himself. 9 Joseph has to explore his inner 
resources, his rationalizations about how to live, the 
importance of a shared emotional life, in order to determine 
why he suffers from "humanititis" ("when the human condition 
is suddenly too much for you").10 
His self-analysis confirms the right of the individual 
to eXist, but his existence is only validated in communal 
living. This negates the irremediable separation of the 
alienated man from the community, his isolation among men. 
Joseph's (theoretical) morality, whether Bellow was 
consciously aware of this or not, is fundamentally Jewish. 
To find fulfilment, not individually but communally. is 
ultimately life-affirming and optimistic. It overcomes 
the nihilistic pessimism of the truly alienated (such 
as Sartre's Roquentin) which leads logically to despair 
and death. Joseph also understands the importance of 
feelings of the heart (although his actions often suggest 
the contrary). Unlike certain contemporary rationalists 
and scientists, he acknowledges the limits of reason. 
Man cannot be defined by intellect alone. To neglect 
emotion, heart and ultimately spiri~ is to mutilate the 
Jewish concept of man. 
The Enlightenment Discredited 
Dangling Man is the fictitious journal of a Canadian 
alien living in Chicago and awaiting his draft call. The 
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entries stretch from December 15, 1942, till April 9, 1943, 
yet little mention is made of the events of World War II 
of which Joseph, intelligent, socially aware, avidly 
interested in newspapers, must have been informed. But 
an acute consciousness of the war seeps through the journal, 
like gas. The icy winter, with its "general malignancy" 
(p. 147), suggests a sympathy between the elements and 
the moral and spiritual climate of the times. But Joseph, 
in his idealism, would like to believe that the beauty of 
the winter, "the trees, like instruments, opened all their 
sounds into the wind," is suited to "a world without deformity 
or threat of damage" (pp. 118 19). 
The entrepreneurial climate the war creates in Chicago 
encourages an avaricious self-interest expressed in the 
war profiteering of Mr. Almstadt and Mr. Fanzel and a 
determination to make the war serve individual career 
interests, as the rise of Myron Adler and the careers of 
Joseph's old friends Jack Brill, Robbie Stillman, and the 
Farsons prove. But Joseph refuses to further any ambition 
by "climbing upon the backs of the dead, so to speak" (p. 64). 
As "a moral casualty of the war" (p. 18), his "relative 
purity," his grand ideals for perfection on earth for 
himself and his fellow man, may be seen to be irrevocably 
"polluted" (p. 15) by news from war torn Europe. May the 
reader not presume that the inherent evil of National 
Socialism, as it spread victoriously through Europe, would 
surely poison the existence of a one time Humanist? Hitler's 
triumphs would negate what,. as an emancipated Jew, a child 
of the Enlightenment, Joseph has hitherto accepted as the 
foundation of all his plans: the intrinsic goodness and 
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dignity of people and their compassionate responsibility 
for others. Hitler's self aggrandisement and self 
idolization exemplify the perversion of human greatness 
promised by the Enlightenment, the full horror of man freed 
from the moral restrictions of an all-observant God. Germany 
under the Fuhrer is without the restr~ints of conscience. 
The brutal behaviour of the Nazis, the inability of almost 
all the victims to do more than suffer, the silent acquiescence 
of so many to the horror and atrocity -all are proof of 
the dehumanization of man. Joseph's personal cry of 
betrayal: 
Was anyone immune al together? In times like these? 
There were so many treasons; they were a medium, 
like air, like water; they passed in and out 
of you, they made themselves your accomplices; 
nothing was impenetrable to them (p. 56) 
could perhaps be interpreted, with hindsight, as a premonition 
of evil caused by the spreading European horror. 
The pessimism which pervades his journal--whether 
its origin be internal or caused by external events -speaks 
poignantly of the disillusionment of a naive Humanist, 
aware of the collapse of his belief in the greatness of 
man. The diary can thus be read as a spiritual preparation 
for his entering the war and an intellectual reconsideration 
of the recourses now open to the sensitive individual who 
retains, despite overwhelming odds, the bias of a liberal 
Humanist. 
Although Joseph concentrates solely on the self, Bellow 
makes it clear that he is a victim of disillusionment, 
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of history, along with countless others. His journal voices 
a private anguish which speaks simultaneously for his 
generation. His December 17 entry links him with "my 
generation, my society, my world." All are "figures in 
the same plot, eternally fixed together" (p. 25). If this 
is a "condemned" age (p. 25), the suffering is universal. 
Identifying with the "many people, hundreds of thousands, 
who have given up all thought of future" (p. 65), Joseph 
cannot plan one for himself. The microcosm his world 
reflects the influence of the macrocosm: "One was constantly 
threatened, shouldered, and, sometimes invaded by 'nasty, 
brutish, and short '" (p. 56). 
At the same time Joseph's diary may be read, with 
hindsight, as a record of an assimilated American Jew, 
who, although physically untouched by the Holocaust, cannot 
fail to register the demise of the rights of race and 
religion in Europe. Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi mentions the 
sense of diffidence, of vulnerability, of the Jewish-American 
authors in the nineteen forties, as well as their 
unwillingness, at this stage, to differentiate the Jewish 
. 1 1 
experlence. But by naming his hero "Joseph" and \'lith 
holding any surname, Bellow could be suggesting that the 
vestiges of a Jewish identity still cling to him. Like 
his Old Testament namesake- nothing suggests the New 
Testament Joseph he is also a dreamer, an idealist. The 
Jewish tradition of dreamers is remarked on by Leslie 
Fiedler, who points out that in the Sixth Satire of Juvenal, 
it is taken for granted that dreams can be bought for very 
little "'[fJrom the Jews. 11,12 Joseph, with his "ideal 
constructions," his yearnings for a perfect society, 
21 
continues this ancient tradition. 
His journal records a metamorphosis from the "old 
Joseph" to a maturer cynic who, in the December 18 entry 
and elsewhere, describes the self he has outgrown. 
December 18 entry is the only one written in the third 
person, which indicates the maturer Joseph is attempting 
an objective self-appraisal. The tone, often cynical, 
ironically condescending, suggests the distance between 
the writer and his former self: II V e r y little about 
Joseph of a year ago pleases me. I cannot help laughing 
at him, at some of his traits and sayings" (p. 26). 
The "old Joseph" has much in common with the liberated 
Jewish intel 1 who, free of the restrictions of the 
European ghetto, could explore alternate (secular) 
philosophies. He has considered himself a scholar, and 
surrounded himself with books, those "guarantors of an 
extended life" (p. 10), which suggests a superior 
alternative to his routine existence. Now Joseph is unable 
to read. He resembles Mr Sammler in a later novel, whose 
war experiences make him suspect his enlightened reading 
was comprised of "the wr~:mg books, the wrong papers.,,13 
Jo contemplates the failure of his own "ideal construc­
tions" (p. 140) along with the utopias of fiction. His 
planned biographical series on the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment has exchanged his private auto­
biographical writings. 
The Joseph of year before supported Humanism, an 
aspect of Enlightenment thinking which upholds the universal 
goodness and compassion of man and ith in his reasonable­
ness. It involves a principle of universalism in which 
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Jewishness merges into anonymity, providing a favourable 
climate for assimilation. Its apparent extension of the 
basic principles Judaism made it doubly attractive to 
Jewish intellectuals. Joseph lieved resolutely that 
the inner life of man was more than its outward expression 
in terms of city structures (pp. 24-25) and sought evidence 
to deny the damning analogue of city and citizens. But 
now, for Joseph, the idea of community is breaking down.,,14II 
His disillusionment is paired with the idea the 
dehumanisation of man, of "the lack of the human in the 
too-human" (p. 153) which he observes in the cities, and 
which undermines the fundamentals of both Humanism and 
Judaism. 
A major difference between Enlightenment thinking 
and Judaism is, in the Enlightenment view, that man's 
greatness is of his own, not of God's making. Joseph has 
enthusiastically supported this idea, confident of man's 
infinite potential for self-realization, stressing 
individuality, like the Romantics he admired and studied. 
Severely disillusioned, he now contemplates the success 
of the "Sense of Personal Destiny" (p. 88) unbounded by 
conscience, unaccountable to any divinity. It allows self 
idolatry, which results in a compulsive power- and position 
seeking Joseph finds abhorrent. "In his incredible arrogance, 
[man] imagined himself entirely sufficient unto himself," 1 5 
but the sequel is self violation and hatred of ot s. 
The old Joseph constructed blueprints for behaviour 
that failed "to take into a,ccount all that was natural, 
including corruptness" (p. 40). He theorised about evil 
easily enough, rationalising away his childhood r of 
23 
his own "rottenness" as Romantic, as "just the general, 
poor, human devil" (p. 77). He argued intelligently that: 
There might be some justice in view that 
man was born the slayer of his father and of 
his brother, full of instinctive bloody rages 
• an animal who had to be tamed (p. 39)) 
but found no such instinct in himself. The changed Joseph, 
aware of his own imperfections, is scathing about this 
former innocence. He counts himself as one of the masses, 
one who ha& grown accustomed to evil and who is seemingly 
indifferent to murder and massacre: 
We do not flinch at seeing all these lives struck 
out; nor would those who were killed have suffered 
any more for us, if we, not they, had been the 
victims. I do not like to think what we are 
governed by. I do not like to think about it•... 
Its kindest revelation is that our senses and 
our imaginations are somehow incompetent (p. 83). 
This attitude ultimately confirms the nullity of the 
individual, his spiritual demise. It allows the validi 
of individual destiny to be questioned, ringing a th 
knell for the values of the Enlightenment, burying the 
concepts of man's innate goodness and humanity, his noble 
individual dignity, his belief in the sacred quality of 
life. But Joseph does not fall prey to this thinking. 
A more experienced person, he now tests his own 
"senses and imagination." They are acutely competent to 
ster the dehumanisation of man. He preserves himself 
from becoming "one of shoal, driven towards the weirs" 
(p. 119), from spiritual or physical suicide, by retaining 
the touchstone of the subjective self. He ores a 
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private inner territory, loaded not with mines but the 
hidden "craters of the spirit" (p. 66). with passionate 
intensity or despair, with curiosity and criticism, Joseph's 
journal records his search for selfhood, a direct challenge 
to those whose spiritual bookkeeping is done as 
imperturbably as if they "were examining [their] fingernails" 
(p. 119). Like the Romantics he no longer reads (though 
he refers to Baudelaire [po 123]), he retains the notion 
of the importance of individuality, fearing the consequences 
of the "era of hardboiled-dom. . the code of the athlete, 
of the tough boy" (p. 9), the Hemingway tradition of 
emotional reticence which results in indifference to the 
plight of others and an insensitivity towards the self. 
The very tone of the journal, spontaneous, eloquent, honest, 
resists the understated style of Hemingway. Comparing 
the Hemingway and the Bellovian hero, Jeanne Braham observes 
that the former 
substitutes rituals for the free play of thought, 
since thought may paralyse men momentarily in 
a world where agility is all that counts. In 
sharp contrast, thought for the Bellow hero is 
all there is. Actions are thought in motion; 
values, judgements and decisions surface as the 
result of the continuous, often compulsive, 
examination of interior life."16 
Preoccupied with the "inner life," Joseph, like many 
twentieth-century thinkers who are concerned with providing 
purposeful value structures and systems with a rational, 
not a religious foundation, has tried to live according 
to a privately constructed moral plan which bypasses the 
idea of God. He cultivates the "cut flowers" of freedom, 
justice, brotherhood and personal dignity which flourish 
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in a Humanistic secular society, severed from their original 
1 , , t 17re 19lOUS roo s. He relies on reason, on planning a 
rational existence for himself and his circle. Included 
in his general scheme was Etta, his niece, who was to be 
"saved" from the trivial values of materialism and converted 
to those of her uncle (po 61). More important was the 
"colony of the rit" he devised for his friends, which 
forbade "spite, bloodiness and cruelty" (p. 39), and 
epitomises an 1 value structure. His earlier political 
choice, Communism, seemed to offer an absolutist faith, 
to imbue life with meaning and sustain its values by the 
force of the Dialectic. 
Joseph's interest in Communism places him in an 
intellectual climate favoured by many fellow intellectuals, 
including Jewish ones, at the time. Fiedler observes that 
during the nineteen-thirties, many Jews could "identify 
themselves with America" and at the same time, " st 
against certain aspects of its life" through Communism, 
while the Party offered a haven for all intellectuals 
' t d f ' . t 18a I lena e rom Amerlcan SOCle y. But Joseph's disillusion­
ment with Marx's idea of society perfecting itself on a 
grand scale seems based on a conflicting idea of freedom. 
Joseph, echoing here the responsible individual choice 
propounded by Judaism, the freedom of conscience and inner 
allegiance, insists on the freedom of the individual to 
make his own decisions. As the cameo of Jimmy Burns 
suggests, blind obedience to the party diminishes rather 
than enhances the humanity.of people. Like other 
disillusioned radical Jews, he condemns a political system 
which purports to serve the e, while in fact "any 
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hospital nurse did more with one bedpan for le genre humain 
than they did with their entire organisation" (p. 34). 
(There is no mention in the novel of the Soviet-Nazi pact, 
which caused so many Communists to leave the party.) 
All Joseph's plans have distorted reality; all avoided 
his suppressed knowledge of the true nature of man, acquired 
during his childhood on St. Dominique street. Only here, 
Joseph confesses, was he "ever allowed to encounter reality" 
(p. 86). His childhood reveries juxtapose a remembered 
epiphany of security and serenity while shining the family's 
shoes in the context of violence and horrific images: a 
cripple taunting his brother, beggars with deformities 
and sores, sexual scenes. Joseph knows that reality is 
composed of both peace and cruelty, of goodness and 
viciousness, yet unconsciously chooses to block out this 
knowledge, "to be untrue to himself," to "see things as 
[he wished] to see them, or, for the sake of [his] plans, 
'must' see them" (p. 39). 
Because they are based on a distortion which ignores 
the lesson of Adam's sin, the polarity at the heart of 
man's moral nature, Joseph's pr i va te, social and pol i tical 
blueprints for a perfect existence fail. His wife asserts 
her independence against his model of "Burckhardt's great 
ladies of the Renaissance and the no less profound Augustan 
women" (p. 98). The argument on Christmas Eve confirms 
the enmity between uncle and niece. In particular, his 
social illusion of a harmonious group free of spite and 
evil is shattered at the Servatius party, where Abt's 
savage instinct to hurt Minna and the tacit consent of 
the clique to his cruelty mock Joseph's idea of an ideal 
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colony. 
The party marks Joseph's recognition of a hidden inner 
brutality in people he thought free of its taint. It 
indicates an enjoyment of malice, a malevolence where it 
was least expected, and suggests that he himself is not 
immune to evil. It of s actual proof of an aspect of 
people he has chosen to disregard, thus shattering his 
theories of human perfection. It is the principal reason 
for the change in his personality and thinking. 
Perhaps the Servatius party can also be seen as a 
vignette portraying atti prevalent in the outside 
world: the sadism of the powerful, the suf ing of the 
humiliated, an "object" which "could not resist" (p. 57), 
the indifferent observation of the bystanders. Joseph 
sees Minna, the victim, as representative "a more 
generalized human being--and a sad one, at that" (p. 52). 
His response has Humanist as well as Jewish overtones, 
an empathic reaction to cruelty and a desire to stop it: 
"'Bring her out of it, Morris, we've all had enough'" (p. 53). 
The old Joseph's plans were hypotheses based on 
theoretical reasoning rather than on experience and the 
objective assessment of human nature. Their practical 
lure forces him to acknowl the impossibility of 
flawless individuals and the futility of social or political 
utopias. He admits his error, the exclusion of the human 
propensity for evil, yet is unable to forego the importance 
of reason when contemplating the human situation. "1you 
always have reasons, and with principles. Capital P
-' 
'" 
says 	Iva (p. 177). 
His dual emphasis on reason (despite its proved 
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shortcomings) and a principled Ii , one based on a value 
system that is partial and relative, not prescribed by 
any religion; his image of man as a rational one; his 
ignoring of the spiritual qualities in man; all could 
indubitably be part of the thinking of any atheist or 
agnostic severed from a variety of religious roots. But 
recalling Alter's Jewish "intellectual purview" of the 
novel, can one not regard Joseph as the prototype of the 
modern, fully assimilated, intellectually orientated Jew 
in fiction? He is almost totally free of any hint of his 
creator's Jewish background, almost suspiciously so. 
There is no hint of Jewish culture or religion in the 
journal. Yet, as so many other Jews, Communism first 
attracts, then repels Joseph. Materialism (never highly 
regarded by Judaism) of s him no alternative. A typical 
child of the twentieth century, he understands and accepts 
the consequences of basing his behaviour on a private 
standard. For example, his principles impair the progress 
a worldly career, as his friend Myron Adler, "realist 
that he is" (p. 37), is quick to understand. They prevent 
the acceptance of money from family and friends; they prompt 
refusal of "good" jobs. They result in a standard 
living which Joseph may liken to that of the early 
ascetics he once studied, but which his former friends 
find squalid. 
Because Joseph cannot compromise his integrity by 
joining the pragmatists or materialists who exploit the 
war situation, is he not forced towards another branch 
of Humanism, Existentialism? Its insistence on the negative 
aspects of existence, on the instability and risk of all 
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human reality is relevant in a period threatened alternately 
by spiritual and material destruction. The dynamics and 
change in Joseph's thinking and behaviour support this 
contention. His philosophical enquiry no longer seeks 
to determine how he may best serve humanity; rather, it 
narrows to exclude all but sole self. A t~dium vitae 
includes humiliation and suffering, while the struggle 
and guil t involved in limited personal choice and the dread 
of death become his preoccupations. Identifying in others 
of his generation a similar "fundamental discontent" (p. 47), 
he finds its expression in Abt's malice towards Minna, 
while Jeff Forman, understanding that "some ways in which 
to be human was to be unutterably dismal" (p. 83), seeks 
to escape this knowledge in a pursuit of danger and 
excitement which ultimately kills him. Joseph chooses 
neither sadism nor adventure, but passive introspection. 
Joseph as Existentialist 
Existence becomes "a narcotic dullness" (p. 18) for 
Joseph. He pictures him~elf alternately as "dangling" 
in a metaphysical void while suspended between army and 
civilian life, or overcome by inertia and boredom, growing 
"rooted to [his] chair" (p. 13). He sees existence 
exclusively as particular and individual, not as communal, 
or as a manifestation of an absolute. "'With whom can 
I start but myself?'" he asks (p. 166), echoing the 
Existentialist precept that- human existence projects itself 
with absolute freedom, and poses itself as a problem. He 
affirms that the self is the only thing that can be known 
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and verified, and attempts to establish a relationship 
to his own ing, an understanding of it, a doctrine of 
individual existence free of any relation to a universal 
power. By becoming lithe earnest huntsman of myself" in 
order to "know what I myself am" (p. 119), Joseph seeks 
to become a "whole" man (p. 67).19 
To achieve this, he confers on himself the position 
of outsider and alien. Extracting himself from the 
mindlessness of lemming-like existence, seeks social 
isolation, particularly after the Servatius party. He 
encourages social ostracism and suffers the neglect of 
his friends and estrangement from his wi Churlish about 
invitations from relatives because they pity his poverty, 
he also accelerates the disintegration of social norms 
by showing rudeness towards Adler (p. 156), Iva (pp. 176-77), 
and Sam Pearson, Iva's cousin (p. 108). Overt aggression 
in the fight with Mr. Gesell (pp. 142 46) and the fracas 
with Vanaker and Captain Briggs (pp. 178-82) confirms his 
ling that he is "a sort of human grenade whose pin has 
been withdrawn" (p. 147). He finds no acceptable outlets 
for the stored "bitterness and spite which eat like acids" 
(p. 12) while he is locked in his anarchistic self. 
Joseph loses all sense of relationship, not only with 
society, but with tangible reality because of his insistence 
on the importance of subj ective experience over obj ecti ve 
knowledge. Thus he can reverse the summer and make himself 
"shiver in the heat" (p. 13). Social isolation is 
accompanied by a complementary cultural estrangement which 
may be ascribed to his itage of an attitude of discernment 
discussed earlier. Joseph rejects the accepted norms of 
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his soc , the values materialism and its twin form 
of avidity, the limitless reaching for recognition, the 
need "of ing consequential" (p. 86) accepted by his 
brother Amos and his friends Abt and Adler. His maverick 
opposition to accredited social ambition also suggests 
a normlessness, although he fails to find an appropriate 
cultural alternative. 
Most frightening is his experience of self estrangement, 
the yawning emptiness of facing an existence in which he 
is no longer in touch with himself. A. J. Heschel coments: 
If the ultimate is being, the human living 
has nothing to relate himself to as living. He 
can only relate himself to nothing. What surrounds 
him is a void where all life is left behind, 
where values and thoughts are devoid of all 
relevance and reference. Facing being as ing, 
man 'discovers himself confronted by the Nothing­
ness, the possible impossibility of his existence. 120 
Having rejected the "old Joseph" whose existence is ined 
by an accepted social position, who believes in society 
and wishes to reform its values, does the new have an 
identity? Searching for a consistent, unified self, he 
finds only its absence. The insignificance of the self 
is mocked, he thinks, in his contacts with people: the 
maid Marie is impertinent; she smokes fiantly in his 
presence. A chicken feather he finds floating in his orange 
juice ~s a sign of his mother-in-Iaw's contempt for his 
inactivity. Vanaker, a fellow lodger, taunts him, a 
nonentity, by stealing small items and with annoying 
personal habits. 
Joseph identifies as a "sort of social activity" (p. 16) 
odd actions which insist on the recognition of their 
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instigators. Vanaker, who coughs or ils to shut the 
lavatory door, the old man whose door was always ajar, 
and another who frequently left the tap running in his 
previous lodgings are all seeking attention. These actions 
are the result of normlessness, the expectation that only 
unapproved behaviour may bring about desired results. 
Joseph demands recognition of his identity through 
similar actions. In order to become "real," to escape 
"non-existence," he seeks confrontation. He insists that 
Jimmy Burns acknowledge his presence, although he knows 
that the rules of Communist Party forbid Burns to talk 
to "renegades" (p. 32). He is abusive towards Mr. Frink, 
the vice president of the bank who, dubious of Joseph1s 
credentials and identity, refuses to cash Iva1s cheque. 
His anti-social behaviour is his personal appeal for active 
recognition, or perhaps, his eagerness" consequences" 
(p. 82). Later he writes that we attack our enemies "from 
confused motives of love and loneliness .. . But for 
the most part, loneliness" (p. 147). 
These aspects of the self suggest a similarity to 
the alienated figures in fiction created by the French 
Existentialists, Sartre and Camus. (Dangling Man was 
originally published in 1944, six years after Sartre1s 
"La Nausee", 1938, and two years after Camus1s "L1:t:tranger", 
1942.) Certain critics support the view that Bellow1s 
fiction exhibits Existentialist tendencies, for example 
Tony Tanner, Howard Harper, and Ralph Freedman, while 
others such as Helen Weinberg regard him as anti­
21Existentialist. Ada Aharoni, in "Bellow and Existentialism," 
22gives a fuller discussion of this debate. Critical 
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opinion seems inconclusive as to whether or not Bellow 
has been directly influenced by French Existentialism. 
Talking general about the influence of Existentialism, 
particularly Sartre's, on the American consciousness, 
Hayden Carruth posits the view that its impact was not 
on philosophical, "'but also and mo!'e fundamentally a 
shift in ordinary human attitudes that has altered every 
aspect of li ln our C1Vl lzat' h'le lChar L h , , '1' lon, ,,,23 w 1 R' d e an 
observes that: 
The influence of Continental fiction on Bellow 
. is most remote, and it would indeed 
difficult to prove that [he has] written conscious 
existential fiction. The problem is more one 
of affinity of mind or spirit. . The new 
American hero is similar to the French existential 
hero because he shares a common world and a 
similar world view. 24 
He then goes on to draw distinct parallels between Bellow's 
heroes and those of Sartre and Camus. 
Whether the influence of Existentialism on Bellow 
s been direct or filtered, Joseph's struggle with the 
meaning of identity, his search fulfilment, his pre 
occupation with limitless freedom, and his formulation 
of values in an ethical vacuum where God is not acknowledged, 
all suggest certain similarities with the Existentialist 
heroes of French fiction, Sartre's Roquentin (Nausea) or 
Camus's Meursault (The Outsider). 
Like certain of Camus's heroes (for example, Dr. 
Bernard Rieux in The Plague), Joseph, "without negating 
it, does nothing for the eternal. He prefers his courage 
and his reasoning,,,25 as his thinking while he listens 
to a Haydn divertimento indicates (pp. 67-68). On the 
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one hand, he tries to consider existence as gratuitous, 
to trust only empirical evidence, to seek identity 
exclusively in man's appearance in the world, in those 
conditioning factors Sartre calls "facticity": "No, not 
God or any divinity. That was anterior, not of my own 
ing" (p. 68), yet he does not deny the existence of 
God. He also evades the question of the mystery of being, 
which "makes even more for uneasiness" (p. 30). By 
excluding any relation between Man and God (in religious 
terms) or between Man and the Absolute (in philosophical 
terms), he confirms what Martin Buber calls an acknowledgement 
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of the radical separation between the and the profane. 
Instead, a sense of radical contingency conveys the absurd. 
With heightened consciousness he adopts the 
anthropocentric stand that all promise of value rests in 
life itself, but is then confronted with the meaninglessness 
of the universe. "To be pushed upon oneself entirely put 
the very facts of simple existence in doubt" (pp. 190-91). 
Having recognised this, can Joseph confront the absurd? 
This alone will establish his integrity in Existentialist 
terms as the tensions an~ conflicts of the absurd itself 
comprise a source of meaning. The conflict must be 
experienced, because it alone may be able to free him. 
If this be possible, Joseph will assume heroic proportions, 
affirming his humanity through the absurd. 
Joseph also has much in common with Roquentin, the 
minor clerk in Sartre's Nausea. He, too, keeps a journal, 
prompted by changed circum&tances. Both respond to physical 
stimuli; both are empiricists. Neither has a fulfilling 
sexual relationship. Roquentin occasionally makes love 
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to Francoise, the cafe owner; Joseph documents the barren 
~ 
relationship with his wife: "We no longer confide in each 
other" (p. 12). His affair with Kitty is short lived. 
Both Joseph and Roquentin suffer anxiety, boredom, weariness, 
a disgust for life. Neither can sustain his study of past 
philosophers, unimportant to his consuming interest, the 
self. Their daily lives have purposelessness in common, 
though Joseph has created a routine of sorts, eating, 
reading the papers, listening to the radio or aim ssly 
walking about. 
Their shared quest is their true identity. 
Roquentin's character is p stic, amorphous, moulded to 
an ideological formula by Sartre, but otherwise unconvincing. 
Joseph's rejected self possessed a degree, a job, a certain 
style of dress, a wife and relations, friends who shared 
his scholarly interests. But at present, "if a question 
of my identity were to arise I could do nothing but point 
to my attributes of yesterday" (po 26). 
These comparisons strengthen the idea of Joseph as 
Existentialist. But does his journal record the growth 
of alienation only? Is there no evidence to suggest that, 
like certain other philosophical ideas born of the 
Enlightenment which Joseph has absorbed and then discarded, 
Existentialism is but a temporary preoccupation in his 
intellectual development? Richard Lehan thinks not. He 
argues that Joseph is alienated from "society, the world, 
and God." With a clever manipulation of abbreviated 
quotation, he equates Joseph's ection of God with that 
of Roquentin and Camus's Meursault. He states that, for 
Joseph, "God is born out of 'a miserable surrender. 
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out of fear, bodily and imperious. . I could not accept 
[he says] the existence of something greater than myself'" 
(p. 68).27 Joseph's actual words are: 
I was not so full of pride that I could not accept 
the existence of something greater than myself, 
something, perhaps, of which I was an idea, or 
merely a fraction of an idea. That was not it (p.68). 
Joseph is not denying the existence of God, as Lehan leads 
one to believe, since he can something greater than 
himself. Rather, he is pitting the strength of an alternative, 
his own reason, against religious acceptance. 
Lehan argues that Joseph is disillusioned with the 
"whole nature of creation" and quotes the "feeling of 
strangeness, of not quite belonging to the world" (p. 30) 
as proof of Existentialist disillusionment. 28 But in 
context this phrase is tinged with religious and philosophical 
colour. Joseph says that not only , but everyone, to 
some extent, shares this feeling. are Platonic 
reverberations in the idea that "the real world is not 
at all and what is at hand is spurious and copied," 
and Old and New Testamerit influences in the comment that 
children feel their "real father is elsewhere" (p. 30). 
The red feeling of strangeness is not one of evil, but 
of the "splendors" (p. 30) of existence. The idea of 
diversified splendours is coupled with one of wonder. 
This awareness of "strangeness," "wonder," and "splendors" 
suggests a s ritual excitement at the secrets of the 
unanswered mysteries of existence rather than a "disillusion­
ment with the whole nature of creation." Thus Joseph's 
Existentialist racteristics do not obliterate a latent 
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spiritual awareness, although he is neither a Jewish nor 
a Christian Existentialist. To be either, he would have 
to acknowledge and explore fully the role of a divinity 
in human existence. 
Lehan then argues that Joseph, like all Existentialist 
heroes, longs for the "purity of the completely self­
contained existence, the very internal necessity of an 
art object.,,29 He cites the similarity between Roquentin's 
reaction to the jazz tune "One of these Days" Joseph's 
appreciation of a Haydn divertimento. I agree that for 
both Joseph and Roquentin an art form, music, shapes a 
formless reality and suggests how to bear suffering and 
humiliation. For Roquentin the jazz tune is a symbol of 
self enclosed completion, but the Haydn divertimento serves 
only partially as a metaphor for Joseph's longed- self­
definition. Although the whole scene argues finally for 
reason in its completeness rather than for art, the 
conclusion is in tension. To achieve the self-contained 
existence of an art form, Joseph needs aid. And the music 
"named only one source, the universal one, God" (p. 68). 
Joseph does not reject God outright. Rather, he chooses 
at this point not to consider divine aid. 
Joseph cannot achieve the self sufficiency of an art 
form. Nor does he aspire to the "acts of the imagination" 
(p. 91) which allow the artist, for example his friend 
John Pearl, to transcend the moral and commercial corruption 
of life in a city such as New York. This transcendence 
may link John Pearl with what is finest in mankind, but 
Joseph has "no talent for that sort of thing" (p. 91). 
The self contained existence of the world of art or 
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cerebration is too far removed from what he calls "'the 
real world, the truth'" (p. 141). (The Bellovian heroes' 
refusal to withdraw via the imagination, via art, has been 
noted by Earl Rovit, while Cynthia Ozick discusses the 
restriction on Jewish creativity engendered by the 
prohibitive commandment against "graven images" in 
introducing her short story "Usurpation".30 Bellow's own 
response to the commandment is a complex one. He himself 
is an author, but he does not allow his characters Charlie 
Citrine is the exception--to express themselves through 
an art form.) 
For Joseph, total self-sufficiency, whether of art 
or intellect, may lead to the abdication of real existence 
for static role playing. If this be achieved, communication 
with others (except those cast in similar roles) ceases, 
and communal life becomes meaningless. Lehan argues that 
Joseph, aloof and removed from "the order of men" who "band 
together for mutual protection . [and) assert the group 
values," ects people. He adds that Joseph also casts 
. d h' b th d db' t . t h' . f 31aS1 e 1S ro er an n ce an eg1ns 0 reJec 1S W1 e. 
It can be argued t~at to begin with, Joseph uses people 
expediently, that he "clings to the nearest passers by, 
to brothers, parents, friends, and w s .. (p. 30) to offset 
.. strangeness in the world" (p. 29). His judgements 
on all he meets, his aggression and truculence support 
a view that he finds human relationships inadequate, 
insufficient. But this is to ignore his changing attitude 
towards people, and that often his actions are mitigated 
by kind or understanding thoughts which excuse his friends' 
actions. "I have not done well alone," Joseph comments (p. 190). 
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He records that "Iva and I have grown closer" (p. 152), 
that Steidler visits him often. Adler keeps in contact, 
Abt writes of his successes, John Pearl of a shared 
recognition of the evidence in city life of the dehumanization 
of man. Contact with his llow man, essential if Joseph 
is to retain his humanity, has not broken down completely. 
Lehan points out that Joseph's talks with his alter 
ago express an Existential idea, "the ambiguity of ethics, 
the difficulty of choice between two courses of action 
that are not morally exclusive of each other.,,32 But 
do these courses really bear the same moral weight? Does 
Joseph sway, immobilised, between them from the journal's 
start to finish? Does he make no choice between the 
irreconcilable orders of death and life, alienation and 
community? If it were possible to separate the two speakers 
this neatly, what would Joseph's final decision be? 
Comparing Joseph to other Existentialist heroes, Lehan 
finds that "once Joseph has divested the world of meaning 
he finds it impossible to act in terms of commitment." 
Yet finally he compares him to the characters in Camus's 
The Plague, who "are able to reaffirm their initial identity 
and to return to the original community.,,33 Surely this 
implies commitment, particularly as Joseph's "return" is 
to enlist in the army. His "imposed consciousness" begins 
with a paralysed awareness of the absurd, but the stasis 
is finally interrupted by action. 
Lehan neglects to mention that in his first talk with 
the Spirit of Alternatives, Joseph denies subscribing wholly 
to a Sartrean philosophy: "'I didn't say there was no 
feeling of alienation, but that we should not make a doctrine 
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of our feeling'" (p. 138). He dismisses the actual possibility 
of ing completely alienated because, firstly, one is 
the sum of one's education and cultural experience, and, 
secondly, the world uses individuals as pawns in its games 
with mankind, regardless of their beliefs (p. 137). 
Joseph also questions the supre~acy of reason, on 
which the ideas of Existentialism, denying the spirit, 
partially rest. Perhaps we are the "feeble-minded children 
of angels" (p. 137), he says. His January 26 entry records 
ominously that the mind flaps "like a rag on a clothesline 
in cold wind" (p. 123), unable to lull the terror of man's 
contemplation of chaos, of himself as a sport in the vastness, 
with no fixed definition or meaning. Running counter to 
the logic of absurdity is the security of feelings, instincts, 
and the heart, which "can be relied on" if "mind's nature 
is weak" (p. 136). This security is encountered in the 
clumsy generosity of Amos, in Iva's patience and loyalty, 
in Joseph's own ightened sensibility to pain and suffering 
towards a "generalized human being" (p. 52). But Joseph 
cannot an unstructured formula for living. Despite 
previous failures, he can only s st once again to the 
Spirit of Alternatives "'an 1 construction, an obsessive 
device'" (p. 140) constructed by reason. In desperation 
he ignores his abandoned political and social utopias, 
the warning of the sick Christian Scientist who is obsessed 
by her memorized message of salvation. Yet his honesty 
prompts the question: "'But what of the gap between the 
ideal construction and the-real world, the truth?'" (p. 141). 
In his second talk with the Spirit of Alternatives 
Joseph rejects the prodding of what he calls "'a kind of 
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conscience "' (p. 164), the '" public part'" of himsel f which 
is 'lithe world internalized'" (p. 165). What follows makes 
it clear that Bellow is considering the pessimism of 
prevalent wasteland thinking which, taken to its logical 
nihilistic conclusion, suggests suicide: "'You can't prepare 
for anything but living, '" Joseph affirms, you "'don't 
have to know anything to be dead'" (p. 165). This is a 
direct repudiation of his former attraction to Goethe's 
sentiment that the "loathing of life has both physical 
and moral causes" (p. 18) and his sympathy for Shakespeare's 
Barnadine, whose contempt for life equall his contempt 
for tho For Barnadine life is meaningless, and therefore 
th equally so. But Joseph is aware that his isolation 
is a support for the "anti-life" (p. 165) and a devaluation 
of existence. He reconsiders his estrangement from society. 
In so doing, there is a return to the positive social 
commitments of the "old Joseph". 
turning inward on the self to explore the craters 
of the spirit, to consi his existence as finite and 
absolute, Joseph avoids facing war as a moral issue 
with clear-cut implications for Jews. Perhaps his former 
moral and social indecisiveness may be ascribed partly 
to this avoidance. But finally it is the fatal shadow 
of its reality~ the suffering and violence it represents, 
that forces him to overcome his alienation. "'I would 
be denying my inmost feelings if I said I wanted to be 
by-pass and spared from knowing what the rest of my 
generation is undergoing'" .( p. 166). His decision to 
"surrender" is not accompanied by feelings of remorse or 
humiliation, but by "gratification and a desire to make 
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my decision effective at once' (p. 183). The paralysis his 
concern with the absurd produced is over. 
His choice of enlistment entails replacing an aimless 
existence with a planned, everyday, ordinary life. Allan 
Guttmann observes that it is "certainly arguable that 
Joseph has returned metaphorically from the empty wilderness 
within in order to surrender himself to a secular equivalent 
of Chalakah, the Law.,,34 His "surrender" is paradoxically 
an affirmation of life which marks the cessation of the 
death-in-life he has experienced. His choice, if it be 
regarded in a recognizably Jewish context, is the right 
one: " . . I have set before you life and death . 
therefore choose life" (Deuteronomy 30.19). 
Joseph's Moral Core 
The question which dominates the novel; "'How should 
a good man live; what ought he to do?'" (p. 39) posits 
a prototype of human existence inimical to Existentialist 
thinking. Implicit is its fundamental Jewish premise that 
man is good, not born into original sin, and that the choice 
of his actions will reflect this goodness. ("0 my God, 
the soul which thou gavest me is pure.") 35 An Existentialist 
would never presume this good as "given", believing rather 
that man may select, in absolute freedom, to be good if 
he so chooses. The second part of the question--"what 
ought he to do?"--emphasises that goodness is not theoretical, 
but needs to be expressed by action in the secular world, 
as advocated by practical Jewish morality. The open-ended 
moral possibilities of Existentialism; of man's passive 
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or static role in the world; his definition of self only 
in his choice of actions, are of a different nature, as 
are the Protestant assumptions of original sin. In the 
Talmud the difference between the righteous and the wicked 
man is measured according to the preponderance of good 
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over evil deeds. Whether Joseph, according to his journal, 
would qualify as good on a count of individual acts is 
dubious, but his preoccupation with goodness is no less 
valid for being mainly theoretical at this stage of his 
life. 
A subsequent journal entry: "M Y talent, if I have 
one at all, is for being a citizen, or what is today called, 
most apologetically, a good man" (p. 91), suggests that 
"a good man" and "a citizen" are synonymous. This is 
strictly in accordance with Talmudic teachings that the 
command to love one's neighbour as oneself is to be expressed 
in spontaneous deeds of charity and goodwill towards others. 
Actions must express a public consciousness, and not be 
per f ormed f or a prlva'te sa1va t'lon. 37 Moses Mendelssohn's 
definition of Judaism as "revealed legislation" (he refers 
to Christianity as "revealed religion") underlies this 
emphasis. He writes: "Do make man's conduct your 
concern, and judge his actions by his compliance with wise 
laws.,,38 Joseph understands this implicitly. He envies 
John Pearl his "community." He has only "this six-sided 
box. And goodness is achieved not in a vacuum, but in 
the company of other men, attended by love" (p. 92). Unlike 
those who, sure of their purposes, "break prisons and cross 
who Siberias" (p. 92), Joseph is uncertain of the direction 
his expression of goodness should take, but knows it must 
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be in community, where "man realizes his personality and 
actualizes his being.,,39 
In direct contrast to his life style, isolated and 
stagnant, or precisely because that lifestyle has revealed 
such limitations, Joseph advocates that man's most consuming 
passion should be to unlock "the imprisoning self" (p. 153). 
His struggle towards "beingness", waged solitarily and 
intellectually, is offset by a counter sense of life, one 
which places conduct and right actions higher than rational 
theories of "becomingness". He suggests that "what we really 
want is to stop living so exclusively and vainly for our 
own sake, impure and unknowing, turning inward and self 
fastened" (p. 154). As the pronouns "we" and "our" denote, 
Joseph here regards himself as a member of society. He 
presumes that all of us, "while we seem so intently and 
even desperately to be holding on to ourselves, we would 
far rather give ourselves away" (pp. 153 54). Unlike the 
Existentialists who acknowledge no given, shared values, 
Joseph links his personal quest for freedom with that of 
all humanity: "We are all drawn toward the same craters 
of the spirit--to know what we are and what we are for, 
to know our purpose, to seek grace" (p. 154). The idea 
expressed here, that all engage in spiritual exploration, 
that there is a communal moral preoccupation which may 
ultimately lead to divine absolution, is far closer to 
a variety of religious concepts than to Existentialist 
thinking. 
Joseph moves away from· using intelligence as the sole 
yardstick of people's worth--"But now I am struck by the 
arrogance with which I set people apart in two groups: 
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those with worth-while ideas and those without them" (p. 152)-­
to consider other units of measurement. Thus Iva, who 
frustrates his attempts at her cultural education, is no 
longer despised, but loved IItoo much to turn her over to 
her familyll (p. 118). His university friends are not sought 
out for their intelligent conversaticn, and are found lacking 
in moral and spiritual depth. Adler, "hale and business­
like" (p. 58), has learnt to "prize convenience" (p. 38) 
but fails in friendship. Abt's letters, epistles of self­
esteem and complacence, go unanswered. Because Joseph's 
old school friend Steidler personifies a humanity devoid 
of dignity and honesty, preferring a Hollywood illusion 
of reality, his visits are corrupting, as if he and Joseph 
are "practising some terrible vice together" (p. 148). 
Joseph himself is quite capable of kindness, shielding 
Adler from embarrassment after the Burns incident by denying 
his need for a job (p. 38), asking Adler to contact John 
Pearl, who is lonely in New York (p. 159). 
His earlier idea of a "colony of the spirit" (p. 39), 
despite its failure, suggests a wish to impose a code of 
moral order on his immedjate worl~to give structure and 
meaning to life. Another early entry, that "everything 
is good because it exists. Or good or not good, it exists, 
it is ineffable, and, for that reason, marvellous" (p. 30) 
suggests a spiritual attitude towards the temporal world, 
an optimism and an acceptance that the wonder of creation 
is not to be understood by the mind only. John J. Clayton 
points out that when Joseph faces pure existence he reacts, 
not with nausea, but with serenity to th9 mysterious beauty 
at the heart of life, as the following passage illustrates: 
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The 	 light gave an air innocence to some of 
common objects in room, liberating them 
from ugliness. I lost aversion I had hitherto 
felt for the ong of rug at the foot of 
bed, the scrap of tapestry on the radiator 
seat, the bubbles of paint on white lintel, 
six knobs on dresser I had formerly 
compared to the ugly as many dwarf 
s. 	 In the m floor, like an 
device of , lay a piece of 
(p. 	119).4 
Morali a sense of mysterious, spiritual, 
point to religious affiliations. But al Joseph is 
aware of tra 1 qualities, of int of 
s s, II of "not quite belonging to wor II which 
marks all men; although his first reaction to e is 
" r" (pe ps denoting a vestigial religious sense), 
he conscious places his rational j s ritual 
assessments. As ical sceptic who rega lf as 
the measure all ngs, the feeling " r" is 
"trying" a s "uneasiness!! (pp. 29 30) • He reassures 
himself it is common to all, and explore 
"the diversifi spl s,the shifts, excitements," 
fsets the liS ss" (p. 30) by concentrating on 
is known, mundane. 
Joseph may try to repress his sense of wonder 
strangeness, but it reasserts itself in the second st 
journal entry il 8. His private revelation of 
"the ephemeral s which we live and pace ourselves" 
(p. 190) is kin to "feeling strangeness, of not 
quite belonging to wor II (p. 30) of the December 18 
entry. Implicit in both entries is the suggestion that 
meaning is wrapped in mys t we avoid contact wi 
sublime because it surpasses our comprehension. He 
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is susceptible to the premise of awe and wonder, to the 
idea of transcendence, but he chooses not to explore it. 
Instead he retreats quickly to the "known acceptance" of 
the everyday, to the "wide agreement" (p. 190) ordinary 
people share about the nature of reality. 
Joseph is unquestionably far removed from conventional 
or even unconventional belief, but he does not deny outright 
the existence of God, as I have already indicated. His 
preoccupation with grace, with divine favour or mercy, 
suggests a receptivity towards a belief in God: "Grace 
by what law, under what order, by whom required? Personal, 
human, or universal, was it (p. 68)?" He longs to accept 
the hardships of life "with grace, without meanness" (p. 67). 
He defines as our final aim in life the impulse "to know 
our purpose, to seek grace" (p. 154). A primary core of 
religious feeling cannot be suppressed even though there 
is no conscious acceptance of God, no orthodox participation 
in ritual or ceremony. 
To the simple household chore of cleaning surfaces, 
sinks, or shoes, Joseph imparts an "importance as a notion 
of center, of balance, of order" (p. 113) tantamount to 
a religious rite, and which calls to mind George Herbert's 
poem "The Elixer", particularly the lines: "Who sweeps 
a room as for Thy laws / Makes that and the action fine." 
He himself "grew deeply satisfied" (p. 85) cleaning the 
family's shoes. For some women, these rituals eventually 
convey knowledge of "part of the nature of God" (p. 113), 
but Joseph refuses this knowledge. He is aware of the 
spiritual in the everyday and he is open to revelations 
of the ephemeral nature of what we call reality, but he 
48 
is not prepared to pursue this awareness. 
Although Joseph concurs with contemporary thinking 
that the major roles played by God and the Devil have shrunk 
to insignificance, that "the stage has been reset and human 
beings only walk on it" (p. 89), he is appalled by certain 
consequences of this recasting. Preoccupied with the "Sense 
of Personal Destiny" (p. 88), man looks for "salvation" 
in his own "greatness" (p. 89). Bitterly Joseph cites 
examples of greatness, which has become synonymous with 
arrogance, treachery, self-interest and c~uelty: the might 
of the revolutionary, the murderer, the ruler. Since God 
and the Devil, right and wrong, are now irrelevant, individual 
advantage is the only consideration. But Joseph knows that 
the limitless reaching for recognition brings no real 
fulfilment and leaves people "lifelessly prostrate" (p. 88). 
He refuses to pursue "greatness," or to succumb to 
the equally prevalent pressure to negate the self in a 
world where man no longer occupies a God-given place. He 
concentrates on individual moral options in his search 
for selfhood, rejecting the universal undervaluation of 
human life which leads to mass suicide, to considering 
the self "to be of no significance" (p. 119), to accept 
death during wartime unquestioningly. Although Joseph 
finds his reasoned alternatives to formal religion to be 
deficient (his "beliefs are inadequate" [po 123]), even 
though he refuses what he considers intellectual suicide, 
supernatural help, he continues to command a certain moral 
dignity, to adhere to certain privately defined standards 
of behaviour. 
Can these standards be interpreted as Jewish? Bellow 
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has not allowed any direct reference to Jews or Judaism 
into the journal. The portrait presented is that of a 
universalist, a cultured intellectual, a citizen of the 
world rather than of one who belongs to a religion or a specific 
people. Only two entries may have a positive bearing on 
Joseph as a secularised American Jew. The first is the 
December 27 entry which recalls his childhood friendship 
with a German boy, Will Harscha. Liela Goldman discusses 
the antagonism of Will's mother towards Joseph in terms 
of German hatred and prejudice towards Jews and the Jewish 
feeling of guilt for causing this hatred. Alternatively, 
as Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi points out, the full impact of the 
Holocaust began to register in America only from the 'fifties 
onwards, and the incident may have nothing to do with 
Germany's wartime policies, but might simply be an example 
' 1 t f t' S 't' 41o f a un1versa ype 0 an 1- em1 1sm. (Compare the Irish 
anti-Semitism in James T. Farrell's Studs Lonigan Trilogy.) 
The January 26 entry suggests a comparison with the 
Old Testament Joseph by recording his namesake's dreams. 
They indicate the conflicting attitudes of the American 
Jew, geographically but ,not emotionally untouched by Hitler's 
atrocities. In his first dream, Joseph is in a slaughter­
house in Bucharest or Constanza. (The Encyclopaedia Judaica 
records that during a pogrom those arrested "were taken 
into forests near Bucharest and shot; others were murdered 
and their bodies hung on meat hooks in the municipal 
slaughterhouse, bearing the legend 'kosher meat. "' ) 42 Bellow 
may have read a report, or'have been informed personally 
about this and similar incidents of the Nazi treatment 
of Jewish corpses. (Joseph remarks: "I have seen the 
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pictures" [p. 120].) In ies are ing 
from hooks, and Joseph s come to identi one. He stresses 
his neutrali his part as " emissary" (p. 120), 
mindful warning: f It I S well to put oneself inff 
c in s ing Ii this I II (p. 120). His careful 
disinterest suggests a refusal to tify wi victims 
or to condemn their s. He is, after all, in America. 
But horror the earn s el ly of an 
emotional and ogical i ification with European 
It is i in the lessness of 
s red, in comparison their bodies to ildren1s. 
(Ironically, , Hell, Jews, meant place where 
pagans practis the human sacrifice of children.) The 
, agonised scriptions of Hell, told to terrify 
as a ild (p. 121), reali 
In second dream Joseph is no longer neutral. As 
a sapper, is dismantling traps, actively i ved 
in the war, dis ing personal . This points to 
his later decision to e, not neutrali a passivity, 
but commitment, to enlist. He himself inter s the 
as tions ,while in action. 
Numerous critics te Jos 's enlistment 
registers a s r, a eat, or whether it is an 
affirmat personal ceo former are Sarah 
Bl Cohen, John J. Clayton, Marcus Klein, and ster 
Eisinger; Robert Dutton is equivocal, while Ada Aharoni 
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of shame: "Not even when I tested myself, whispering 'the 
leash,' reproachfully, did I feel pained or humiliated" 
(p. 182). Joseph's "breath of relief" (p. 183) is translated 
into "[ulniversal relief" (p. 187) among his family, and 
he registers no objection. Having entered the army, he 
records, without any resentment, that he is now part of 
a certain group of people, indistinguishable from the other 
enlisted men drinking at a bar (p. 184), having his blood 
tested with other new recruits (p. 188). He returns to 
his reading, with its promise of unexplored ways of being 
(p.189). 
The tone of the novel's last five lines is in sharp 
contrast to this acquiescence, particularly the final three 
phrases: 
Hurray for regular hours! 

And for the supervision of the spirit! 

Long live regimentation! (p. 191) 

Ironic self-castigation, a mockery of his former search 
for a private definition of freedom are coupled with a 
derisive snarl directed at the authority he has sought 
out. It is evident that Joseph's decision is not a facile 
one, but fraught with conflicting emotions, with tension. 
A Sartrean view of Joseph's enlistment might well be 
that his choice is inauthentic, a passive surrender, rather 
than a self-creating one. Alternatively, it could be seen 
in accordance with Sartre's idea that freedom must be directed 
outside itself, into political commitment for example, 
44if it is to take on meaning. In the latter terms, 
enlistment would comprise the "action" overcoming alienation. 
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But again is cynical resignation in the tone: 
HI am in hands, relieved of self-determination, freedom 
cancelled" (p. 191). Mi enlistment not a form 
moral cowa ice, t resolution of fear experienced 
when we lito govern ouselves"? "we choose a master, 
rollover on our backs a for leash" (p. 167). 
ing against ei r Sartrean i tion of 
the ing, one mi consider difference in 
terization Roquentin Joseph. former 
is a puppet, lifting intellectual psychological limbs 
in ience to his master's phi while latter 
resists complete Existential definition. This occurs when 
Bellow allows his preoccupation wi individual moral choice 
to w , to encompass not only a separate, but a social 
identi For e, Joseph's attitude s war 
is almost exclusively self-cen but a crucial 
occurs. Initially, he consi rs the difference 
ing a "victim" or a " iciary" ing wartime 
( p. 84). He s the Allies: "between ir imperialism 
ours, if a full choice were possible, I wou 
ours" (p. 84). He does not drift unthinkingly into 
war as many s do (po 119), but prepares himself 
!Is ritually" for the army (p. 133). He s a nice 
distinction tween a willingness to become "a member 
the army" ( ip implies ce) not II a 
of it" (pp. 133-34)1 which suggests a stioning of mili 
life. To S rit of Alternatives insists that 
war is in no way "essentia to people, it is inc 1 
to indi v I iritual lopment (p. 168). But he s 
down when ronted with question whether he has 
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a separate destiny (pp. 168-69). This is the crucial point. 
His subsequent voluntary enlistment may thus be seen as 
an affirmation of a communal, not an individual morality, 
a commitment to society. By risking his life, Joseph ensures 
his humanity, his dignity; while alienation shrivels his 
communal impulses, turning his potential goodness and 
sweetness into bitterness and spite. 
The moral quality which influences Joseph's thinking 
in the latter part of his journal could suggest the influence 
of Bellow's abandoned Judaism. For example, there is a 
strong movement away from nihilistic thinking, a revival 
of the life force, implicit in his eagerness for spring 
to reappear (p. 170). He is aware of its message of 
"impossible hope and rejuvenation" (p. 172), while the 
"breath of warm air" after the icy winter is linked with 
his decision to enlist (p. 183). To achieve this unlikely 
renewal of faith in himself and in mankind, he needs to 
commit himself to something other than the self. As Jewish 
ethical teaching would advise, he chooses to rejoin society. 
("Separate not yourself from the community" is a familiar 
rabbinic dictum.)45 Agatn, in accordance with Jewish 
thinking, which stresses the ordinance to choose, not death 
and evil, but life and goodness, to see the empirical world 
as real and significant and life and history as real and 
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meaningful, his choice is the correct one. 
Conclusion 
If Dangling Man were Bellow's only novel, it would 
be impertinent to call him a Jewish novelist. The journal 
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II 
s little overt Jewish significance. creation of Joseph 
as a wholly assimilated American with no hint in 
or background or habits of a st sts that 
in 1944, at a time when it would been well n 
sible to ignore being J Bel to do so. 
But one must keep in mind Ezrahi's djscussion of the sense 
diffidence, of vulnerabili Jewish-American 
writers in the 'forties ing singled out as 
Jews, as well as Norman tz's observation that Bellow 
and embodi lse which had been growi 
among all the members second generation . . to 
lay a serious claim to ir i as Americans and 
to their right to a more marginal role in the 
literary culture coun In ition, the 
emancipation alternate i ions self, 
such as the political finition Marxism and the 
analytical criteria of which novelists cou 
to explore. Is Bel 's pu e to prove that Jew is 
as human as ile, equally capable of angst, soul 
sing, of suf ring in an intellectual and spiritual 
wasteland? Is Joseph embodiment a literary era, 
expres ? Why d Bellow dec to write a war 
novel t ba nces on the periphery, but never actually 
enters real zones battle? 
Emil L. im wrote in 1968 of s ss 
that "until a few years ago Jewi ical 
has a nearly total silence on s ect 
holocaust. II his reasons is silence are that 
is no in Jewish his for Nazi genocide, 
t crime was so appalling that ogians re sed 
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"to ru in where angels fear to tread.!l 8 Only in 1969 
d Bellow choose as his main protagonist a s 
Ho st, refore I venture to presume t, 
like Jewish theologians, Bellow was unable, 
or just after the war, to plunge into a fictitious 
oration of what could only have ified and di 
his sensibilities and intellect. 
Instead, Dangling Man presents the portrait of an 
assimila Jew, so at one with his environment t Edmund 
Wilson called the journal "one of most st eces 
of testimony on the psychology of a whole generation.!l49 
It is evidence, contrary to Sartre's assertions t is 
is well-nigh impossible, of a Jewi writer's success at 
total cultural and intellectual literary assimilation. 50 
Yet simultaneously it is starting point of a process 
of ideological evolution which will be discus in 
chapters that follow. 
I 
r Two 
The Vi 
"And 
have 
say I am a critic, you mean I 
opinion of is This is my 
More , can you have use 
for' life? Less than human, you don't either. 1 
ion 
S DeKoven Ezrahi, writing Jewi -American 
s' responses to the st in nineteen-fort s, 
identifies a "transference of patterns and fears of 
anti-Semitism into American context. II This suggests 
t on one level may be as lIa ng 
al of Holocaust as a process ce 
,,2
and de ion take possession of p If s 
is so, Bel is ing central Jewish experience 
of the twentieth c --perhaps of hi -in 1947, 
a which s 1 with ively 
His protagonist, Asa 1, eludes initive 
classification. The r who labels him as representat 
waste ideology is suddenly conf with his "ghetto 
(p. 202), with both its limited tunnel vision 
and its s This may lect 
an ambivalence in Bellow himself who, though attracted 
to certain literary and phi 
the time, is c ly al ng himself simultaneous with 
ical ions of 
pers Jewry_ The of the novel suggests 
II 
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assimilation need not be at the cost of Jewish identity. 
Certain key occurrences cause Leventhal, a secular 
Jew seemingly assimilated into the heterogeneous population 
of New York, to reassess his identity. The first is the 
absence of his wife, visiting her recently widowed mother 
in Baltimore. Without her love and ~upport to ballast 
him, Leventhal finds himself increasingly lonely, isolated 
in the Existentialist sense, an outsider in his chosen 
society. Forced into self-awareness through solitude, 
he is compelled to consider his plight which, particularly 
in the early chapters of the novel, has much in common 
3
with the Existentialist reading of modern man's predicament. 
Secondly, an hysterical telephone call from his sister­
in-law demands his help because his nephew is seriously 
ill. By becoming involved in a family tragedy, Leventhal 
finds himself reconsidering the ideas of duty and responsibility, 
of family ties, of what have been labelled the "duties of the 
heart,,,4 of arbitrary punishment and reward. 
The third occurrence is the reappearance of Kirby Allbee, 
an acquaintance who appears out of nowhere to accuse him 
of causing his downfall to revenge a grudge. His intrusion 
into Leventhal's privacy provokes the latter to weigh up 
conflieting ideas of responsibility and its abrogation. 
It exposes him to evil via a maliciously manipulated 
relationship, to consider whether a man is guilty of that 
which he did not intend, to reassess the role of the sufferer. 
It casts him as both victim and victimizer. 
Allbee's accusation is directed against Leventhal 
because he is a Jew. His anti-Semitism brings Leventhal's 
Jewishness into sharp focus as he reassesses his identity. 
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Is he successfully assimilated in the New World? If he 
is Allbee's victimizer, could he not be asserting the right 
of the American citizen to fight for survival in capitalist 
New York? Or is his Jewishness, the most important part 
of his moral being, an ineradicable component of his 
personality? Is it not evident in his additional role 
as Allbee's victim, as the s~bmissive Jew who accepts his 
suffering as scapegoat of the nations? 
Allbee's anti-Semitism is the catalyst that causes 
Leventhal to confront his position as an assimilated Jew 
in America. Involuntarily he evokes the values of a 
vestigial Judaism, juxtaposing them with the alienation 
and nihilism of certain Existentialist theories, the 
philosophies of contemporary man released from religion. 
By the end of the novel he is no longer a man avoiding 
the essential questions of identity and causality, but 
one who is becoming interested in metaphysical enquiry. 
Leventhal as Waste lander 
In Dangling Man, the chief protagonist, Joseph, displays 
certain symptoms associated with alienation: isolation, 
anxiety, restlessness. His careful diarization of his 
psychological and mental states informs the reader that 
Joseph is aware of his condition. In The Victim, Leventhal 
exhibits similar characteristics. They indicate that he 
is part of what Nathan Glazer calls "a systemic alienation 
involved in modern social organization as we know it.,,5 
But, unlike Joseph, Leventhal does not subject his 
psychological condition to self-scrutiny. His alienation 
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manifests itself in physiological, psychological and 
behavioural symptoms which he is unwilling to diagnose. 
When he is in the company of his wife Mary, who loves 
him, he forgets to feel "nervous, restive and unwell" (p. 59). 
But when she leaves him to visit her recently widowed mother, 
her absence allows the dormant feelings of physical dis-ease, 
of insecurity and anxiety to surface. For certain 
Existentialists, the primary "ontological" feelings of 
anxiety, hypochondria, and boredom indicate the grimmer 
aspects of the Existential condition. 6 Leventhal is prey 
to all three. He feels amorphous anxieties--he is disliked 
at the office, continually unsure of personal relationships 
with people such as the Willistons (a WASP couple he respects), 
and fearful of having made a bad impression on first meeting 
acquaintances, with Dr Denisart and Shifcart, for example. 
His attempts at finding specific causes for his anxiety-­
his job provides no tenure, his past life has been ugly 
and hard--evade the true source: a desolating sense of 
rootlessness. His hypochondria manifests itself mainly 
away from work: 
Since Mary's departure his nerves had been unsteady. 
He kept the bathroom light burning all night.... 
This was absurd, this feeling that he was threatened 
by something while he slept. And that was not 
all. He imagined that he saw mice darting along 
the walls .... He was sure he was unwell (p. 26). 
His heart beats "thickly" (p. 24); his nerves are unreliable. 
Dressing, he is "suddenly powerless to move and fearfully 
hampered in his breathing" (p. 209). Like Sartre's Roquentin, 
he takes no pleasure in his physical eXistence. 7 Leventhal's 
purposelessness, the inertia indistinguishable from fatigue 
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or which lITIS him is free of fice 
routine, closely les state scribed by He 
in which "we are equally removed from spair and j 
and everything us seems so lessly commonp 
that we no longer care anything is or is not." 8 
This feeling is more than the fear an 
more than mere unoc ed time passing s y in ly 
flat. It attests to an inner iness and powerlessness. 
It is an acknowl of meaningless existence, undi 
by social or religious norms. 
Leventhal's pessimism, his depression, his real or 
simulated indifference towards himself s then 
stion, icularly in the opening of 
the novel, that he is floundering in a senseless and 
society. Initially he displays no clear guidelines for 
t or actions, no desire to late a personal or 
al set rules. He is the prey of disconnected urges, 
responsive to his own inadequate ions. His 
lsive, actions, such as running to answer 
the summons of his sister in-law, Elena, leave him "bitter 
irri (p. 9). He his our when underII 
pressure as t lIa fool ll (p. 25). His career has not 
and is result of acc 1, zard 
success. After" inning to driftll (p. 18), he finds 
an assortment He resigns from customs 
ng "himself ift" (p. 20) arrives in New York 
with no position confirmed. Having begun job-hunting "in 
a rit of utter hopelessness" (p. 21), he eventual 
lands a job wi Burke and ny. Later he confesses 
to Mary, 1111 was lucky. I got away with it'" (p. 22). 
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The random pattern of Leventhal's life seems to show in 
microcosm the lack of a grand design, of a planned meaning 
to life that lies beyond existence. 
Universal meaninglessness is also mirrored in Leventhal's 
idea of personal invalidity. His wife diagnoses his "illness" 
as a lack of self-confidence, as his being "'not sure of 
[himselfl'" (p. 49). Her absence allows his pessimism, a 
private nihilism which complements a universal nothingness, 
to engulf him. His lack of a positive self-image corresponds 
to the de-individualisation suggested by the over-crowding 
in the city, in streets, lifts, restaurants and cafeterias, 
the packed park, the "thronged" zoo (p. 91). Asa is 
indistinguishable from countless others, purposely self­
effacing, a "faceless man of the masses.,,9 His insignificance 
offers itself as an insignia of urban life. To be singled 
out from the anonymity of the crowd surprises or embarrasses 
him. For example, when Harkavy hails him in the cafeteria 
on Fourteenth street, he fails to hear him (p. 103). In a 
subsequent restaurant scene, he misinterprets a detaining 
arm as the accidental movement of a stranger, not as a gesture 
of friendship from Williston (pp. 171-72). 
Bellow's description of the city, its hostile abrasiveness, 
its pressures, acts as a metaphor for the general state of 
aliena tion. The ci ty is overpowering, t rea c her 0 u s 
incomprehensible. New York is crowded with "barbaric 
fellahin" (p. 9), a stupefied throng dazed by the chaos 
it has created. Its essence is its masses, physically 
jostling with Asa, or subtly pervading his subconscious. 
He is penetrated "by a sense not merely of the crowd in 
the park but of innumerable millions, crossing, touching, 
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pressing" (p. 151). Later Allbee remarks bitterly.: "There 
are a hundred million others who want that very same damn 
thing. I don't care whether it's a sandwich or a seat 
in the subway or what" (p. 159). Amid this impersonal 
enmity, Asa must achieve "consciousness". 
He fears the city. Its aggressipn is directed against 
him by its impersonal opposition. A "concussion of cars, 
like hammer blows" (p. 86) assaults him en route to the 
subway; exhaust fumes "[catch] him in the face" (p. 124); 
his nerves are ripped by "a tearing of gears" (p. 124). 
His reaction to urban living is aggressive, overwrought. 
He slams at a moving bus with his open hand (p. 146), forces 
back a train door (p. 9), fo~ces his way through a crowd, 
even when dreaming (p. 138). He pushes himself into his 
clothes "violently" (p. 11); he "unavoidably" (p. 12) pushes 
against his little known nephew; eventually he pushes against 
Allbee "with all the force of his powerful arms" (p. 68). 
His aggression, similar to Joseph's in this regard, may 
be an unconscious attempt to confirm his identity in a 
society which is largely unconscious of his existence. 
It also suggests a blind battering against an inimical, 
uncaring universe. His emotional response is a protective 
neutrality. He has schooled himself to be unfeeling and 
incurious towards himself and others, nurturing a crustaceous 
impassivity, and so revealing a lack of accommodation, an 
unresponsiveness. The indifference he attributes to Millican, 
a colleague, is actually his own. Apprehensive of the 
life around him, he withdraws "like a shellfish down in 
the wet sand" (p. 163), thus approximating "the faceless and 
anonymous hero. . The man without an identity.,,10 
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That Leventhal is close to an acceptance of an absurd 
universe is evident in the similarities between him and 
Allbee, whose alienated qualities remain constant throughout 
the novel. The face of the absurd universe is revealed in 
Allbee's concept of human insignificance, in his sense 
of the futility of individual effort; "'Now it's all blind 
movement, vast movement, and the individual is shuttled 
back and forth'" (p. 62). When Allbee professes that the 
world is one of irrefutable contingency where "'if' swings 
us around the ears like rabbits" (p. 166), Leventhal does 
not contradict him. He shares Allbee's belief in the 
arbitrary deal~gs of fate, attributing both his jobs to 
chance (pp. 22, 230). He cannot understand how a less 
fortunate person can envy him, as "neither man had made 
the arrangements" (p. 69). Allbee's image of people, "'one 
day we're like full bundles and the next we're wrapping 
paper, blowing around the streets'" (p. 67), evokes a 
wasteland of futile existence. Nihilism and despair, not 
love and hope, are his credo:" . most people count on 
dying" (p. 159). Leventhal's statement that people are 
full of fear, "fear of death, of life more than of death, 
perhaps" (p. 128), endorses Allbee's idea of human wretchedness. 
Williston remarks that "there were ministers in 
[Allbee's] family, influences to throw off" (p. 39). In 
addition to discarding temperance, Allbee has forsworn 
God and the Christian faith. He dismisses the spiritual 
quality of man, stressing only the creaturely. "'You mustn't 
forget you're an animal'" ~p. 166), he says, and emphasises 
that " . . we're not gods, we're only creatures" (p. 67). 
Accepting that he is "mulish" and will die like an animal (p. 185) 
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he questions t Ca lic idea that t "'wor was c 
Ifor me, I" and that soul is fr lute required, not 
IIInow, but (p. 159). He rstands John 
Baptist's to repent, to s self-knowledge, 
will not seek s own salvation. Recalling the Oracle 
Delphi, he erves: "'Know thyself! knows 
nobody wants to it •• • we keep our s shut'"(p.184). 
resul t is the i quality of i ifference, an 
ssivity in the suffering whi scars him with 
mark of \Hth a multitude o s he will 
ie like animals ll (p. 185), the quarry, not t huntsman, 

himself. 

Allbee displays certain characteristics whi confirm 

ive aspects existence. These I s failed 
or discontinued relat i (with his wife wi the 
Willis )i his real sical s fering grief 
wife who was kill in a car accident- her 
ings a "terrible look pain . to his (p. 237)"-­
his aspirations to ing a banker, preliminary 
scenario writer, and actual limitation s 
possibilities. Leventhal res s acutely to se 
mis s of Allbee, tant is ssimism 
ir, the a and hopelessness 
II I felt Al 's presence. Ii a 
great tiring wei t, and I at him with dead fat lI(p.186). 
Ki describes a similar dread as the cancel tion 
of all expectation: "'If a man remains without poss lities, 
it is as if he lacked air.,.,,11 Bellow often s 
Leventhal, Allbee's influence, as "fearful 
in his ing" (p. 209), alt does not present him 
as a man wi 
65 
Allbee never moves beyond the negative cynicism of 
one who inhabits a moral wasteland. Through him, Leventhal 
becomes aware of the dangers of absurdity. He perceives 
that if he continues to act as Allbee does, he will be 
"countering absurdity with absurdity, and madness with 
madness" (p. 92). Like him, Leventhal no longer practises 
his religion, but unlike him, he cannot throw off the 
traditional moral and ethical influences of his Jewish 
background which strongly oppose the idea of an absurd 
universe. 
By allowing the moral dynamics in Leventhal to illustrate 
alternatives to wasteland philosophies, Bellow seems 
consciou~ly to be breaking with an attitude of despondency, 
both literary and actual, encouraged by Existentialist 
thinking and writing. Leventhal is initially alienated, 
both in a philosophical and psychological sense and also 
socially, as a second generation Jew in New York. His 
regeneration, the emergence of a more vital life force, of 
a less selfish enquiry and interest and concern in people 
other than himself, augurs a new hope for those who are 
doubly alienated, and expresses a qualified optimism unusual 
in post-war European or American literature. Precisely 
because Leventhal displays so many of the characteristics 
of the wastelander (particularly in the first chapters 
of the novel), the changes in his behaviour, attitudes 
and thinking are doubly significant. They stress the moral 
resilience of the Jew, both to the obvious danger of anti-
Semitism embodied in Allbee' (whose name contains an ominous 
play on "all beings"), and to the less evident seductiveness 
of philosophies unexplored before the Jewish emancipation 
from ghetto life. 
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In order to prove this contention it is necessary 
to examine various aspects of Leventhal's Jewishness: his 
reactions to anti-Semitism; his role as victim and victimizer; 
how his assimilation compares with that of his brethren; 
and, finally, the essentially Jewish nature of his moral 
enlargement. 
"Anti-Semite and Jew" 
It seems likely that Bellow was reacting to Sartre's 
"Reflexions sur la Question Juive" (1946) when he wrote 
The Victim (1947), for his depictions of Leventhal, a Jew, 
and of Allbee, an anti-Semite, show marked parallels to 
Sartre's prototypes. (He was living in Paris on a Guggenheim 
scholarship at the time.)12 In his initial depiction of 
Leventhal, certain resemblances to Sartre's Jew are evident. 
The latter defines the Jew, not by feature, or religion, 
but by his being considered so by other men, and Leventhal 
is certainly viewed in the latter terms by certain characters 
in the novel. He is jerked into an awareness of being 
Jewish by anti-Semitic remarks. They begin with the comment 
of his boss, Mr Beard, that he, "like the rest of his 
brethren" (p. 11), takes unfair advantage. They are 
continued vitriolically by Allbee: Jews, "you people" (pp. 30, 
117, 123, 186), prefer talking to physical violence; Jews 
are responsible for a "sort of Egyptian darkness" (p. 121) 
in which Allbee is floundering; Jews place self-interest 
above all else (p. 123). 
Beard's remarks, in keeping with Sartre's ideas, suggest 
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tha t he merely tolerates the Jew he employs. He does not 
consider Asa an assimilated American, and Allbee's continued 
attacks likewise suggest that the Jew is essentially 
unassimilable. He is never accepted as a man, but is always 
singled out as a Jew. Sarah Blacher Cohen, discussing 
Leventhal's Jewishness, contends that he becomes what Sartre 
calls the lIinauthentic Jew,lI poisoned by the stereotype 
that others have of him. 13 Sartre defines the lIinauthentic 
Jew" as one who runs away from his situation, who denies 
hi s intolerable isolation and responsibi 1 i ties. Hi s implicit 
14
aim is to destroy a Jewish reality, to escape its limitations. 
In the opening chapters of the novel, it is not 
Leventhal's Jewishness, but his positive attempts at 
assimilation, to be accepted as an American, which predominate. 
He dismisses Beard's anti-Semitism as IInot important, merely 
disgusting ll (p. 25). That this is a continuation of an 
earlier attitude is suggested by his IIshrug[ging] off ll (p. 39) 
of Allbee's anti-Semitic remarks at one of the Willistons' 
parties years ago and thinking so little of them that he 
subsequently asked Allbee for an introduction to Rudiger, 
for a job interview. U~like his Italian sister-in-law, 
whose old-world fear of hospitals he derides ("' [d)on't 
be such a peasant, Elena! 'II [po 15]), and unlike her mother, 
whose influence on Max's family he considers primitive (p. 155), 
Leventhal sees himself as an enlightened American. 
In many ways he manifests the Jewish inferiority complex 
which Sartre says is created when a Jew chooses to live 
inauthentically.15 He fea~s a blacklist in the newspaper 
trade, although his friend Harkavy gives the assurance 
tha t Rudiger can't persecute him (p. 43). He imputes 
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to Elena's mother a judgement on the Jew, "a man of wrong 
blood, of bad blood" (p. 56), because her grandson has died. 
He interprets Mr Beard's mild comment on his brother's 
"mixed marriage" (p. 45) as being anti-Semitic. He even 
suspects Williston of siding against him and championing 
Allbee's cause "because he [Leventhal] was a Jew" (p. 79). 
Sartre suggests that the "inauthentic Jew" may be 
forced into masochism. Because he is humiliated and despised 
and treated as an object, he may come to think of himself 
as an inanimate thing, and thus absolve himself of his 
responsibilities. 16 The indifference which Leventhal displays 
is surely one of his main defence mechanisms in a hostile 
society. It deadens both his sensitivity to insults and 
towards his own self-awareness. It becomes an outward 
cloak, affording Leventhal the "appearance of composure" (p. 46) 
he hides under, guarding him from others ' suffering and 
from his own. 
Thus Leventhal illustrates Sartre's theories about 
Jews and Allbee similarly exemplifies his perception of 
anti-Semitism. In Allbee Bellow has created a spokesman 
for racial prejudice fearfvlly reminiscent of the voice of 
Nazi Germany. S. Lillian Kremer notes that "Allbee's language 
17
and imagery correspond to the Nazi propaganda of the 1930 ' s."
Allbee himself frequently explains to Leventhal that his 
insults aren't meant to be personal, but theoretical, partly 
a joke (p. 132), partly a habit (p. 236). Kremer compares 
Allbee's insistence on the growing Jewish presence in American 
civilization to the Nazi accusation that the Jews were 
dominating German life. 18 He presumes that the Jews are 
"right at home in this" (p. 119), that they survive and thrive 
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like salamanders in the flames of New York. They have 
usurped the authority of the "old breeds" (p. 121), Allbee's 
ancestors, after whom the streets are named. Instead of 
the descendents of Governor Winthrop, "the children of 
Caliban" (p. 121) are running everything. 
commenting on the declining power of the White Anglo-
Saxon Protestant elite group from the end of the nineteenth 
century, Michael Selzer notes that one form their frustration 
took was an acute aristocratic distaste for the Jews. He 
writes that the 
urbanization and industrialization of America 
brought about a vicious populist reaction against 
'big city' capitalism that pitted the virtues 
of Jacksonian pastoralism against the vices of 
an allegedly Jewish modernity during the first 
quarter of the twentieth century.19 
Allbee's language illustrates Selzer's point. Mourning 
his supposed economic displacement by the Jews, he accuses 
them of acting only for profit, for "percentage" (p. 123), 
of making their spirit their "business assistant" (p. 123). 
Later he talks of making a deal with Leventhal, of accepting 
a "settlement" (p. 188); as he has resigned himself to 
the loss of his original position of "stockholder" (p. 189) 
in American civ~ization. Hjs metaphors are maligning and 
recall the Shylock caricature of the Jew: grasping, calculating, 
conniving, heartless towards the gentile in business. He 
echoes Sartre's anti-Semite, identifying a Jewish will 
to dominate the world in a Jewish takeover of American 
business (p. 64). 
Like the Nazis, who forbade Jews to be involved actively 
in German culture (the Nuremberg Laws of 1935), and like 
70 

Sartre's anti-Semite, who believes that the art and culture 
of the country in which a Jew finds himself can never be 
truly assimilated by the sojourner, Allbee accuses the Jews 
of polluting the American cultural heritage and wishes 
them out of it. He resents the fact that a Jew, Lipschitz, 
has presumed to write a book on the American Transcendentalists, 
Thoreau and Emerson. He objects to Jews singing "American" 
songs (which, ironically, include Negro spirituals). "'You 
have to be born to them, '" he says (p. 38). Jews should 
confine themselves to their own music, "any Jewish song" 
(p. 38), not sully the birthright of Americans. Cultural 
exclusiveness is linked to racial superiority, which the 
Nazis translated into the "final solution". Leventhal 
understands this. '''Millions of us have been killed'" (p. 123) 
is his anguished response to one of Allbee's outbursts. 
Allbee is similarly capable of murdering a Jew. "[H]e could 
have killed me" (p. 222), notes Le venthal, after Allbee has 
tried to asphyxiate him, emulating the method used in the 
camps. 
Yet Bellow's anti-Semite is not a generalised disembodiment 
of prejudice. He is de~icted as an individual, convincingly 
human, realistic, pathetic. At their first meeting, when 
he denies being related to Le venthal--'''By blood? No, no . 
heavens! '" (p. 29}--he is expressing a personal disgust at 
the thought of being "contaminated". That Leventhal is a 
Jew is of paramount importance to Allbee, far outweighing 
any similarities they might share as alienated individuals. 
What he says in general about the usurping Jews and the 
economically displaced Prot e stants in New York applies in 
particular to Leventhal and him s elf. He blames Leventhal for 
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a calculated maliciousness, alleging that in revenge for 
anti-Semitic remarks he passed at a party, Leventhal plotted 
his dismissal by Rudiger. This marks the start of his 
deterioration, while subsequently (but by no means as a 
result of Allbee's downfall) Leventhal has been successful. 
His anti-Semitism is a chosen passion, virulent and 
venomous. Like Sartre's prototype, he affirms his membership 
of an elite by treating Leventhal as an inferior. He presumes 
a superiority based on birth, not on personal merit, and 
imagines that wealth and social prominence and leadership 
are his birthright (p. 121), so fitting Sartre's description 
of the Jew-hater as the man who is afraid, not of the Jews, 
but of his own inadequacies, of change, of society, and 
ultimately, of the human condition. Because of his fears, 
Allbee needs his anti-Semitism. If he could not blame his 
downfall on the Jew, he might be forced to find its cause 
within himself. Only once, in a drunken mood of self-pity, 
does Allbee say '" I am to blame, I know it'" (p. 161). 
He is sadistically attracted to Leventhal and an 
ambival~nt love-hate relationship develops. When he praises 
"'good old Leventhal! ~indhearted Leventhal, you deep 
Hebrew ... '" (p. 160), his compliments conceal a mocking 
quality. Drawn to finger his enemy's hair, he rationalizes 
that he does so '''just to satisfy my curiosity'" (p. 183). 
Sadism is kin to the criminal instinct which Sartre affirms 
is "in the very depths of [the] heart" of the anti-Semite, 
whose ultimate aim is "the death of the Jew.,,20 Even this 
extreme trait is exhibited.by Allbee when he almost murders 
Leventhal by deliberately turning on the gas in his apartment. 
A concept that Sartre fails to note or explore and 
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one which Bellow underlines emphatically is the un~rring 
knowledge the anti-Semite displays of the Jew's responsiveness, 
his sensitivity to the accusations and sufferings of others 
that far exceeds the obligations of everyday intercourse. 
It is not by accident that Allbee decides on Leventhal for 
or help (Williston is in a much stronger~ position to offer it), 
but because his instinct is to lean on the scapegoat of 
ancient times. The "guilt" of the Jew lies in his susceptibility, 
his responsiveness to the plight of others, his need to refute 
the stereotype fostered by the Allbees of this world. He 
is the victim of his own generous impulses, and thus of 
whatever demand his fellowman may make of him. A darker 
dynamic of the relationship involves the "knowledge" the 
Jew-hater has that his victim feels guilty (which recalls 
Kafka's The Trial), and the latter's reciprocal defensiveness 
at being considered guilty of an unspecified or an unjust 
charge. (Unjust allegations against the Jews in the Middle 
Ages include their "using blood, desecrating the Host, 
21poisoning wells;" that they killed Christ, and ritually 
slaughter a Christian child every Passover. 22 In the eighteenth 
century they were denied , entry into the modern world in Europe 
because of a supposed "antipathy to science and culture, a 
preference for trade, a preoccupation with money.,,}23 
The Jew is expected to behave better than his tormentor 
while he is being reviled for being worse. Allbee sneers 
at the Jews, mocking their material success, insulting 
their customs, putting them beyond the pale of gentlemanly 
honour. Yet the code of behaviour he demands from Leventhal 
is far finer than his own. His code does not seem to 
interfere with his inhuman tormenting of the Jew he accuses 
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of betraying human values. The "damages" (p. 119) he asks 
for (while denying that he does) are far in excess of any 
standards of objective bookkeeping. 
Sartre's anti-Semite holds that the Jewish belief 
in free will is a licence to be evil, that the Jew is to 
24blame for all the malevolence in the world. (This mis­
interprets the Jewish belief that evil, outside man, tempts 
him, but the sages are optimistic that he will choose good.)25 
Bellow's presentation of Leventhal questions Sartre's 
contention. He is depicted as being capable of evil, of 
having inadvertently hurt Allbee, but he is by no means the 
devil incarnate. It is Allbee, the lapsed Christian, whose 
"fallen nature" (p. 219) has no trouble in asserting that 
"evil is as real as sunshine" (p. 123). Allbee's own 
corruption is such that he wonders "if anybody is innocent" 
(pp. 180-81). He epitomizes falsehood though his posturing, 
acting, lying. 
It is Allbee who forces Leventhal to confront evil, 
both in himself (to accept culpability for Allbee's fall) 
and in society. So far Leventhal has avoided this knowledge, 
hiding behind an innocence which is "almost a sin" (p. 76). 
When he inadvertently witnesses a woman caught in adultery 
by her husband, he draws the shade (p. 81). But Allbee 
guides him into a knowledge of "a depth of life in which he 
himself would be lost, choked, ended. There lay horror, evil, 
all that he had kept himself from" (p. 224). But, surprising 
Allbee with a prostitute, he confronts and finally expels him 
him from his apartment. Bellow's Jew is thus taught to 
recognise and acknowledge evil committed by a gentile, not 
vice versa, and to reject it. 
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Leventhal's association with Allbee forces him to "choose" 
himself as a Jew, to realise his Jewish condition. He moves 
away from an "inauthentic" identity which separated him from 
the community and alienated him from the traditional values 
of his people. To reject his heritage was to reject himself. 
Acceptance of "authenticity" ends his alienation. It is a 
moral choice and his actions indicate increasingly that 
Leventhal has accepted the social responsibility which is 
the core of being Jewish. In addition, he recognises a moral 
responsibility towards himself on which his personal dignity 
is incumbent. Leviticus 19.18 may urge one to love one's 
neighbour, but not more than oneself, not at the expense of 
26
one's self-esteem. In reply to the question of identity, 
his previous, alienated reply would have been "I am I", that 
is, I am solely responsible for my morality, my actions. 
Now his response would be closer to the traditional Jewish 
answer: "I am the son of my father", that is, I inherit or 
27 
am influenced by my parents' opinions and moral standards. 
Leventhal's own father did not consider himself alienated 
from his society, nor was he alienated from himself or from 
the world of affairs. It was his contempt for the gentiles 
with whom he was forced to do business, and not their opinion 
of him, that excluded them from his private life. Leventhal 
now identifies with his father's thinking. At Mickey's 
funeral, the "chapel displeased him. . . it was peculiar, 
after so many generations, to have this. Prompted by an 
indistinct feeling, he thought to himself, 'Never mind, thanks, 
we'll manage by ourselves. "' (p. 148). His parent's 
contempt for the gentile now permeates his own attitude, for 
example his scorn for Beard's moralising, and he repeats 
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his father's phrase with all its irony: "'Grosser philosoph'" 
(p. 162). 
rrha t he has returned to "ghetto psychology" (p. 202) is 
evident in his opinion of Disraeli. He sees him as the 
prototype of the "inauthentic" Jew whose "boundless ambition" 
proves both the Jew's wish for recognition as a man amongst 
men and the actual failure, in Leventhal's opinion, of 
these asplra lons.. t' 28 The gentiles never forgot Disraeli's 
origins. He was "the monkey on John Bull's chest" (p. 108), 
"[d]er alter Jude" before being "der Mann" (p. 109). He 
objects to Disraeli's breaking the archetypal pattern (scorned 
by Harkavy) of the Jew as spiritual, not political leader 
in the world: '" Jews and empires? . It never seemed right 
to me'" (p. 108). He dislikes what he imagines to be 
Disraeli's attitude towards his Jewishness, likening it to 
"a weakness" (p. 110) which has to be overcome. 
Leventhal's growing Jewish awareness stands out in relief 
against the determined and seemingly effortless assimilation 
of certain fellow Jews, his companions at a cafe luncheon, for 
example. The latter have exchanged an "out-dated" world 
view for a popular American definition of human life, 
suggested by their satisfaction with the inadequacies of 
Livia Hall, the actress. Goldstone (whose name obviously 
alludes to materialism) and Harkavy do not question their 
own assimilation, and show themselves eager to affirm the 
complete integra tion of Disraeli, '" an authentic Englishman, 
if citizenship stands for anything'" (p. 108). Shifcart's 
name ("ship ticket" in Yiddish) suggests the wandering, 
insecure, unwelcome Je~ and is in ironic contrast to his 
avid assumption of Hollywood norms and his ostensible ease 
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in his new surroundings. He now promotes an image of womanhood 
which devalues the quality of being human, but which can 
be marketed successfully (pp. 105-07). 
Harkavy, when younger, seemed unaware that his party 
imitations were in fact caricatures of certain Jewish 
mannerisms and provoked the delighted interest of racists 
like Allbee (pp. 37-38). But later his reaction to Allbee's 
blatant anti-Semitism is a cold fury towards Leventhal 
for allowing the situation to develop: "'Next thing I know 
he sounds like the Protocols, but it's all right with you. 
Influence with Jews! '" he shouted (p. 213). Harkavy, 
unthinkingly sure of his overt assimilation and intrinsic 
Jewishness, dislikes the threat to both implicit in the 
Allbee-Leventhal relationship. 
His self-assurance resembles that of Mary, Leventhal's 
wife, whose origins, whether Jewish or gentile, Bellow 
never clarifies. Her confidence could betoken the fully 
assimilated Jewess, while her name suggests a Christian 
background. Mary writes intimacies on postcards, unconcerned 
who, besides her husband, may read them. Harkavy, too, 
accepts that "'1 have to take myself as I am or push off' II (p. 76). 
Neither seems alienated from either their society or their 
roots. Unlike her husband, Mary is not thrown into confusion 
by a random anti-Semitic remark made by one of the audience 
at a movie. An inner security makes possible lithe value 
of staying cool" (p. 124). Similarly, Harkavy's spontaneous 
reaction to Leventhal's premonitions of anti-Semitism in 
both Williston and Allbee is to dismiss it summarily: "'Oh, 
you're way off, boy, way off'" (p. 78). 
Shifcart and Goldstone, Harkavy and Mary are far closer 
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to Sartre's definition of the "inauthentic Jew", but they 
display none of the unease or anxiety Sartre links with 
this prototype. It is Leventhal, insecure and acutely 
self-conscious, who displays characteristics which suggest 
a Jewish inferiority complex. It is he who thinks he is 
victimized. The historical and religious implications 
of the Jew as victim, as scapegoat of the nations, is 
unexplored by Sartre, but accentuated by Bellow, as the 
title of his novel suggests. Sartre narrows the Jewish 
role of victim to a foil for the man who chooses the non­
human, who needs a scapegoat in order to realize his own 
negativity, and who would be equally satisfied to persecute 
a black or a man with a yellow skin. In addition, the 
persecutor often portrays himself as the victim: "Die Juden 
sind unser ungluck," are the words of Heinrich von Treitschke. 29 
But the Bible contains a prophecy, borne out by history, 
that God's chosen are to suffer guiltlessly: "Know of a 
surety that thy seed shall be a stranger in a land that 
is not theirs, and shall serve them; and they shall afflict 
them . " (Genesis 15.13). This inscrutable divine decree 
(gezeira in Hebrew) is an indirect result of the decree 
of creation, of divine long-suffering with man in spite 
of his sins. The choice for the chosen is either acceptance 
of the divine experience with its attendant burden, or 
. t 30non-eXlS ence. Isaiah 53 describes the martyrdom of 
Israel throughout the centuries, while the calculated near-
genocide in the twentieth century placed Jewish suffering 
on a level difficult fo~ those exempt from it even to imagine. 
Zephyra Porat places Leventhal in this religious and 
historical context. As the victim, 
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Leventhal mildly and meekly turns the other cheek 
to his loud-mouthed, aggressive Christian persecutor 
Allbee, as if whosoever would be a Jew must conquer 
his aggressive drives, must refrain from avenging 
insult and injury, must sacrifice himself, love 
his enemy.31 
It appears that Leventhal's carefully developed role as 
victim supports her contention. At their first meeting, 
he flatly denies any responsibility for Allbee--"What an 
idea!" (p. 34). At their second encounter, his conventional 
mutter of sympathy, "'I'm sorry'" (p. 64), is twisted into 
the acknowledgement of a "charge" (p. 65). Their third 
meeting is dominated by Allbee's virulent anti-Semitic 
attack which leaves Leventhal "uncomprehending and horrified" 
(p. 123). But by turning and walking away, he leaves Allbee 
victor of this altercation. His subsequent submission to 
Allbee's will is clear when he allows Allbee to move into 
his apartment and defile it with a physical and moral 
corruption that is "'nasty, twisted, bitchy, dirty'" (p. 170). 
Initially he refuses to consider "a deal" (p. 157), Allbee's 
idea of "a settlement" (p. 188), but later wavers under 
the determined pressure of his victimizer. Their changing 
relationship seems to prove that Allbee has the whiphand. 
Leventhal emerges as the victim, not only of an isolated 
anti-Semitic incident, but, by implication, as the scapegoat 
of historical necessity. 
At the same time, however, he is cast as the victim 
of ironic circumstance. His aggression towards Rudiger 
(when the latter refused to employ him) unwittingly set 
in motion the course of events which contributed to Allbee's 
downfall: the loss of his job, his uncontrolled drinking, 
his estrangement from his wife, her accidental death, and 
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his subsequent deterioration. That Leventhal is a Jew 
compounds the irony, as Leslie Fiedler has been quick to 
note. He points out the ambiguity of Bellow's title, 
unexplored by Porat: Bellow is not "'content with the simple 
equation: the victim equals the Jew, the Jew the victim, '" 
but "'has had the imagination and the sheer nerve to portray 
the Jew, the Little Jew, as victimizer as well as victim. ,"32 
It is precisely because Leventhal has caused--however 
unwittingly--Allbee's present degradation, precisely because 
he comes to accept responsibility for his downfall, that 
he allows Allbee to browbeat him. As victimizer, he 
repudiates the role assigned to him by Porat. Inseparably 
intertwined with his submission to his persecutor is his 
actual power as the original victimizer. 
The ambivalence of Allbee's and Leventhal's shared 
roles as victim and victimizer is stressed in the presentation 
of Leventhal as Allbee's "duplicated" identity in the 
psychological sense. While retaining a clear awareness 
of Allbee's viciousness, Leventhal nonetheless develops 
"a curious emotion of closeness--for it was an emotion" (p. 133) 
for his victimizer. He abhors Allbee's drinking, his 
dirtiness, the filth he leaves behind in the apartment (p. 169). 
Yet, moving towards an identification with Allbee, he 
displays similar reprehensible qualities. He, too, is 
slovenly in dress and habits, he also gets drunk and sleeps 
away from home. He seems to ape Allbee's outward behaviour 
unconsciously. But the latter's presence also forces him 
to an unwilling confrontation with the darker depths within 
himself, to face what "everybody knows but nobody wants 
to admit" (p. 184), the admission of his own imperfection. 
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Bellow has further complicated the equation by presenting 
Leventhal not only as the victim and the victimizer, but 
by adding to his other roles that of indifferent bystander, 
a role given prominence by Elie Wiesel more than two decades 
later. Wiesel writes that "[d]own deep . man is not 
only an executioner, not only a victim, not only a spectator: 
he is all three at once.,,33 Leventhal's indifference is 
the protection of contemporary man in a moral wasteland; 
his role as victim, the heritage of the children of Israel; 
while that of victimizer could perhaps anticipate the largely 
defensive tactics now practised by the Israelis. 
Porat (herself an Israeli) contends that for Bellow 
Judaism and violence are mutually exclusive, that Bellow 
sees the Jew as the Christian does, as "the true Lamb of 
God, the true victim.,,34 Earl Rovit has a similar idea 
of the "cautious" position of the Jews, who prefer vacillation 
and dread to fighting the evils of life. 35 Their censure 
disregards the Jewish tradition which reveres, not the 
courage and manliness of the Western ideal as portrayed 
by Hemingway, but righteousness and wisdom. ("The Midrash 
extols David the singer of psalms rather than the slayer 
of Goliath.,,)36 
When attempting to "place" Bellow's stand on Jewish 
aggression, one needs to remember that he is a Diaspora 
Jew, whose survival, unlike the Israelis', is not contingent 
on protecting a homeland, and that The Victim was written 
twenty years before the 1967 Six Day War. Bellow's attitude 
towards Israel, which lives "with the nightmare of annihilation," 
where Jews can't "take their right to live for granted," 
is clear in To Jerusalem and Back (1976). Here both an 
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admiration for Israeli achievement and the fear that the 
Israelis have not yet "burst from historical sleep" to 
confront the reality of possible extinction are shown. 37 
But to return to The Victim, is Bellow's presentation 
of Leventhal that of a "true victim", of a man totally 
opposed to physical violence? Indisputably, Leventhal's 
first confrontation with Allbee indicates that the impulse 
towards violence (his imaginary assaults if Allbee "starts 
something" [po 27] or follows him home [po 33]), is held 
in check by social constraints and a heritage of non-violence. 
His planned physical violence ("' ... I'll punch him in 
the jaw. I'll knock him down .• I swear, I'll throw 
him down and smash his ribs for him! '" [po 34]) indicates 
the frustration of the weak who fear aggression in others. 
But when Allbee actually lays hands on Leventhal at 
their next meeting, he defends himself: "He pushed Allbee 
with all the force of his powerful arms. He fell against 
the wall with an impact that sickened Leventhal" (p. 68). 
Although violence "sickens" Leventhal and takes Allbee 
by surprise--'" [t]hClt I 5 not how you people go about things. 
Not with violence'" (p. 30)--the former is finally turned 
into the aggressor by Allbee's immoral behaviour. Leventhal 
ultimately evicts his tormentor from his apartment with 
physical force. "Leventhal pushed him. . made a rush 
at him. . . Pinning his arms, he wheeled him around •. 
[and] thrust him out on the landing" (p. 221). 
Later Allbee returns to kill the Jew by asphyxiation. 
Previously accused of avoiding danger, of "keeping his 
spirit under lock and key" (p. 123) like the rest of his 
people, Leventhal struggles with his would-be murderer 
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in mortal combat, acting in accordance with the idea of 
a Jewish God as a "vengeful God . . who ordered his people, 
if a man seeks your life, take his first.,,38 The fight 
also recalls Genesis 32.24-28, when Jacob wrestled with 
Samael, a prince of darkness. Rabbi Solomon Ephraim 
Luntschitz equates the angel with a trait in Jacob's 
personality which he must confront and conquer so that 
spiritual resilience may be established. 39 Similarly, 
if the fight is given a psychological interpretation, 
Leventhal must overcome certain weaknesses, must wrestle 
with the dark forces of his alter ego, in order to gain 
moral strength. 
Leventhal finally expels Allbee from his apartment, 
breaking forever their intimate association and exorcising 
himself of the roles of victim, victimizer, and indifferent 
bystander. No longer is he a victim, as he has answered 
Allbee conclusively with brute force, with the language 
that "was all they understood" (po 124). Nor can he be 
the victimizer, as Allbee's attempt to kill him outweighs 
any previous harm he might have caused Allbee. The actions 
the above-mentioned roles have forced him into effectively 
shatter his earlier passivity with regard to himself and 
society. In this scene, a kind of parable, Bellow might 
be suggesting what Porat contends he does not: that 
retaliation of force such as practised by the Israelis 
may be the only answer to anti-Semitism. Yet the novel does 
not suggest conclusively that this is so. 
At odds with the idea of violence is the halting 
development of Leventhal's "second sight", of a moral and 
metaphysical awareness that is rooted in the ethical teachings 
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and behaviour of his Jewish ancestors, which belie self-
interest and violence. The enlargement of his morality, 
his tentative assertion of values suggests, in Sartre's 
terminology, that Leventhal is "choosing" himself as a 
40Jew. His "choice of authenticity" is a moral decision 
which allows him an ethical security far superior to that 
gained temporarily by violence. The breadth of Jewish 
morality hinted at in the characterization of Leventhal 
goes a long way towards refuting Sartre's charge of the 
Jew as one whose religion has dissolved over twenty-five 
centuries, and captures what is perhaps the most enduring 
Jewish quality in a modern Jew: the persistence of a set 
of ethical values. 
These standards are not exclusive to Judaism, but 
are entertained in various degrees by most of the monotheistic 
religions and by many agnostics and atheists "whose faith 
41
and morals. [Judaism] has so largely moulded." But 
with regard to Leventhal, they will be discussed with particular 
Jewish reference. By putting certain ethical precepts 
into action, Leventhal begins to emulate the "authentic" 
Jew, who asserts himself as being different. In this way 
he deprives the anti-Semite of his power. 
Bellow's "Authentic Jew" 
What, according to Bellow, would constitute an "authentic 
Jew" in twentieth-century New York? Schlossberg, a Jewish 
journalist, defines the prototype. He dismisses the idea 
of "more than human", the aspiration to rise above the 
common lot, even to the God-like position of immortality. 
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He also disregards as IIless than human ll the concept of 
people without an inner life who resemble Allbee's "full 
bundles" (p. 67), prepacked, easily interchangeable, "blank" 
(p. 113). He advocates a middle state, to be lIexactly human" 
(p. 112), not more or less. This state must contain three 
qualities, greatness, beauty, and dignity. 
This definition seems in line with liberal Humanism, 
which stresses the importance of man (in contrast with 
the importance of God) and teaches that the dignity and 
worth of each individual is to be respected by others. 
Is the "authentic Jew ll for Bellow therefore no more than 
a universal Humanist? The distinction lies in the 
interpretation of "greatness," "beauty," and "dignity," and 
becomes clearer when the definition is considered in its 
correct context in the novel, and when it is subsequently 
enlarged on by Leventhal. 
John J. Clayton has noted that Schlossberg is an 
authority figure, an alter Jude whose speech bears the weight 
of Jewl'sh tradl'tl'on.42 Sc hIossberg s t resses tha t "the 
specifications" (p. 112) of his definition are not his 
own, that he is acting as spokesman for a group of Jews: 
"'Between ourselves we can tell the truth, can't we (p. 112)?'" 
His audience listens attentively. No-one interrupts or 
contradicts him. Shifcart's joking "'amen and amen'" at 
the conclusion of his speech is a form of ratification. 
His approval is in contrast with his previous disagreement 
with Schlossberg, which suggests an alternate and perhaps 
a double set of values. 
What Schlossberg says has meaning for Jews because 
it reiterates the Humanistic stance of Judaism. (As Knopp 
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has argued, is no definition of Jewish Humanism as 
It is not a separate i , as is 
Humanism, but the incorporation if Jewish values 
a way of Ii .)43 potential s and beauty 
recognises in man would not be the secular 
Renaissance man, h educated in the ities 
and sciences, but that of the reI ous, or morally 
aware Jew, exercis his divine given free will. Manfred 
1 observes 
] i dignity of man, s 
of his talents or stat Ii , preci 
because is the responsibility and 
is the most 
important 
For the Jew, d ty is by 
individual moral responsi lity. The idea of responsi lity 
IIis implicit in sberg's urg I Have d ity, you 
unders me? d (p. 113), and is understoodf II 
by Is himself " drawn" (p. 105) 
(The name "Schlos ", a lation 
or a lock, and " , a mountain 
or , hints that may have 
key to Leventhal's problem of ty.) C ton argues 
's s no ion in the plot, 
but, as l's act indicate, theme af ts 
plot. 45 
1 enlarges on sberg's 
finit of "human". "But ess one was more than human 
or s than , as Mr S put it, payments 
had to be met" (p. 128). He adds that "he liked to think 
44 
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'human' meant accountable in spite of many weaknesses-­
at the last moment, tough enough to hold" (p. 129). This 
moral accounting is calculated in two different columns. 
There are the inevitable H.P. payments, the duties of those 
who have voluntarily entered a contract (such as Max and 
Elena). There is also the duty, the accountability of 
every man (for example Leventhal himself) to prove his 
humanity by accepting resonsibility for his fellow man, 
regardless of the lack of a "contract" or obligation. 
Leventhal's definition is at the centre of Judaism, 
which holds that man's obligation towards his fellow man 
is the foundation of the moral universe: "He who transacts 
his business honestly and is pleasing to his fellow men 
is accounted as having fulfilled the entire Torah." 46 
The responsibility of man is one of the three pillars which 
purportedly support the universe (the other two are Torah 
and Service to God). Social responsibility, not individual 
salvation, is the Jewish ethic. Life is seen as a moral 
task. The Good Life is one of action, in service of one's 
fellow men (and thus of God). The moral life is one of 
· . th 47persona I concern and I ov~ng serv~ce on ear . 
Therefore, to be "exactly human" is to choose the 
dignity, and the concomitant beauty and greatness that 
goes with one's accepting of moral responsibility. To 
refuse it is to obliterate the intrinsic humanity of people 
and to make it possible for the Allbees to conceive of 
them as empty parcels of waste paper swept up by the capricious 
winds of fate. The choice of dignity suggests that Bellow's 
"authentic Jew", despite his discarding ritual and custom, 
his neglect of Torah and synagogue services, has retained 
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the morality inherent in Judaism. It has to be translated 
into action, into actual "payment". This becomes evident 
as Leventhal assumes increasing responsibility for Max's 
family (endorsing the strong family ties among Jews) and 
for Allbee's welfare. 
The Implications of Responsibility for the Self 
The concept of responsibility is the moral core 6f 
Jewish ethics. Its social importance is humorously illustrated 
by Israel Zangwill in The King of Schnorrers,48 while the 
Jewish critic Daniel Fuchs notes the "typical Jewish sense 
of obligation" in Bellow's "characteristic metaphor" of 
k ' ", H 49cont rac t and under t a lng ln erzog. Responsibility is 
also the fulcrum of The Victim, introduced by the first 
epigraph, which tells of the inadvertent killing of Ifrit's 
son by a merchant who carelessly threw away some date stones. 
The incident suggests the following questions: Is a man 
guilty of an unintentional action? What are the boundaries 
of human responsibility? How far do one's obligations 
towards one's fellow men extend? The ideas of causality, 
contingency, and fortuitous action are also introduced 
in this epigraph. 
Bellow plays on the theme of responsibility with ever-
deepening variations. One of its most important aspects 
is self-responsibility, which involves a knowledge of the 
self, and Bellow indicates that Leventhal hides from this 
knowledge. He introduces him as a man whose eyes display 
"an intelligence not greatly interested in its own powers, 
as if preferring not to be bothered by them, indifferent; 
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and this indifference appeared to be extended to others" 
(p. 17). Leventhal avoids self-knowledge and yet is 
uncomfortably aware of the importance that self-confrontation, 
which exposes the "really important things, the deepest 
issues" (pp. 101-02) may hold. The "operation" (p. 215) 
he needs to perform to heal himself (Asa means physician, 
healer) is constantly postponed. 
Only once does he confront one of the crucial "deep 
issues" (p. 102), admitting that self-hatred leads to self-
degradation, when Rudiger exposes and confirms his feelings 
of inadequacy: 
he himself had begun to fear that the lowest 
price he put on himself was too high and he could 
scarcely understand why anyone should want to 
pay for his services. And under Rudiger's influence 
he had felt this. 'He made [him] believe what 
[he] was afraid of' (p. 102). 
This feeling of worthlessness is a complicated tangle of 
personal, social and Jewish inferiority. He suspects 
derogatory judgements from Jews as well as gentiles, from 
both Dr Denisart (p. 58) and Shifcart (p. 114), and from 
the Willistons (p. 93). Lacking a clear definition of 
self, he is at the mercy of others' opinions. If they 
are reassuring, as Mary's are, he feels confident, but a 
disparaging remark shatters his self-esteem. His inferiority 
feeling makes him vulnerable to Allbee's attacks and he is 
unable to don the protective self-confidence which would 
discourage persecution. Only by assuming moral responsibility 
for others does Leventhal come to appropriate it for himself, 
and this, finally, "heals" him. 
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Responsibility for Others 
Mickey's illness and Allbee's accusations are the 
direct causes of gradual change in Leventhal. Initially 
he performs his family duty with exasperated impatience, 
with anger against both irresponsible parents. Elena is 
ignorant of elementary hygiene and scientific medicine; 
Max has chosen to live away from home. "'He sends them 
money and that makes him a father. That's the end of his 
responsibilities ••• that's his idea of duty'" (p. 115), 
Leventhal thinks. Because he is aggrieved at carrying 
his brother's burden, his mitzvah, his good deed, is robbed 
of true ethical value which, according to the precepts 
of Judaism, depends on the underlying intention of the heart. 
Intimate contact with Max's family changes his responses. 
His interest in Philip deepens until, "full of love for 
the boy" (p. 194), he wishes he could protect him from the 
realities of death and grief, a wish tantamount to an 
assumption of total responsibility for his nephew. His 
reappraisal of Elena's sanity indicates that he feared 
she suffered from mental illness, like his late mother, 
while his condemnation of his brother is replaced by a 
complete identification with his grief. Max may have married 
out of the faith and be associated with what have been 
construed as non-Jewish characteristics: he is "a common 
labourer, an absentee father, a distant brother,,;50 while 
Asa, more in line with Jewish tradition, has risen above 
the working class and cares for his wife and his brother's 
family. Yet Max has retained a humanity Asa lacks and 
can learn from. Max's assessments of his mother-in-law 
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( "a harmless old woman" [p. 196]), of Elena (he recalls 
her strength during the Depression), even of the nurses 
who failed to inform him that his son was dead (p. 197), 
form a direct contrast to his brother's condemnation of 
these people. 
Asa parts wi th his brother, "feeling his heart shaken" 
(p. 197) in response to his confession and to the idea 
of being "half burnt out already" (p. 197). This emotional 
response suggests the breaking of the studied indifference 
and contempt under which Leventhal has been hiding his 
sensitivities. A further implication is that by identifying 
with his brother, he opens his heart to tenderness and 
compassion, qualities essential to the Jewish sense of self. 
Once the heart has fulfilled its duties, his actions towards 
his relations have true ethical value. 
Leventhal's complex attitude towards Allbee undergoes 
a similar change. At first he vacillates between a reluctant 
personal acceptance of indirect responsibility r"I may be 
to blame in a way, indirectly'" [po 33]} and a downright 
denial of it. But the social implications of responsibility, 
devoid of private guilt or obligation, are unavoidable. 
Leventhal feels a kinship with the detritus of humanity, 
with "horrible images of men" (p. 61), with "the lost, 
the outcast, the overcome, the effaced, the ruined" (p. 23). 
Allbee's accusation stimulates a conditioned Jewish response 
which urges communal responsibility, to "love thy neighbour 
as thyself," to be thy brother's keeper, to remeinberthat 
if "I am only for myself, what am I?,,51 Leventhal himself 
has defined "human" as "accountable" (p. 129). His latent 
Jewishness encourages him to meet the moral "costs" (p. 128) 
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demanded by Allbee by caring for him. The "bill of goods" 
(p. 212) Allbee has sold him is a reminder of a community 
consciousness submerged until recently by city pressures. 
Unlike Harkavy, who fails to understand the implications 
of the Allbee-Leventhal relationship, Leventhal's attitude 
now suggests a growing awareness of responsibility: "'I 
must have wanted to buy'" (p. 212). (The money metaphors 
point to an ironic contrast between Allbee's former accusations 
that the Jews have ruined the gentiles financially and the 
value of the Jews' private moral bookkeeping for the gentiles.) 
Leventhal's response to Allbee becomes personal, more 
than a social obligation. At first he resists identifying 
with his plight (p. 62), but empathy is unavoidable. Allbee 
is "half revolting .•• but half--ah, half you could not 
help feeling sorry" (p. 160). A "kind of dismayed pity" (p. 161) 
fills him, never obliterating his sense of injury, but 
submerging it sufficiently for him to be kind to Allbee. 
Again, the duties of the heart are fulfilled. 
Leventhal's moral obligations towards his fellow man 
confer on him a dignity that begins with a conscious exercise 
of freewill, a breaking of the aimlessness of his existence. 
Although he considers Elena's first call for help "somewhat 
in the nature of a duty" (p. 10), he answers it. On Allbee's 
first visit, he chooses confrontation rather than flight: 
It occurred to him that he could escape Allbee. . 
he could still get away •..• He could go even 
now. . . • Yet he stood firm and strangely enough 
he felt that he had proved something by doing 
so (p. 60). 
The development of his dignity is balanced against a contra­
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dictory definition of man drawn from his observation of 
people in New York who crush their finer, spiritual 
inclinations: "Since it was done by so many, what was it 
but human (p. 128)?" What obliterates the dignity of the 
wastelander is the "fear of death, of life more than death, 
perhaps" (p. 128). But Leventhal hearkens to a moral 
imperative, to the affirmation Judaism demands of man's 
relation to the world by will and deed, which changes his 
relationship towards people. 
The changes alter his personality. He now questions 
his former neutrality, the "caution that led to sleep and 
dullness" (p. 85). He has shared Mrs Harkavy's scepticism 
about nurturing concern and compassion; her dictum that 
people "'are bound not to take things too much to heart, 
for their own protection'" (p.73) is echoed by Leventhal, 
who agrees that you "couldn't find a place in your feelings 
for everything, to give at every touch like a swinging door, 
the same for everyone" (p. 85). Neutrality minimises the 
danger "of being broken" (p. 85). The realization that 
this is a denial of life, of being what one is to the utmost, 
now horrifies him. "'Dear God, am I so lazy, so weak, is 
my soul fat like my body (p. 139)?'" he asks, and proceeds 
to rid his soul of its harmful corpulence. For example, 
he reacts to the news of Mickey's death with spontaneous 
grief--"He could not restrain the play of muscles in his 
throat.. he began to cry" (p. 145). This death is a 
harsh reality for him, devoid of the artificial falsifying 
which makes necessary "paper grass in the grave" (p. 207). 
The fatty layer of indifference no longer protects his heart. 
The moral insentience of the "less than human" is broken. 
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Leventhal has also rai himself to the ranks 
ISthe human II by judging actions 

his own. He finds Elena and Max lty of being bad S; 

Harkavy, iling in his duty as a end (p. 77); 

Willistons, of prejudicial judgement of his actions; even 

s associates at work, of a of That 
judged him and found him wanting comes as a shock 
to But by ng to ticism in 
a way· which proves that he accepts its idity, he 
IS IIremoves f from s ca 
moves closer to ing "exactly human". 
A variation on of res lity is 
attitude of Willistons towards Leventhal and Al 
It is ironic that censure an Protestant 
who upholds ct biblical dictum action and 
consequence I to reconsider meaning 
of respons lity (pp. 95-103). In a society morality 
outlines, Williston has, Leventhal, 
decency and fair play in the old lish sense. 
letter the ous 1, 
a comparat stranger. But, beginning to question the 
nature icence, Leven recons his ses: 
You might he was a bother 
to you you rid him. You 
might do it se you disl him rly 
and wanted to pay for your udice and then, 
feeling you had paid, you were free and even 
entit to h (p. 82). 
Willistons and 1 agree that to be human 
means to be Ie. But do agree on the meaning 
of compassion? r actions towa e who 
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bear out Milan Kundera's inferences about the word "compassion". 
He points out the etymological differences in different 
languages which affect its meaning. Coming from the Latin 
"with" (cum) and "suffering" (passio), the English word 
means that we sympathize with those who suffer; or, that 
we cannot observe coolly while others suffer. The word 
"pity", which has a very similar meaning, also has overtones 
of condescension towards the sufferer. Kundera concludes 
that "compassion" is therefore an inferior, second-rate 
sentiment in English. In languages such as German and 
Polish the word "compassion" is formed by a noun formed 
from an equivalent prefix combined with the word that means 
"feeling". Its usage is approximately the same, but its 
meaning is broader. It means, to share all emotion, anxiety 
or joy, happiness or fear. 52 The Hebrew word for compassion, 
rahaMim, has the more encompassing meaning of sharing all 
emotion. The root of the word is rehem, a womb, which 
implies the capacity to share all feelings, as well as 
suggesting the unique care of a mother. The everyday usage 
of rahmonis is to share (without any condescension) the 
suffering of others. 53 
The Willistons' interpretation of "compassion" seems 
to follow its meaning in English. Their pity for Allbee 
is conveyed as a detached interest for a former friend, 
a settling of an obligation with cold charity, ten dollars, 
while they carefully avoid any involvement with the nastiness 
of his personal life. Their attitude (in contrast to 
Harkavy's, for example [pp. 212-13]) suggests that Leventhal 
must shoulder the burden of his real obligation as well 
as his inherited burden, the suffering for the sins of 
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others which is the rightful load of the Jew. Allbee may 
visit them, but he must stay with Leventhal. Leventhal's 
compassion is far closer to the interpretation of the German 
word mit gefi.ihl,(literally "feeling with"), or the Hebrew 
rahamiPI. He moves beyond interpreting his responsibilities 
with impersonal, cold efficiency, or grudgingly, or because 
no-one else will perform them, or because he has the means 
to. Drawn to Allbee "with a kind of affection" (p. 182), 
he shares his suffering. 
The "Suffering Servant" 
Leventhal practises tzedakah, the righteous discharge 
of social responsibility. But it affords him no relief 
from the "spell of confusion and despair" (p. 187) life 
has cast over him. What he has assumed, with the widening 
of his emotional sensibilities, is a burden of suffering 
quite different from his previous one of hopelessness and 
nervous irritability. He suffers for his part in Allbee's 
fall. By acting as a surrogate paren~ he suffers empathically 
for his brother as well as for Allbee, because of his acute 
identification with his plight. Leventhal, far more than 
the financially and emotionally secure Harkavys, fellow Jews, 
because of his vulnerability, his self doubt and insecurity, 
is able to empathise with suffering humanity. He begins to 
see himself as a part of, not apart from, it. The revelation 
that "everything, everything without exception took place 
as if within a single soul or person" (p. 139) is accompanied 
by "a rare, pure feeling of happiness" (p. 139). This 
truth, that we are all to a greater or lesser extent mirror 
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one , links 1 with all humani 
and in particular wi his as recalls " 
explicit recognition in Allbee's eyes which could not 
was the his own II (p • 1 39 ) • 
Suf ng sharpens his what it means 
to human. His ical knowledge of 
his actual experience--"you cou It expect to be 
, but only try to do what they must. hideous 
s were done, cannibalistic things. Good as 1, 
of course" (p. 85). A na desire, that it is 
to think well. people, is al when Al 
moves in, violating his privacy by snooping and reading 
his pr corres il his 1 bed with 
a prostitute, finally attempt to him. 
does not allow evil lito possess his being,"54 but confronts 
it reacts to S II was caught it, with 
awful pain and d , in heavy blows" (p. 224). Uncorrupted 
by Allbee, firms a ter power moving 
events man's brutality to man.,,55 
INo is he diminis by suffering 
i f Ins of noting it spass ly 
generalizing about it as he once did: "Suffering? Of course, 
suf exper it" (p. 36), its n 
has contributed to the Itexpansion" of his 
relevance Bellow's second epigraph is now An 
unknown aspect of lithe human has been revealed toII 
1. He has the hel sness human 
suf ing, "innumerable s ... imploring, wrathful, 
despairing faces," and has accepted responsibility a 
of it. Awareness of his and its accompanying 
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suffering marks Leventhal as "the eternal Jew, accepting 
his moral responsibility for a world he never made.,,56 
Conclusion 
The coda stresses the differences, both internal and 
external, betwe~n Leventhal and Allbee. The former looks 
younger, more approachable. He feels better. No longer 
are anxiety, boredom and nausea his predominant emotions, 
the expression of the sufferings of the self-centred, of 
the alienated. Mary is home again. Her pregnancy promises 
a strong family unity, with Leventhal competently assuming 
the responsibilities of parenthood. By contrast, Allbee 
resembles his empty packages, with skin "a fabric quality, 
crumpled and blank" (p. 236). His outward affluence signifies 
"something extraordinary, barbaric, rich, even decadent" 
(p. 235), which suggests his kinship with the "barbaric 
fellahin" (p. 9) who thrive in New York, but Leventhal 
discerns an inward "decay" (p. 236). 
The reality which preoccupies Allbee at the end of 
the novel is still the importance of social standing, whether 
we are conductors or passengers on the train of life. But 
Leventhal fumbles with the idea that the position one 
occupies is not necessarily the most important aspect of 
living. People are mistaken if they believe that promises 
are made at the beginning of life, safe-guarding one's 
allocated position. The nature of the promise is different. 
"Possibly there was a promise, since so many felt it. He 
himself was almost ready to affirm that there was" (p. 231). 
But this promise cannot exist in a world where all is "a 
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IIshuffle, all, all accidental hapha (p. 231). It 
can exist only if one bel s in an 
rea ty which is beginni to st 
at the is a metaphysical one. He 
moved Ai's ion to question 
him the force whi "runs things!! (p. 238), whi 
sets the in in mot The question remains 
a ing it, s himself from the 
idea an arbi existence. The morali has 
ised is religious in essence, although he has yet 
who ined it. 
• 
Chapter Three 

Herzog 

And the peculiar idea entered my (Jewish) mind that 
we'd see about this! My life would prove a different 
point altogether. Very tired of the modern form of 
historicism which sees in this civilization the defeat 
of the best hopes of Western religion and thought, 
what Heidegger calls the second Fall of Man into the 
guotidian or ordinary.1 
Introduction 
Herzog presents a challenge to the reader. Is the 
novel to be read primarily as one of ideas, or is it a 
novel of character? To investigate either approach would 
be entirely feasible, but is there no integration between 
the two? Could Herzog's Jewishness not provide the link? 
In order to explore this possibility, this chapter will 
consider first Herzog's family background, then his 
assimilation to America. In the discussion of ideas which 
follows, the ethical values of Herzog's orthodox Jewish 
education will be balanced against certain currently 
fashionable philosophical and literary ideas. The concluding 
section will attempt to trace those aspects of his personality 
which resemble traditional Jewish types. Finally, the 
development of his character and his moral enlargement, 
which is bound up implicitly with his emotional and 
intellectual responses to modernity, will be considered. 
Bellow himself draws a dividing line between Herzog 
and his first two novels. In an interview with Granville 
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Hicks, he says: 
I consider Herzog a break from victim literature • . . 
As one of the chieftains of that school, I have 
the right to say this •.•• Victim literature 
purports to show the impotence of the ordinary 
man. In writing Herzog I felt that I was completing 
a certain development, coming to the end of a 
literary sensibility. This sensibility implies 
a certain attitude towards civilization--anomaly, 
estrangement, the outsider, the collapse of humanism. 2 
Bellow may deny a link between Herzog and victim literature, 
but surely Herzog shares the guilt and powerlessness, the 
alienation and self-victimization of Joseph and Leventhal? 
Are not their similarities of situation evident, their 
isolation and loneliness? Temperamentally they have in 
common irascibility, anxiety, hypochondriacal tendencies 
and the eagerness to suffer. Like Joseph and Leventhal, 
Herzog may be trying to define his existence in a frightening, 
uncaring universe, but unlike the former heroes, he has the 
power of an unquestioned moral vigour, supported by an 
awesome intellect. These strengths finally overcome personal 
despondency and generalised pessimism, and find spontaneous 
expression in his attitude towards both man and history, 
towards himself and the "crisis" of the twentieth century. 
While no claims are made to an exclusive Jewish quality 
in Herzog's moral (and ultimately religious) stamina--other 
philosophies and religions with which Bellow is familiar, 
such as Christianity, indubitably have precepts in common 
with Judaism--in this chapter Herzog's moral resilience 
will be explored largely in its Jewish context. An 
identifiable moral stance places Herzog in an historic 
Jewish tradition and serves as a reminder of the endurance 
1 01 
of the Jews, who have survived previous catastrophes without 
abandoning the image of man to which they have pledged 
themselves. Herzog's daily experience seems to mock the 
dignity of man and fashionable scholarship appears bent 
on negating all future for mankind. But the novel challenges 
both the belittling of the individual and defeatist attitudes 
with the thrust of a positive, life-affirming morality 
expressed through its protagonist. 
Norman Mailer states disparagingly that Herzog and 
other heroes "of moral earnestness" are "passive, timid, 
other-directed, pathetic, up to the nostrils in anguish: 
the world is stronger than they are; suicide calls.,,3 But 
surely this is to ignore the pervasive tone of the novel, 
its humorous irony, the cutting sharpness of Herzog's Yiddish 
wit, whether self-directed (admiringly or admonishingly) 
or aimed at the human condition. Herzog's comic irony 
becomes a form of moral vision which defines his attitude 
towards himself and towards the progress of civilization. 
It is a survival mechanism, earthy, practical, defying 
philosophical abstractions. It frees the novel from the 
gloom of Bellow's victim literature and conveys a message 
of practical salvation for the self. 
Liela H. Goldman calls Herzog Bellow's most Jewish 
novel, but argues that it represents a remembered, not 
a living Judaism. She slates Bellow's incorrect use of 
Hebrew, the fact that he writes no letters to past or 
contemporary Jewish thinkers, and what she interprets as 
a disloyalty to the Jews evident in certain character 
depictions (for example the damaging stereotypes of the 
lawyers, Himmelstein and Simkin).4 Goldman may not wish 
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any depiction of a Jew by a Jew to be unflattering, although 
it be based on valid sociological observation, but Bellow 
himself voices a contrary opinion: "It may appear that the 
survivors of Hitler's terror in Europe and Israel will 
benef i t more from good publicity than from rea 1 i s tic 
representation," but in the final analysis, "[iJn literature 
we cannot accept a political stand~rd."5 Goldman does, 
however, note the "unconscious philosophical II level Of Jewish­
ness in the novel which "unknowingly infiltrates the human 
psyche through generations and expresses itself in an attitude 
towards life and in the modus vivendi of the individual." 
She identifies "a basic Jewish ethos" in Herzog which is 
expressed in his choice of life, not death: "He could not 
allow himself to die yet•... His duty was to live" (p. 33); 
in his interpretation of personal freedom of choice as 
meaningful, unlike the "howling emptiness" (p. 45) of 
contemporary interpretation; in his idea of active social 
commitment: "I really believe that brotherhood is what 
makes a man human" (p. 280); and finally, in his acknowledgement 
of a contract with God, to complete "his assignment, whatever 
that wasil (p. 238).6 
Bellow never allows Herzog to deny his ancestral roots; 
instead, he is shown taking pleasure in his Jewish family 
background. This is in direct contrast with his treatment 
of his first hero, Joseph, from whom Bellow carefully removed 
all trace of Jewish--or any other--ancestry. Perhaps Joseph's 
selling of the birthright of his Jewish identity for a mess 
of pottage, a universal anonymity, mirrors Bellow's own 
attempts at assimilation at that time. That Joseph no 
longer (hypothetically) identifies himself as lithe son of 
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his father" according to Jewish custom described by Daniel 
Bell, that he denies his Jewish heritage, may be indicated 
7in the withholding of his surname. Franz Kafka, also a 
Jew, named the protagonist of his novel The Castle K., 
which suggests both the alienation of the hero from his 
family roots and a personal lack of identity. But Moses 
Elkanah Herzog suffers from no such deprivation. 
Unlike Leventhal, who has no Jewish family background, 
no traditional moral upbringing, and who is forced into 
a halting, agonised moral definition of self, Herzog reaffirms 
certain moral precepts which may be interpreted as Jewish 
in origin. His ideas of God, the universe, and man, on 
which he bases his opposition to Christianity, Alienation, 
and Romanticism, suggest the basic beliefs of Judaism. So 
does his awareness of civic responsibility. This responsibilit1 
encompasses a generalised "humanism of civilized posSibility,,,8 
of fulfilling moral obligations in the real world in community, 
not in isolation, of understanding that the "real and essentiaJ 
question is one of our employment by other human beings and 
their employment by us" (p. 280), but it could also recall 
specifically, Hillel) the Jewish sage's enlarged social vision 
not to seek separation from the community.9 
He opposes a passive acceptance of nonentity, of 
impersonality, aware that he alone is able to define his 
own identity: "! am Herzog. I have to be that man" (p. 73). 
His sense of obligation is religious, "lowe the powers 
that created me a human life" (p. 227), and again could 
evoke Hillel--this time his stress on personal obligation. 
Herzog's assertion of a sense of self also affirms the 
rights of the individual in a compulsively collective society; 
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it is a refusal to be devalued, to support the prevalent 
persistent dehumanisation. 
His vehement opposition to modernism, defined by Daniel 
Fuchs as "alienation, fragmentation, break with tradition, 
isolation and magnification of subjectivity, threat of the 
void, weight of vast numbers and monolithic impersonal 
institutions, hatred of civilization itself," imbues the 
novel with a resilient energy and indicates a realistic, an 
10
essentially Jewish inclination, not a visionary one. Thus 
the humorous irony of the novel rests on the discrepancy 
between the hero's moral and intellectual propensities and 
his awareness--often humorous, or self-disparaging, or self-
pitying, or complacent--of his failure to realize them. 
The Jewish Family Legacy 
Bellow observes that the 
Jewish slums of Montreal during [his] childhood, 
just after the First World War, were not too 
far removed from the ghettos of Poland and Russia. 
Life in such places of exile and suffering was 
anything but ordinary.11 
Thus Bellow writes of the shtetl experience virtually firsthand, 
juxtaposing a ghetto-like insularity with the promise of 
those widening social and cultural horizons documented by 
12Irving Howe in World of Our Fathers. Life on Napoleon 
street reflects accurately both the poverty and the religious 
spirit of the Jewish immigrant experience. Living in a 
slum, part of a despised minority, the Jew can still awake, 
"eagerly loving" what he sees, and pray, "'[h]ow goodly 
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are thy tents, 0 Israel'" (p. 146). The paradox, that 
those who guard the Torah live in squalor, suggests that 
ordinary existence can be hallowed by faith. (The celebration 
of the Sabbath has always indicated what Elie Wiesel calls 
"the divine revelation in Time," that the ideal world can 
be contained in the everyday world.)13 Because of the 
holiness inherent in the common life, it is hallowed. 14 
This Jewish belief is at the core of the legend which tells 
that the world is sustained by the purity of thirty six 
saints, unknown even to themselves, who live humbly as 
ordinary people. 15 Herzog, who grows up in a society where 
the relations between the individual, the community, and 
God find expression in the solidarity of family life and 
in the sense of responsibility to the community, later affirms 
that the "strength of a man's virtue or spiritual capacity 
measured by his ordinary life" (p. 112) is of paramount 
importance to the modern age. (In Mr Sammler's Planet, 
Sammler comes to a similar conclusion: "And what is 'common' 
· 16
about 'the common life'?") Thus the hopefulness of the 
Jew ("eagerly loving what he sees") endures, despite the 
course of history. 
The background and existence of the Jewish immigrants 
to Chicago are sketched briefly in vignettes of the Herzog 
family and their boarder Ravitch. The history of the Russian 
Jews comes to the Herzog children in their grandfather's 
letters, in the metaphorically useless Romanoff roubles 
he sends them, in witnessing the disintegration of the 
families of Ravitch and Uncle Mikhail. Moses receives the 
bequest of the historic consciousness of his race, an 
emotional involvement with the Jewish dead which remains 
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a , albeit ic and , throughout the novel. 
Returning from abroad, 
Whom perhaps I was looking 
(p. 73) • , remembrance, links him to the dead,..;:;...;;;;;.~..::...:.:;;.. 
to both his father his fellow Jews, in 
These personal histories, old tales from old 

t may not be worth I remember. 

I must. But who se--to whom can this matter? 

So many millions--mult --go down in terrible 

pa in (p. 1 5 5 ) . 

On holiday in Poland, he "smells" the atrocit (p.31), 
and returns f to the (p. 32). He 
appreciates his "privi II status as an American Jew, 
untouched by the Holocaust: 
But Herzog never ines himself in terms of a collective 
Jewish identi His is an historic awareness, not an 
active participation. He may visit Israel, and correspond 
with his cousin Asher who lives there (p. 55), but he has 
no Zionistic Ins , his Jewish identi seems 
to rest on the memories of his childhood. 
The immigrant family experience a patriarchal 
, reminiscent of the European. In Russia, Jonah Herzog 
lived like a gentleman. !lIn Petersburg there were servants" 
(p. 142). In Montreal he cleans up the vomit and 
pants" (p. 143) of his drunken boarder. Yet despite his 
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poverty, his business humiliations, his sister's jeers, 
he retains the respect due to the head of the family, the 
patriarch, "a sacred being .•• a king" (p. 154). (One 
may compare the Hasidic Rabbi Aharon Karliner's admonition 
that "'[w]e are all princes; to forget that, is the gravest 
sin of all.,,,)17 Inherent in this paradox is the idea 
that the basic dignity of people is not dependent on wealth 
or social status, and that no human being is to be denigrated 
18 
or dismissed or devalued. Each child is traditionally 
encouraged to regard himself, as Herzog does, "the son of 
a king,,,19 to aspire to "marvellous" (p. 100) qualities, to 
believe that the world was created for his sake. 
Mother Herzog fulfils the traditional role of the 
Jewish mother. Moses' idealizing memories of her selflessness 
suggest an alternative to the mockery and smothering love 
of the "Portnoy" stereotype of Jewish motherhood. She 
supports and admires her husband in spite of his failures. 
Her ambition for her children indicates the Jewish "caste 
madness of yichus i ' (p. 147) as well as social ambition. 
Unlike her sister-in-law Zipporah, "that realist" (p. 153), 
her imagination is relatively untainted with modern materialism. 
It is still alive with ancient images of good and evil, a 
primitive Manicheanism which is part of her legacy to Moses. 
Alfred Kazin observes that Bellow "was brought up in a 
deeply Jewish spirit and with the Yiddish language, the life­
thread of a cultural and religious tradition in Eastern 
20Europe," and this is reflected in the Herzogs' family life. 
Through poverty Jonah Herzog may be forced into bootlegging-­
the laws he contravened have long since been rescinded--but 
his is not a criminal mentality. The failure of his "criminal" 
II 
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career is humorous I not judgementally, by Bellow. 
His moral t to Moses, impl t in the c comedy 
which stars his drunken Ravi , includes a communal 
concern, a goodness of t and a receptivity to others' 
woe. Moses' mother's fice ts the lity 
of suffering, while her sal to Jews with 
("I[n]ot Jews! Never! • couldn't have heart'" 
[po 154) upholds an ancient sh pri 
is inseparable from family life, evident in the paradox of 
boot's boys ting anc prayers" (p. ·146). 
Moses grows up familiar with both Hebrew and Yiddish. He 
joins in morning prayers. is a on the 
t. His wishes him to become a rabbi, to continue 
the ly tradition (p. 28). 
Yet Herzog consciously the 
traditional Jewish way of life in his own marr His 
rejection of Daisy and the " an , purposeful, 
existence" (p. 109) is a refusal to follow formula 
of his parents' marriage. Daisy is not a Madeleine or a 
Ramona. She is !Ian s reli woman, responsible 
to point of grimness" (p. 228), a IIconventional Jewish 
woman" (p. 123) who has "good qualities" (p. 109). But 
Herzog finds She who, 
" . self-control clean" (p. 267), is 
also betrayed by husband but who is ned--even if 
it self ion--to maintain a home for her son. 
His second choice, Made ine, is the complete antithesis of 
the traditional Jewish wife and 
of the artistic s of American-Jewish life. She 
scorns sacrifices her mo has made for her o 
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fa , for love, "art", not for reli on or tradi on. 
A socio cal interpretation of Madeleine could 
i her representation as an assimilated alternative 
to conservative Jewish norms, but Herzog's vi 
censure of (whi prepares Mr 's 
even more voci satire Angela in the ter novel) 
ts that Bellow himself rejects radical changes 
tradi onal of woman. may fi 
the Herzog's criticism Made ne humorous, 
it contains a moral censoriousness. For 
decries Made I s it, her of 
III, let alone lithe standards (p. 265). 
's i marr s cast a doubt on the 
values i in a traditional moral upbringing can survive 
without observable ri , enforced by a fading 
memory tands s s. His longing for 
Napoleon street is stronger than mere sentimental nostal 
He mourns the ssing of a itional way life, the 
living embodiment of Jewi faith. He moral 
watchi put 
compassion icit in s , care 
Ravitch, but s chi are den 
is a response to 's commandment to 
the race, while des of Jewi male is 
to father a kadish, a son who will intone the prayer 
dead on his If. f Kazin t his t 
father, a "hardened working s ic, " conti to 1 
him "my .,,)21 The obligation is to transmit
---".:...;;.;..;;=-.;;;;..;:.;;. parents 
the Jewish moral a ethical i tance, which takes 
as 
ir 
11 0 

precedence 	over educating the mind, and even over religious 
22
observance. "'Cleverness without heart is nothing at all. 
Piety is false, III is the saying from the school of Karlin,23 
while modern yeshiva (Talmudic Academy) education further 
illustrates the point. But Herzog has deprived his own 
children of this essential education by deserting his first 
wife and courting disaster with his second marriage. The 
absence of his children is indubitably "painful to his 
instincts, 	his Jewish family feelings" (p. 30). His sincere 
interpretation of his duty in life in terms of parenthood is 
evinced in the care with which he prepares the information 
to give to Marco on their timed outings, his suggestions of 
holidays to be spent with him, and in his almost obsessive 
concern about Junie's welfare. But as a Jewish father he is 
a failure. 
If Herzog marries Ramona, the structure of family life may 
be restored, as she wants a conventional liaison in spite of 
her philosophy of sexual pleasure. Herzog notes "how kind 
she wasil (p. 204), that her "instincts were good" (p. 209), 
that she has identified him as "a family type" and "she wants 
[him] for her family" (p. 205). This union might ensure that 
he becomes "a patriarch, as every Herzog was meant to be" 
(p. 210). But is Ramona a family type? Herzog's vacillation 
is typical of his failure to translate knowledge into acts 
of commitment. The residue of the Napoleon street values 
allows him to appreciate what Ramona is offering, but he 
lacks the decisiveness to grasp it. 
Thus Bellow's own experience of an authentic Jewish 
background is used, not sentimentally, but ironically, to 
underline his hero's inability, or disinclination, to live 
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in White Saxon Protestant America" (p. 316), is 
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ostensibly a statement of assimilation, but does he not remain 
"the Jew-man of Ludeyville" (p. 55), with Bellow punning on 
looney, lewd, and ludicrous? 
The caricatures of Himmelstein and Simkin may be Bellow's 
invective against the Jewish absorption of the worst of the 
American business and professional world and its blotting 
out of orthodox Judaism. Alternately, they offer a comparison 
to Herzog. While both lawyers have prostituted their mental 
inheritance, the keen Torah-trained Jewish mind, to make 
money from the legal profession, and while they are 
contemptuous of their client's failure to know "'what goes 
on'" (p. 94) in the real world, Herzog retains their respect 
for continuing academically "the life of the mind.,,27 In 
the old tradition, he prefers learning to material gain. 
A brute realism and cynicism characterise their advice to 
Herzog, a callousness ultimately degrading of the Jew and 
the individual generally. A calculated shrewdness about anti­
Semitism and an illusionless realism as to whether true 
assimilation has occurred, underlies Simkin's advice that 
Herzog should engage a gentile lawyer in court; while the 
clearcut emotional duties of the Jew have eroded in 
Himmelstein to a schmaltzy sentimentalism indistinguishable 
from heartfelt "American" insincerity: "'Stick with the folks-­
with good hearts. With love. Jesus! What d'ye say?'" (p. 96). 
Simkin pronounces Gersbach, a professional radio 
announcer and a (self-proclaimed) poet, to be "a recognizable 
Jewish type" (p. 224). The crook, the actor, and the 
exhibitionist in his character all depend on his chutzpah, 
the brazen effrontery with which he exploits his dubious 
potential. His salesman qualities (his charm, hypocrisy, 
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(p. 109), but her life is a clever exploitation of the symptoms 
of the sick society. "She owed her survival to intelligence. 
It was part of her sickness to be shrewd" (p. 106) is Herzog's 
conclusion, while he interprets her "conning" (p. 61) of 
their psychiatrist as a ruse to have him certified. Her 
single-minded employment of the power principle for her own 
ends is seen as ultimately degrading and sterile, a futile 
fury. 
Yet Bellow makes clea~ Madeleine's initial attraction 
for Herzog, his pleasure in accepting the role of husband-
protector (p. 89), his avidity to ally himself with her 
"modern" ailments: "'But it's she who's sick, sicker than 
I am'" (p. 62). Only after her deception does he denigrate 
her, employing a double standard. He decries her adultery, 
yet his own sexual adventures (Wanda, Zinka, Sono) are related 
without self-censure. A feminist reading of Herzog would 
doubtless reveal chauvinist tendencies: Madeleine as sexual 
object, the right of the male, but not of the female to 
philander, Herzog's childhood acceptance of his mother's 
sacrifice of her strength for his pleasure as a male right 
(p. 145), but it would also have to take into account Bellow's 
traditional Jewish background in which the male role has 
always been the dominant one. (Morning prayers include thanks 
28to God "who hast not made me a woman.") This background 
demands the keeping of the seventh commandment, and both 
Herzog's father and Polina, Daisy's mother, decry his sexual 
misdemeanours (pp. 109, 174). Herzog himself wryly pays 
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lip service only to outdated virtue: "Have all the traditions, 
passions, renunciations, virtues, gems and masterpieces of 
Hebrew discipline and all the rest of it ••• brought me to 
these untidy green sheets, and this rippled mattress?" (p. 178). 
Himmelstein, Simkin, Gersbach, and Madeleine may portray 
certain aspects of assimilated Jewish-Americans, but Bellow's 
humorous denunciation strips them of dignity, of nobility, 
of the moral values which supported Herzog's impoverished 
parents. They are reality instructors, awkwardly flourishing 
in a modern wasteland of materialism, but deracinated, 
spiritually empty. Has Herzog's assimilation also caused 
his soul to shrivel? Is he as superficial, as hollow and 
grasping as his contemporaries? His lifestyle appears more 
typical of Jewish-American intelligentsia than of any other 
group, containing the necessary professional career, choice 
of mistresses, marriages, frequent visits to doctors and 
psychiatrists. His American patriotism is certain, as a 
comparison with Elya Gruner's divided loyalties between Israel 
and America in Mr Sammler's Planet confirms. He enthuses: 
"0 Smithers, my whiskered brother! what a responsibility 
we bear, in this fat country of ours!" (p. 34). As befits 
the onetime class orator who has quoted Emerson, Herzog 
believes "his American credentials [are] in good order" (p. 167) 
His break with orthodox Judaism seems final, as he now observes 
no rituals or holidays, attends no synagogue. At the age 
of sixteen he was already a free thinker, antagonizing his 
father by coming home "with that Christianized smirk of the 
long-suffering son" (p. "257). 
There is much that suggests that Herzog represents 
modern alienated man. He succumbs to gloom and despondency. 
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He suffers on the periphery of society, of Academe, of family 
life. He struggles to define his identity. He worries the 
fashionable problem of alienation: 
[W]hat it means to be a man. In a city. In a 
century. In transition. In a mass. Transformed 
by science. Under organised power. Subject to 
tremendous controls. In a condition caused by 
mechanization. After the late failure of radical 
hopes. In a society that was no community and 
devalued the person (p. 208). 
Is he not, as Leslie Fiedler has predicted, the Jew as "central 
symbol, the essential myth of the whole western World" in 
this "apocalyptic period of atomization and uprooting, of 
a catholic terror and a universal alienation,,?29 Is he not 
the Jew as Marginal Man, an idea which Bellow's childhood 
friend Isaac Rosenfeld has posited, a "doubly alienated figure, 
caught--sometimes uncomfortably, sometimes exhilaratingly-­
between his own inadequate but unalienable heritage and the 
mirage-like promise of modern civilization,,?30 
Rejected by Madeleine, Herzog's first-hand experience 
of modern suffering (compare Shapiro's theoretical "knowledge") 
allows an exploration of Angst and despair, but only so that 
he can protest the authenticity of man in contemporary America 
more convincingly. It gives credibility to his attack on 
wasteland thinking. He attempts to prove that the individual 
need not become part of a preordained philosophical or literary 
pattern (for example of "the canon of Joyce and Kafka"),31 
that individual resistance and resilience may reaffirm the 
existence of the sovereign self. Nor is Herzog's defection 
from Judaism radical, as his lack of overt Jewish practices 
might suggest, as his optimistic, realistic, non-theoretical 
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approach to life (ironically restricted to certain letters 
and meditations only) indicates the influence of Judaism. 
Alfred Jospe defines the Jewish conception of life "as a 
moral task, ,,32 and Herzog writes to Dr Bhave: "I've always 
wanted very much to lead a moral, useful and active life" 
(p. 54). His academic criticism, the yardstick by which 
he measures his scholarly colleagues (alive or dead), his 
lovers, his friends, all suggest his hereditary ethical 
training. So does his conscience, judging his own former 
actions and antics and providing the guideline by which he 
attempts to live. The warmth and sensitivity of his 
personality, his self-deprecating humour, also suggest 
Jewish prototypes. A comparison with certain Shalom Aleichem 
heroes, and then with the non-Jewish writer John Updike's 
depiction of a fictitious American-Jewish author, Henry 
Bech, in Bech is Back, helps to illustrate this point. To 
classify Herzog as alienated is to disregard these counter-
indications. 
If, as Sartre propounds, true assimilation depends on 
the genuine conversion to the host country's current idea 
of man, Herzog is without doubt philosophically and 
psychologically unassimilable. 33 He may adopt a "posture 
of collapse on the sofa" (p. 17) and his thinking may be 
heavily psychoanalytical, but Bellow consistently mocks 
the restrictive classification of Freudian definition 
through Herzog. 
Daniel Fuchs writes that: 
Freudian perceptions are at the heart of twentieth­
century life. Freud gives us a view of man which 
is new, denuding, disillusioned, which is radically 
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subjective and iconoclastic, which is, in short, 
modern. Bellow's resistance to Freud begins in 
opposition to the terms with which these views 
are given. Freud is a prime instance of modernism, 
against which Bellow has mounted a sustained 
critique. 34 
Herzog's encounter with the psychiatrist Dr Edvig bears 
this out. His use of psychological categorisation is ironic, 
mocking, as his "anachronistic" (p. 10) character opposes 
his own and Dr Edvig's textbook labelling of personality 
"symptoms": "His clinical picture was depressive--not the 
severest type; not a manic depressive" (p. 10), while Madeleine 
has a "paranoid mind" (p. 63). Presupposing the uniformity, 
not the uniqueness of people, psychology has defined categories 
into which it slots individual idiosyncrasies. Herzog 
spontaneously rejects a science which regards the human 
psyche as clinically analysable rather than unique and morally 
viable, that interprets an act of charity, for example, as 
sado-masochism (p. 62). To rename moral vice as psychological 
sickness (for example, Madeleine's guilt-prompted fantasy 
that a detective is following her and her spending spree, 
wholly in keeping with her extravagance in the Berkshires, 
become "paranoid episode[s]" [po 62]), is simultaneously 
to excuse people's faults and to reduce their humanity by 
ignoring their right to a moral conscience. By having Herzog 
compare the traits of paranoia to the ten plagues of Egypt, 
does Bellow not suggest, with humorous irony, that paranoia-­
and, by extension, psychological definition generally--is 
an affliction (p. 83)? 
Man as the sick animal (p. 10) is an unacceptable 
definition for the Jew, who disagrees with both premises. 
Eugene Borowitz observes that Jews can't conceive of man 
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"as nothing more than another animal.,,35 This is a brutalising 
element in modern thought. Herzog talks not of "that long 
disease, my life," but of "that long convalescence, my life" 
(p. 10), thus pointing to a fundamental distinction between 
his thinking and that of the Augustan humanist, Alexander 
Pope, whose words, "[t]he Muse but served to ease some friend, 
not wife, / To help me through this long disease,my life" 
36Herzog echoes, only to contradict. Inherent in this 
distinction is the assumption that he has contracted some 
of the symptoms of worldliness, of modern stress ("this 
Western plague, this mental leprosy" [po 177]). But if 
weaknesses are acknowledged as moral ailments, if Herzog, 
the self-capped "specialist in in spiritual self-
awareness" (p. 314), can diagnose and seek his own remedy 
at Ludeyville, he has no need of psychiatry. 
Herzog's Jewish Alternative to Alienation 
Herzog is persistently abstracted, meditative, disconnected 
from prosaic reality, coping clumsily with its crises (his 
divorce, his academic commitments, his financial affairs). 
Yet his internal monologue and his letters protest the primacy, 
the importance of the everyday. Thus Bellow allows a 
precarious imbalance of action and intention to upset Herzog's 
equilibrium. This instability is humorous for the reader, 
while it also conveys a well-known moral impasse. Herzog 
the Humanist agrees with Montaigne and Pascal's definition 
of reality as the "strength of a man's virtue or spiritual 
capacity measured by his ordinary life" (p. 112), which 
echoes the Judaic emphasis on "a code of conduct II rather 
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37than a system of thought, but Herzog the impulsive over-
reactor rushes to board an aeroplane, to go to Chicago to 
shoot Gersbach. 
Herzog experienced a harsh reality during his impoverished 
childhood (which reminds the reader of the reality of st. 
Dominique Street encountered by Joseph and the deprivation 
of Leventhal's early years). Fortunate that he "didn't have 
the means to get too far away from our common life" (p. 329), 
Herzog understands that a moral response to life cannot be 
practised in elite intellectual isolation, by fleeing 
materialism (Nachman's Rimbaudesque bohemianism) or by 
following abstract systems of thought--"One can't become 
utopian" (p. 54). Salvation is to be sought in everyday 
practicality, which recalls the idea that in Judaism "one 
is damned or saved by one's way of life." 38 For Herzog, 
theoretically, lithe truth of life" (p. 76), of everyday 
existence, is to be found in the rotten apples peddled by 
Shapiro's father, in the one fresh egg brought as a gift 
by his aunt Zipporah, in the sight and smells of a fish 
store which evoke the memory of his mother. (Bellow's 
friends talk about the author's "affinity for nature so 
unexpected in an urban intellectual.")39 These images suggest 
an appreciation of a basic simplicity, of the natural life. 
The "good sense, clarity, truth II (p. 34) sought by so many 
are more likely to be discovered at this prosaic level of 
life than in the idylls of the poets or the abstract theories 
(such as Alienation or Existentialism) of writers or 
philosophers. 
Kierkegaard's insistence that "horrible pain and evil" 
(p. 324) are necessary to reteach truth to mankind, that 
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"truth is true only as it brings down more disgrace and 
dreariness upon human beings, so that if it shows anything 
except evil it is illusion, and not truth" (pp. 99-100), 
is echoed in Himmelstein's equation of facts with nastiness 
and nastiness with truth (p. 92). Herzog challenges this 
outlook, restating his opposition to it in his question to 
James Hoffa: '''What makes you think realism must be 
brutal?'" (p. 225). He rejects it emphatically, 
[clonvinced that the extent of universal space does 
not destroy human value, that the realm of facts 
and that of values are not eternally separated. 
And the peculiar idea entered my (Jewish) mind 
thatwe'd see about this! (p. 112) 
An alternative to Kierkegaard is found in the Book of 
Job, which suggests that the lessons of truth are by no means 
evil. Robert Gordis and Matitiahu Tsewat argue that Job 
is strengthened ultimately by pain and deprivation. He 
serves God, not in anticipation of reward or punishment, 
1 l'ft' t . t . 40b u t as proof tha the e 1ca 1 e genera es 1 sown 1ncen 1ve.t th ' 
Herzog's suffering in no way resembles Job's, but he does 
not "dis integrate and suf fer and hate, like so many others" (p. 99). 
Implicit in the story of Job is the Jewish concept, discussed 
by Manfred Vogel, of the intrinsic goodness of people, that 
41they will employ their free will to choose good. Herzog's 
"weakness for good deeds" (p. 115), his refusal to believe 
"that there was no faithfulness, no generosity, no sacred 
quality" (p. 100) in people suggests an affinity with this 
thinking. 
Aware of the discrepancy between thought and action, 
Herzog berates himself: "Where is that human life which is 
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my only excuse for surviving! What have I to show for myself?" 
(p.227). He longs to define his humanity, not in Christian 
terms of his immortal soul--"Not immortal longing" (p. 227)-­
but rather along Humanist lines: "No, entirely mortal, but 
human" (p. 227), which has connotations of fulfilling 
obligations and responsibilities on earth. An earlier emphasis 
has been on 
[s]urvival! ••• Till we figure out what's what. 
Till the chance comes to exert a positive influence. 
(Personal responsibility for history, a trait of 
Western culture, rooted in the Testaments, Old 
and New, the idea of the continual improvement 
of human life on this earth [po 134].) 
Herzog's wide scholarship allows a generalization about 
the influence of both Testaments on Western civilization, 
but the idea of survival in the twentieth century may have 
specific Jewish relevance, particularly if we recall the 
the passage which begins "[w]e are survivors" (p. 81). Of 
greater importance, perhaps, is the Jewish spirit of optimism 
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which influences this attitude. Historical experience 
taught Jews to be stoical in adversity, and as Alfred Jospe 
says, Judaism believes "that history is not blind. It has 
direction and a goal.,,43 Thus Herzog looks not to the 
horrific past (perhaps to the Holocaust), but to the future, 
assured that technology will aid the eventual achievement 
of perfection on earth for mankind (p. 81). His assumption 
that each individual has a part to play, a "[p]ersonal 
responsibility for history" (p. 134), also harks back to 
Judaism's encouragement of the individual response, that, 
in Jospe I swords, "man is not merely an obj ect of history. 
He is also the subject of history" 
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If Herzog were to be successful in stealing his father's 
pistol and murdering Madeleine and her lover, his actions 
would support Himmelstein's and Kierkegaard's assertions 
that nastiness, evil, and truth are synonymous. But in this 
important instance, Herzog's actions--or rather, his lack 
of violent actioris--and his thinking coalesce. Violence 
and killing are foreign to Herzog, as they are to the Jew 
(Jonah Herzog also could not pull a trigger) and his behaviour 
becomes a parody of law-breaking. Not melodramatic murder, 
but rather his plea: "'Let life continue--we may not deserve 
it, but let it continue'" (p. 57) confirms his allegiance 
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That the influence of ancient teachings absorbed earlier 
still influences Herzog's life is metaphorically suggested 
by the comparison between the hall light in the old family 
home and ner tamid, the eternal light in the synagogue (p. 252). 
The glow of ancient teachings absorbed earlier still 
illuminates Herzog's life. It dispels the metaphysical 
gloom, the lack of spiritual illumination for modern man 
metaphorically suggested in images such as this: "In dusty 
niches bulbs burned. Without religion" (p. 47). It is in 
contrast to the Eliot-like description of the return of spring, 
whicj1 reminds people of "their own failures, of sterility 
and dea th" (p. 1 8 ) . 
In contrast, Herzog's focus is foremost on life. 
commenting on his memory of his father's death, Robert Alter 
observes "the Jewishness of Herzog's wry, skeptical, worldly, 
almost disarming, faith in life" implicit in his "untranslatable 
verbal shrug" in the Yiddish phrase "'[n]u, maile"' (p. 250). 
Herzog's ultimate acceptance of death as an inseparable part 
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of life is suggested by his comparison of the day of Junie's 
outing with the day of his father's funeral (p. 286). This 
embodies a Jewish pragmatism learnt from his mother, who 
taught "that life was life only when it was understood clearly 
as dying" (p. 189). The Jewish attitude is exemplified in 
the annual Day of Atonement, Yom Kippur, which in many ways 
46is a rehearsal for death. His mother's acceptance of 
mortality, "proof" to her son that Adam was created from 
earth (the Hebrew word for earth is adama) complements her 
own death, which she turns into a lesson in dying for her 
son (pp. 239-40). This lies at the root of Herzog's dismissal 
of the modern concept of death as something to fear, 
illustrated by Tina ZOkoly's theories on how to face death. 
He discerns that underlying her method is a modern belief 
in the salutary properties of dread, in death, not in God 
(p. 279). 
In this sense, to him "perpetual thought of death was 
a sin" (p. 39). People may have polluted life, but Herzog, 
unlike those who "[play] at crisis" (p. 324), unlike idealists 
such as Nachman, can still hold that "belief based on reason" 
(p. 173), people's intelligent interpretation of the will 
of God, can save them from annihilation. That evidently 
he continues "to believe in God" (p. 238) takes Herzog by 
surprise, but it is this belief which gives credence to his 
opposition to wasteland thinking, to the slogans "God is 
Dead" or "Death is God". Fuchs observes that it "is not 
accidental to the novel that Herzog is a Jewish intellectual," 
and cites as fundamental to Jewish thought the absence of 
the idea of original sin, the importance of man's own actions 
in redemption and adherence to the law. 47 For Judaism, the 
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basis of moral social interaction between people is the 
contractual relationship between God and man, the covenant, 
recalled by Herzog in the following metaphor (one of many) 
of undertaking and obligation: "I wilfully misread my contract. 
I never was the principal, but only on loan to myself" (p. 238). 
He queries not the purpose of life, but his interpretation 
of it. 
Belief in God negates the idea that the universe is 
structureless and meaningless, and thus Herzog cannot but 
be hostile to this aspect of modernism. Bellow's own 
opposition is evident in his satire of Tina Zokoly's theories, 
expressed through Lucas Asphalter. Following Tina Zokoly, 
Asphalter has tried to confront his own death. Herzog 
identifies the influence of Heidegger in the affirmation of 
an "absurd" death, in the attempt to triumph over the 
quotidian (pp. 277-78). That Bellow finds this idea ridiculous 
is evident in the comic images (chorus girls playing baseball, 
the sight of a fat aunt's buttocks) which fill Asphalter's 
mind as he tries to contemplate reality and truth from his 
coffin. Herzog opposes Heidegger's "second Fall of Man" (p. 112) 
which implies that man has sinned irrevocably, albeit in 
secular terms. He doubts that this is "the full crisis of 
dissolution" (p. 80), whether "the filthy moment [has] come 
when moral feeling dies, conscience disintegrates and respect 
for liberty, law, public decency, all the rest, collapses in 
cowardice, decadence, blood" (pp. 80-81). He opposes the 
idea of an absurd universe, the world as "nothing but a barren 
lump of coke" (p. 296), without substitutes for the loss of 
traditional religious assumptions, where all facts defy human 
understanding, where moral revulsion can be overcome only 
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by total change, by "apocalypse and desperation" (p. 324). 
The "'fall into the quotidian'" (p. 55) is supposedly 
accompanied by dread, anguish, terror. Yet the coarse, practical 
humour of Asphalter's reveries and the enjoyment of the 
burlesque which formed part of his childhood, effectively 
undercut the idea of a mental and spiritual disintegration. 
Language and Moral Realities 
Opposing alienation, Herzog allies himself with 
"thoughtful people and humanists" who "struggle towards 
suitable words" (p. 279) in an attempt to re-instate an 
unfashionable moral reality. Through language, "by writing 
letters helter-skelter in all directions" (p. 279), he 
challenges the aesthetic, psychological, and pseudo-pessimistic 
assessments of human behaviour, preferring an ethical standard. 
Because speech is God's gift to man, the sanctity of the word 
is to be revered. Will Herberg calls it the human point of 
contact with God which allows the explorations of freedom 
and moral responsibility, while Abraham J. Heschel writes 
that "words are the vessels of the spirit. And when the vessels 
are broken, our relationship to the spirit becomes precarious.,,4 
Herzog's "'[s]trict and literal truthfulness'" (p. 195), the 
urge for "speaking, piercing, making clear judgements, uttering 
final explanations, necessary words only" (p. 74) is the 
expression of his concept of a moral reality. Ironically, 
it is in contrast with his actual behaviour, his marital 
infidelities, for example, and his vacillating attitude 
towards Ramona. 
He blames creative writers (one thinks of Ezra Pound, 
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and the early Eliot) for fostering prevalent philosophical 
attitudes: 
Here the responsibility of artists remains to be 
assessed. To have assumed, for instance, that the 
deterioration of language and its debasement was 
tantamount to dehumanization led straight to cultural 
fascism (p. 82). 
Herzog doubts the actual commitment of "[l]iterate people" 
to the ideas they borrow and parade as "certain crabs • 
beautify themselves with seaweed" (p. 224). To restore to 
certain words their original, ethical value ("to change it 
all into language, to force Madeleine and Gersbach to have 
a Conscience. There's a word for you" [po 279]), is to stall 
the acceleration towards moral decadence encouraged by the 
glib use of such words as "dread": "But it isn't a question 
of dread, or any such words at all . •• " (p. 279). Certain 
words need to be defined by actions to retain their original 
validity. Thus Herzog queries Dr Edvig's professional 
classification of Madeleine as "religious" (disproved by her 
actions) and the doctor's definition of "humility" which 
reduces the concept to "masochistic crawling or cowardice" 
(p. 70). Edvig's interpretations of these words, if their 
moral value is taken into account, suggest the debasement, 
not the uplifting of the human spiri t. Words may have lost 
their moral value, but this (hypothetical) potential is still 
exploitable. Thus Herzog notes cynically that the strength 
of an outdated morality is employed for deception and profit, 
as words are weighted with "goqdness" for commercial value. 
Benjamin Franklin himself recommended "Reliable Appearances," 
the "honest look," as a business asset (p. 168). 
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its users, Bellow oys and language i cally 
to this ef For , the conversation between Shapiro 
(a colleague whom Herzog has known from childhood) and 
r mas of ( p. 82) 
academia, not with erudition but with ism and 
sm, an s. It recalls a nic 
aphorism, "asses laden with It , which distinguishes between 
49
with real mere carr 
The ly name-dropping Madele and ro is a 
mutual confidence trick. Mady's academic exhibitionism presents 
a fa show of her dated intellectual s, while 
a basic insensate i (a "sucking snarling und 
laugh" [po 77]) ro's stic sophistication. 
His imitation of WASP speech patterns, his euphemisms, his 
ion a "Proust (p. 76) of sentence, Ie 
suggesting that he af s a certa appropr academic 
, also points to his s h f from his 
ground, to an inauthent Jewishness. 
Herzog's scorn s col 
latter's oral ition (his correct pronunciat of 
s in seven dif s [po 77]) 
S II Ii II (p. 76), moral core which 
strengthened his r father. To master one's subject 
ly c and social success is to mi its final 
goal. Simi Herzog ridicules Madeleine's intellectual 
hopscotch, played indiscriminately with Russian 
11 ia, Zadowsky, Dostoevski, and Soloviev, or with 
Joseph Both compete callously in an intellectual 
is by 
game, as if br ems, not the te , are 
r area study. 
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Herzog's contempt for Shapiro is both personal and 
academic. After the Holocaust, how can any Jew deliver a 
"merely aesthetic critique of modern history" (p. 81)? Shapiro 
is but another consumer of the "canned sauerkraut of Spengler's 
'Prussian Socialism', the commonplaces of the Wasteland outlook, 
the cheap mental stimulants of Alienation, the cant and rant of 
pipsqueaks about Inauthenticity and Forlornness" (p. 81). His 
outlook allows a separation of "the problem of truth from 
the problem of living, cognition from man's total situation."SO 
Functioning in isolation, reason propounds irrelevant concepts 
of man. Shapiro's writing denies the traditional Jewish 
integration of mind and morality (mentioned by Moses 
Mendelssohn and Josephine Knopp),S1 which is implicit in 
Herzog's make-up, "Some new thought [grips] his heart" (p. 7), 
while Shapiro negates the "rich blood" (p. 81) of his heritage, 
clambering to academic success on the emptiness of the void. 
A View of Christianity and Romanticism 
The satiric portrait of Shapiro is based on the 
irrelevance of his aesthetic approach to history and the 
harmful influence he and fellow writers exert, while the 
caricature of Madeleine Pontritter goes beyond a parody of 
scholarship to include a criticism of Christianity. Deprived 
of a traditional upbringing by her father, the American 
Stanislavsky, she turns to the Catholic church with "terrible 
eagerness and twisted perplexi ty and appeal" (p. 69). Herzog 
thinks "'Madeleine wants a saviour'" (p. 60). But the 
attraction of the church is satirised as a spectacular one: 
"Ecclesiastical dolls--gold-threaded petticoats, whining organ 
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pes" (p. 124). Madeleine's a at conversion is 
comically described as an enthusiastic flight from reali 
theatrical over sation of the ), characteri 
emotional displays a longing a tual 
experience. 52 This divorce between religion and reality 
is alien to Judaism, as the following story, retold by Martin 
Buber, : A man "i by God" seeks to to 
God alone, because he has had no success wi his 
But God sends him back to , saying that "[He] has sunk 
[His) hearing in fness mor s.,,53 In contrast 
wi nels rations, Herzog "wou never grasp 
Christian and Faustian world alien to [him]" 
(p. 241). He t "actual world, to say 
of the infinite universe, [demands] a sterner, a real 
masculine character" (p. 124). 
He dislikes simi ties between istiani 
nihilistic thinking, lithe present moment always as some crisis, 
some fall from c ssical greatness, some corruption or evil 
to from" (p. 60). This presumes the idea inal 
sin, a 11 from grace or a golden age inimical to Jewish 
thinking. For the Jew, "the sin of Adam did not corrupt 
all mankind if he be condemned, it is through his own 
works . . . if he be it is his contrition 
and penance." 54 (The Jewish i tion of the suffering 
servant in Isaiah 53 is not Christ, but all Israel.)55 By 
refusing to the world as fal , Jewish nk 
s the ial passivism Christianity, the need 
a saviour or an apocalypse. It allows the final 
responsibility for the self to be delegated not to ith 
in a redeemer, but to man's indiv 1 moral response 
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his active life. For Herzog, Dr Edvig's Protestant Freudianism 
"reveals a lousy, cringing, grudging conception of human 
nature" (pp. 63-64). This denies the dignity of man associated 
with free will and moral choice in Jewish thought and its 
ensuing confidence in the human potential for goodness, which 
undercuts the Christian emphasis on evil. In a discussion 
which further demonstrates the point, Ruth Wisse notes the 
polarisation of good and evil in certain Christian heroes 
such as Melville's . Billy Budd. Their Jewish counterparts, 
Herzog, for example, illustrate the mixed condition, an 
acceptance of a "stained humanity.,,56 
The relationship between Christianity and Romanticism 
is the subject of Herzog's first book. His disagreement with 
the former is certain, but his attitude towards Romanticism 
is more ambivalent. Writing to his old tutor Harris Pulver, 
Herzog notes that: 
Romantic individuals • . • accuse this mass 
civilization of obstr~cting their attainment of 
beauty, nobility, integrity, intensity. I do not 
want to sneer at the term Romantic. Romanticism 
guarded the 'inspired condition', preserved the 
poetic, philosophical and religious teachings, the 
teachings and records of transcendence and the 
most generous ideas of mankind ... (p. 172). 
Yet, like T. E. Hulme, Herzog is repelled by the "'dampness'. 
and the swarming of Romantic feelings" (p. 135), by the 
failure of the individual attempt to concretise Romantic 
abstractions evident in the lives of Nachman (another of 
Herzog's childhood friends) and his wife Laura. Laura, "a 
pure soul that understands only pure things" (p. 139) is 
committed to an asylum after her third suicide attempt. 
Nachman's allegiance to William Blake and Rilke and his 
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dismissal of the fat gods of materialism leave him destitute. 
The grim failure of his life illustrates ironically, defiantly, 
the subj ect of his poetry, the unique quality of individuali ty (p. 14C 
Herzog mocks his own propensity towards Romanticism: 
"I fall upon the thorns of life, I bleed. And then? I fall 
upon the thorns of life, I bleed. And what next? I get laid, 
I take a short holiday • .. " (p. 214). He has little regard 
for Nachman's Romantic poetry, and they disagree about a 
definition of man. In the sequel to his published work, 
Herzog proposes to overturn "the last of the Romantic errors 
about the uniqueness of the Self" (p. 45). Yet his gentleness 
with Nachman, in comparison with his censure of other 
childhood friends such as Shapiro, suggests a sympathy for 
his idealism. 
That Herzog might favour the Romantic sensibility is 
evident in his attachment to certain ideas of Blake, notably 
the naive "blessedness" of existence. Yet although the 
subjective standards of Romanticism parallel Jewish thought 
in some ways, ultimately "Jewish feeling resists Romanticism 
and insists on an older set of values.,,57 Hulme thought 
Romanticism's faith in the infinite potential of man dangerous 
because, taken to extremes, it suggests that man, without 
God, can become perfect. ·Like Hulme, Herzog dislikes the 
Romantic concept of human perfectibility. His alternate idea 
of man, remarked on by Nachman (p. 140), is closer to the 
Jewish definition. Herzog has learned "to accept a mixed 
condition of life" (p. 140), which echoes Bellow's own position: 
"We make what we ,can of our condition with the means available. 
We must accept the mixture as we find it--the impurity of it, 
the tragedy of it, the hope of it. ,,58 
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The Subjective Self 
Bellow observes that: 
'Ideology commands an end, imposes a law, speaks 
the first and last words and abolishes confusion. 
But it has no interest in the miracle of being 
which artists endlessly contemplate. ,59 
This attitude is the key to Herzog's thinking about the self. 
He opposes systematised, abstract, objective definitions 
of man, whether philosophical and alienated or psychological 
and Freudian. He dislikes both the Romantic propounding 
of human perfectibility and the Christian opposite, belief 
in man's inherent imperfection. His resistance to the theories 
of Inauthenticity and Despair is centred on his inherited 
idea of man. The choice is between "disintegrating ourselves 
by our own wills in proof of our 'freedom', or the acknowledging 
that we owe a human life to this waking spell of existence, 
regardless of the void"(p. 321). He cannot condone the 
disintegration of the individual in a post-humanistic society, 
his lack of identity in an amorphous mass. He is capable 
of employing irony against the individual: "Three thousand 
million human beings exist, each with some possessions, each 
a microcosmos, each infinitely precious, each with a peculiar 
treasure" (p. 182), but refuses to see individuality as 
megalomania, or as a bourgeois possession, or to condone 
its belittlement (p. 99). The alternative of mass man, of 
the soul of the mob (characterized by soullessness) is too 
frightening. 
The attitude of secular Existentialist pessimists 
contradicts the biblical idea of living as part of a created 
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whole. It accepts being as the ultimate. Thus man can relate 
himself to nothingness only. A void, not a determining 
presence, surrounds him. His thoughts and values are self-
centred and self-defined. Confronted by nothingness, "'the 
possible impossibility of his existence'" is to be considered. 60 
But Herzog finds plausible the biblical idea that life is 
ultimately real. His opposition to the annihilation of 
individuality is at root religious because it implies the 
extinction of the divine spark in man. God's imprint on 
each individual calls for self respect, a dignity of thought 
and behaviour, but primarily it allows him the freedom of 
moral decision. Herzog will not accept the death of morality 
on which the individual and collective humanity of man rests. 
He insists that there are "moral realities •.. as surely as 
there are molecular and atomic ones" (pp. 185-86). 
It seems to him that "all he asked • . . was a bit of 
cooperation in his effort, benefiting everyone, to work 
towards a meaningful life" (p. 129). He affirms the subjective 
self and its moral activity against the overwhelming 
objectification of humanity, accepting that he "was what 
he was" (p. 31), that "[he [is] Herzog," that he has "to be 
that man. There is no one else to do it. After smiling, 
he must return to his own Self and see the thing through" (p. 73) 
He rejects classification: "Excuse me, therefore, sir 
[Gersbach] and madam [Madeleine], but I reject your definitions 
of me" (p. 306). The subjective capacity is essential if 
one is to experience one's humanity. It is a prerequisite 
for what Buber calls the "I" and , Herzog his conscious and 
· 61separa t e belng. In order to "be", he has to "do". That 
is, Herzog is committed to an idea of action as an expression 
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of morality. That he, not a saviour or a psychiatrist, is 
solely responsible for hi s own salva tion is evident: "There 
is no one else to do it" (p. 73). 
This is made clear in the course of the novel, which 
traces Herzog's moral development. There is a change from 
a judgemental attitude towards Gersbach and Madeleine, from 
thoughts of revenge, even of murder, to a tolerance, an 
acceptance of their shortcomings. His recognition of Gersbach 
as a particular person, not as a stage villain, is an 
affirmation both of his rival's and of his own subjective 
individuality: 
As soon as Herzog saw the actual person [Gersbach] 
giving an actual bath, the reality of it, the 
tenderness of such a buffoon to a little child, 
his intended violence turned into theatre, into 
something ludicrous (p. 265). 
The private quest for subjective truth and man's responsibility 
to be himself are basic requirements of many faiths, 
epigrammatically expressed for Judaism by Rabbi Zishe: "When 
I get to heaven, they will not ask me, 'Zishe, Zishe, why 
weren't you Moses? They will ask me, 'Zishe, why weren't 
you Zishe?,,,62 Herzog's internal pilgrimage is attempted 
by self-analysis and self-castigation, ironically lightened 
by wit. His personality suggests the paradoxical inter­
weaving of two typical Jewish concepts of identity, that 
of the schlemiel and of a "marvellous" Herzog. 
The "Schlemiel" and the "Lamdan,,63 
Ruth Wisse defines the schlemiel as follows: "Vulnerable, 
ineffectual in his efforts at self-advancement and self­
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for his 
as archetypal Jew, especially in 
s capacity 
t 
1 victim." He is either berated 
s ish weakness, or exalted 
his s , his of affliction, his 
innocence inst corru ion. S scr s Herzog as the 
as comic ils in "male initiative, pride, 
d i soc II who succeeds in 
final self ending"). On this 
,,64
equivocation rests "loser-as-victor. 
The ses Herz 1 are evident to 
Tennie Pontrit for whom is II , a sweet 
little soul" (p.131); to leine and Gersbach, who 
manipu te his life; to his Himmelstein, ully 
in control of Herzog's 1 rs, , i , to 
Herzog himself. He sees h f as (p.17), 
"suffering at heart like a f " (p. 97), a victim, although 
he hates "the victim bit" (p. 88). But t are his 
alternatives? 
Not to be a fool 
alternatives. 
Was it the power­ , 
his will--the scientific in 
? 
ic to 
1. . . . 
organizational realist? (p.131) 
To court power is e to it 1 fencelessness 
of Jew, whose moral strength dictates 
for 65strong. He ects , self-
seeking toughness of the reality instructors se, ing 
" different orders" (p. 1 31 ), he has a dif ferent assi 
aims paradoxically link Herzog the wi 
itional Jewish hero, the wise man or chacham, wi 
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the revered scholar, the lamdan. 
Whether Herzog is aware of the similarity or not, his 
heroic quest, undertaken largely at the "unconscious 
philosophical level", resembles the ancient Jewish desire 
to seek virtue through knowledge and to resist the separation 
of the one from the other. The old sages did not consider 
learning as an end in itself, believing that knowledge and 
reason were the ways to wisdom, of which virtue is the highest 
form. Rabbi Pinhas said: "I should rather be devout than 
clever, but rather than both devout and clever, I should 
like to be good.,,66 The obligation of the scholar is to 
share his knowledge. Learning and social conscience are thus 
linked. Following the ancient example, Herzog views his 
career not as the fulfilment of personal ambition only, but 
as an attempt to remedy incorrect ideas about civilization. 
"It was not simple vanity, but a sense of responsibility 
that was the underlying motive" (p. 126). 
His preoccupation with morality rather than with pure 
intellectuality is evident in his attacks on the thinkers 
to whom he addresses his unposted letters. It is never their 
reasoning or intellectual prowess he queries, but the under­
lying idea of man stripped of all dignity and nobility, man 
devoid of "marvellous qualities" (p. 100), of a sacred 
quality, of moral certainties. This is at the heart of his 
opposition to the theories of alienation and inauthenticity 
predominant in Sartre and Heidegger, to the barren wasteland 
of Spengler, Ortega y Gasset, and Pound, the merely aesthetic 
analysis of modern history promulgated by Burckhardt and 
N' t h d d b Sh ' 67le zsc e an ape y aplro. 

Herzog's scholarship is of a different variety. It 
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reflects Bellow's temper of "liberal humanism. • it 
posits integrity in the ordinary world.,,68 At the centre 
of his cultural studies lies a moral intellectualism, a 
belief in civilization and the value of man. Shapiro and 
Madeleine follow selfish ambitions, but with Herzog it "was 
not simple vanity, but a sense of responsibility that was 
the underlying motive" (p. 126). He translates his idea 
of himself, "a thoughtful person who believes in civil 
usefulness" (p. 169), into an academic vision of lithe man 
on whom the whole world depended for certain intellectual 
work, to change history, to influence the development of 
civilization" (p. 111). To state categorically that lithe 
progress of civilization--indeed, the survival of civilization-­
depended on the successes of Moses E. Herzog" (pp. 131-32) 
is perhaps to emphasise the foolish optimism of the schlemiel. 
Regarded cynically, Herzog's aims appear monstrously comical, 
in keeping with the hyperbole often evident in his character. 
But if taken as a spontaneous expression of "unconscious" 
Jewish philanthropy, Herzog, like the writers of the Mishna, 
the Midrash, and the Talmud, is exploring knowledge as a 
moral obligation for the spiritual education of humanity. 
Assuming the responsibili ty of the scholar to correct the 
degraded image of man, he simultaneously uplifts both his 
own self-image and that of mankind. To be "a marvellous 
Herzog . . to live out marvellous qualities vaguely 
comprehended" (p. 100) is thus an assertion of Jewish humanism 
against the powers of dehumanization. 
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The Duties of the Heart 
Herzog's subjective sense of self includes not only 
his vulnerability and proposed scholastic philanthropy, but 
that "[t]errible handicap, a soul" (p. 104). His agreement 
with Rousseau's statement: "Je sens mon coeur et je connais 
les hommes" (p. 135) indicates a preference for subjectivity. 
Knowledge is a product of the individual heart, not of the 
anonymous sterile intellect alone, as Hulme's followers, 
the wasteland writers, and modern scientists would have us 
believe. For Herzog, "reality [opposes] the 'law of the 
heart ' " (p. 129). That Herzog understands the Jewish 
interpretation of the duties of the heart is clear in his 
wish that his daughter Junie be educated "according to the 
Herzog standards of 'heart~ and all the rest of it [or] she 
will fail to become a human being" (p. 265). "Standards 
of heart" have to be learnt. Mere emotional reaction is 
not sufficient, but needs to be measured against an emotional 
set of values which determines its validi ty. If "standards 
of heart" exist, a certain objectivity is required and a 
distinction is made between "softening, heart-rotting 
emotions" (p. 147) and an objective -moral sensibility. 
Without the latter, one fails "to become a human being". 
Menschlekhkayt thus depends on the duties of the heart. 
Particularly in a period which concentrates on the importance 
of the objective intellect, the stress on subjective 
spontaneous feeling combined with a moral directive is to 
be desired. 
Herzog finds the "raging consumption of potato love" 
(p. 183) proliferating everywhere as abhorrent as a total 
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trust in reason and as effective a way to dehumanize man. 
He sees the vulgarization and eventual discarding of the 
duties of the heart as the hallmark of mass man. It cheapens 
the concept of brotherhood. Politicians use it to manipulate 
popularity: liThe general won because he expressed low-grade 
universal potato love" (p. 72). As the unique soul becomes 
part of the soul of the mob (p. 92), indifferent, incapable 
of free choice, of individual emotional response and moral 
responsibility, so the divine stamp on man, the concept of 
man made in the image of God, as stated in Genesis 5.1-2, 
is obliterated. This corruption or falsification of genuine 
goodness and kindliness, a perversion of the human heart 
which no longer has a moral touchstone, allows "a second 
distortion of the divine image" (p. 183) to occur. 
The contrast between genuine feeling and its fake 
substitution underlines the difference between Herzog and 
Himmelstein (p. 97) and particularly between Herzog and 
Gersbach. Sarah Blacher Cohen .points out that Gersbach 
caricatures Herzog's emotional excesses and emphasizes their 
irrelevance, but does this view not ignore the fact that 
Herzog's moral and emotional sensibilities change and develop, 
while Gersbach's responses remain predictably the same 
69throughout the novel? The latter's moral posturing (for 
example his advice to his friend [pp. 65-67]) is meaningless, 
false. He supplies emotion on demand, like a commercial 
commodity ("[s]ubtlety for the subtle. Warmth for the warm. 
For the crude, crudity" [po 222]). The archetypal phoney, 
he obliterates the true value of feeling to gain instant 
popularity. (But the reader must remember that she or he 
sees Gersbach through Herzog's by-no-means-objective eyes. 
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Only once is the reader allowed to glimpse him directly, 

when he bathes Junie with tenderness and affection.) 

The caricature of Gersbach is principally that of "an 
emotional king" (p. 67), manipulating emotion for selfish 
ends. Herzog may indulge in immoderate emotion, but an 
ironic self-consciousness smiles at its excesses. Consumed 
with self-pity, he nonetheless recognises the danger of 
feeling that swings loose from a moral anchor. He acknowledges 
the self-centredness of his hypochondria, the emotional 
indulgence in his appeals to old friends such as Libby Vane 
and Phoebe Gersbach. He can identify lithe insidious blight 
of nostalgia" (p. 147) which blurs his memories of Napoleon 
street and realize that his strong family ties are mocked 
by his own broken marriages and affairs. He recognises and 
regrets the weakness implicit in an excessive display of 
heart, as Madeleine exploits his love and Gersbach his 
friendship. 
Herzog tacitly agrees with Nachman's opinion that he 
is lIla good man.. • a good heart •.•• A gentle spirit'" 
(p. 140), but confuses the concepts of goodness and innocence. 
His own experiences and actions (the homosexual's assault 
when he was a child, his own adultery, and hatred, and 
vanity, his contemplation of revenge, which includes murder) 
indicate a knowledge of evil, but Herzog has "refused to 
know evil" (p. 252). He has avoided it consciously. Like 
the child in the nursery rhyme ("and pussy will love me 
because I am good" [po 124]), he anticipates love in return 
for naIvete and goodness, to be spared the worst of life 
in return for docility and goodwill (p. 161). This is not 
true innocence but a form of bargaining, a moral cowardice, 
142 

a cultivated falsehood of reaction to both private experience 
(Madeleine's betrayal) and historical fact. (No historian, 
and a Jew to boot, dare refuse to confront the slaughter 
in the twentieth century.) Herzog asserts: "Fountains of 
human blood that squirted from fresh graves! Limitless 
massacre! I never understood it!" (p. 83). Yet he does 
come to terms with the "mixed condition" (p. 140) of life, 
and of his own self, acknowledging that his heart is "part 
pure, part wicked" (p. 54), which becomes a confession of 
moral growth and self-recognition by the end of the novel. 
The moral enlargement of Herzog's concept of suffering 
as opposed to the static quality of Gersbach's exploitative 
attitude is a clear indication of their essential differences. 
To suffer--the etymological meaning is to be bent low by 
an unbearable burden--impairs man both spiritually and 
physically. Jews do not "choose" to suffer, although their 
experience points to a history of affliction. But persecution 
need not necessarily debase the . sufferer. This Herzog knows 
from his own father's example. He can identify genuine 
suffering because of his early "great schooling in grief" (p. 155) 
when he absorbed the tales of his father's woe: starvation, 
imprisonment, poverty, persecution (p. 154). His parent's 
history is a microcosm of Jewish hardship, a continuation 
of "a Biblical sense of personal experience and destiny" (p. 155). 
The memory of this pain is an ongoing guarantee of Herzog's 
Jewish identity: "I remember. I must" (p. 155). The lesson 
of this historical suffering is to bear hardship with moral 
dignity. It is mocked by Herzog's own "suffering", his 
breakdown following betrayal by his wife and friend. By being 
"'a victim'" (p. 88) he has encouraged their deceit and 
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debased and belittled himself. As he learns the extent of 
their superficiality, he dismisses his "suffering" as 
ludicrous: "Only self-hatred could lead him to ruin himself 
because his heart was 'broken'. How could it be broken by 
such a pair?" (p. 265). To continue to blame Madeleine and 
Gersbach for his plight suggests that his feelings are as 
artificial as his victimizers'. 
If Gersbach has had Herzog's moral education, he shows 
no sign of it. Herzog may have a Jewish appreciation of 
suffering, "••• under his own rules the man who had suffered 
more was the more special II (p. 68), but Gersbach's dramatization 
of the childhood amputation of his leg, his "suffering" as 
he usurps Herzog's role as husband and father, is a questionable 
exploitation of its potential. He is part of a modern "brutal 
standard" (p. 115) that is oblivious to a possible link 
between morality and suffering. While Gersbach is indifferent 
to individual anguish, to all but his own desires, Herzog, 
grasping the full implications of the "new terminal standard" 
(p. 155), relates its importance to the heart. Himmelstein, 
whose own morality is questionable, understands this: "'You're 
not like those other university phonies. You're a mensch'" 
(p. 87). "'1 understand it.. . I grew up. . when a 
Jew was still a Jew'" (pp. 90-91). 
Social Conscience 
For the Jew, the duties of the heart are fully realised 
in the expression of social conscience which stresses the 
mutual responsibility of men and the value of community. 
liThe Bible . . makes its ethical demand compatible with 
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social reality.,,70 The completion of Hillel's much quoted 
maxim, 1m ain anee lee mee lee, "if I am not for myself, 
who will be for me?" is ukh-sh'anee l'atzmee mah anee, "but 
71
when I am only for myself, what am I?" This stresses the 
movement from a personal to an enlarged social vision, the 
development in Judaism of correct personal values for the 
common good. To opt out is to deny a connection with the 
human, whether general, or particular and familial, and though 
Herzog has failed, twice, as a father, he insists that his 
duty "was -to live. To be sane, and to live and to look after 
the kids" (p. 33). 
Herzog seems aware both of the Jewish ethic and of his 
own failure to live according to it. He tells Asphalter 
that the "real and essential question is one of our employment 
by other human beings and their employment by us" (p. 280), 
that he really believes "that brotherhood is what makes a 
man human. If lowe God a human life, this is where I fall 
down" (p. 280). He agrees that the individual must strive 
for social justice during his lifetime and not wait passively 
for the reign of justice on earth (the Messianic arrival). 
He exhibits a Jewish practicality about where to begin if 
one is to aim at a perfect society: "You must start with 
injustices that are obvious to everybody, not with big 
historical perspectives" (p. 54). But he fails to confront 
the question of violence and evil in society. Personally, 
Herzog is incapable of violence, but as a scholar he (unlike 
Shapiro) is intensely affected by past wars and mass killings, 
by modern anarchy which denies man's position as "little 
lower than the angels" (Psalm 8.5) and confirms his proximity 
to the brutes. He decries philosophers (Rousseau for example) 
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who have encouraged revolutions, engineered famines, and in 
this century, inspired "the demonic nihilism of Hitler" (p. 81). 
Yet when actually faced with a travesty of private and public 
concern and justice, the brutal murder of an unknown child, 
Herzog the human being is totally inadequate. Schooled by 
his father and his father's fathers, he responds to a courtroom 
recital of child abuse, a statement of atrocity, with intense 
horror and pain. He concentrates with "all his might--mind 
and heart--" (p. 247) and finds, not glib socio-economic 
facts or psychological apology, but only "his own human 
feelings" (p. 247). 
I fail to understand! thought Herzog.... but 
this is the difficulty with people who spend their 
lives in humane studies and therefore imagine once 
cruelty has been described in books it is ended (p. 245). 
Here Bellow berates Herzog's passive, unworldly, scholarly 
"goodness". The murder is senseless, beyond the perimeters 
of rational thought. Mere "human feelings" cannot, restore 
life to the child, create a just society, or prevent future 
brutality. Herzog may understand "that human beings would 
not live so as to be understood by the Herzogs" (p. 245), 
that they cannot be perfect, but he fails to make any positive 
contribution to curb corruption or protect the innocent. 
That this is well-nigh impossible still does not exclude 
the moral responsibility of the individual to strive for 
social justice. Herzog's pity for the murdered boy indicates 
his Jewish propensity for rahamanut, tenderness, but 
compassion without action can disintegrate into meaningless 
sentiment. There is a strong sense of self-pity in Herzog's 
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dramatisation of the court scene as a paral of sown 
domestic affairs. His iate decision is 
f to icago to ensure that Madeleine and Gersbach (al 
gui locking Junie in a car while they [p.107]) 
are not mistreat his s tragedy the 
bat child is to a personal warning, 
conscience of the ist rendered i fectual. 
above intense inner emotion or moral 
fervour seldom fi ing public express is characteristic 
Herzog. His emotional generos is all-encompass 
his grief for a roommate (p. 125), his devotion to his 
0 Pulver ( p. 170) , his a st embarrass f ly 
1 (p. 84) • He calls sly on mutual ly 
responsibility ( money from Shura, call on \ViII 
to secure his re se police) I yet is a virtual 
s to ily. He worries constant 
's maternal ability, himself has led his 
His genu love and concern for their welfare 
not alter his senteeism, his eccentrici 
s unpredi Ii That realizes extent of 
his shortcomings ironically lines his i ion 
of Blake: "'Man liveth not Self alone in his IS 
,It (p. 280). 
Conclusion 
Herzog: \Vou "Mensch li 
What is Bellow's purpose in calli his main protagonist 
Moses E Herzog, a name trailing s of biblical 
and national g ? Is to be a literary, Moses, 
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leading the twentieth century from a spiritual wilderness 
to individual and communal freedom? The biblical Moses 
received God's law at Sinai. Does his namesake continue 
to carry out its commandments? Elkanah (the father of the 
prophet Samuel) means one whom God has created, or possesses. 
The name suggests a belief in the creation and that its 
bearer is chosen by God, his "possession". His task is to 
show His way to the gentiles. It has further connotations 
of individual goodness, of being worthy of God's attention, 
responsible to duty, responsive to virtue. (Although Bellow's 
translation of Elkanah into the Hebrew "Hanon" meaning 
"graced" is, strictly speaking, incorrect, it could have 
that further connotation.)72 Herzog means duke, one of 
aristocratic birth, and suggests social superiority. It 
also contains the German word herz, meaning heart, courage, 
mind, spirit, feeling; a further reference might be to 
Maurice Herzog, a volcanologist and climber, which suggests 
fearless adventuring. 
The promise of these names is ironically mocked, not 
least by Herzog himself. Herzog aims at academic leadership. 
His research is to be revolutionary, but his incomplete book 
lies mouldering in Ludeyville. The letters he writes attempt 
dialogue, to influence philosophical and political thought. 
They remain unposted. The acute promptings of his social 
and family conscience rely on a theoretical knowledge of 
the Mosaic code, yet he remains guilty' of a paucity of good 
deeds. Neither does he employ the promptings of his heart 
to any purpose. The realities of perversion and cruelty 
he witnesses in court appal him, reinforcing his knowledge 
as a historian that his inadvertent exposure to evil is but 
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a minute experience of its ubiquitous presence. But the 
charge of grief is self-circuited, shocking only himself. 
Similarly his understanding of the suffering of modern man 
never alleviates him. The heart (herz in "Herzog") is mocked, 
as is the suggestion of social superiority. Ironically 
Father Herzog's pretensions ("a gilded little gentleman" 
[po 151], anedel-mensch [po 150], who sends his children 
to piano lessons instead of to work) are inherited by his 
son, who refers to himself mockingly as "Squire Herzog. 
The Graf Pototsky of the Berkshires" (p. 82). In his turn 
he is convinced his children are of "finer clay" than 
Himmelstein's "hamsters" (p. 281). (The true superiority 
of the Herzogs is the adherence of the immigrants to their 
Jewish tradition, the knowledge of which makes Herzog, middle­
aged, twice divorced, financially unsound, a desirable 
husband for the likes of Himmelstein, even if the proposal 
is no more than a flattering insincerity on the part of the 
lawyer. ) 
Herzog himself is wryly aware of the discrepancy between 
the spirit of menschlekhkayt which imbues him and his actual 
failure to put it into practice: "~ord, I ran to fight in 
Thy holy cause, but kept tripping, ne ver reached the scene 
of the struggle" (p. 135), which recalls Proverbs 19.2: He 
who makes haste with his feet misses his way (hotay). (The 
Hebrew word for sin is het, meaning to miss the intended 
mark or goal.) Perhaps this is the tragic flaw of the 
emancipated Jew, whose knowledge of his moral tradition and 
awareness of his inability to live it through mocks his 
liberated lifestyle. But the final chapter carries a suggestion 
that Herzog may yet fulfil the promise of his names. He 
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is down, but not knocked out by the blows of adversity. A 
process of self-healing has occurred, and self-knowledge 
and self-acceptance allow the cessation of self-mockery. 
The schlemiel has unwittingly won peace of mind. 
"I am Herzog. I have to be that man" (p. 73) was his 
desperate affirmation at the start of the novel. Now he 
can state tranquilly, "Here I am" (p. 317). He can be "that 
man" . "What a struggle I waged! --left-handed but fierce. 
But enough of that -- here I am. Hineni! How marvellously 
beautiful it is today" (p. 317). The immediate translation 
of "here I am" into Hebrew changes its implications from 
a secular Existentialist statement to a religious declaration 
of ob,ligation inherent in election by God. In submission 
to God's will, Abraham was prepared to sacrifice his precious 
only son, Isaac. Hineni (Genesis 22.12). Before services 
commence for the New Year and the Day of Atonement, the 
. . 73 Hreader prays privately and humbly to God. Hlnenl. erzog 
indicates a similar availability, an "eagerness to begin" 
(p. 329), to share his life with others. 
He exhibits Fromm's three requirements for the religious 
mentality, wonder, "ultimate concern" (Tillich), and oneness 
of separate self with All. Wonder is evident in his awareness 
of God's glory manifest in nature (the oriole's nest [po 78], 
the transparency of sea, sun and light [po 98]), while 
ultimate concern is evident in his desire "to do your 
unknowable will, taking it, and you, without symbols. Every­
thing of intensest significance" (p. 333). Finally, oneness 
of separate self with All is implicit in the peace of the 
74final passages set at Ludeyville. This type of mentality 
may flirt with modern thought which finally rejects God-­
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Herzog's relationship with Ifill lila ial 
i• . . • She brought ogy into my life. 
to with catas III (p. 341 )-- t only to renounce it. 
Fuchs that, for Bellow, "God is not simply immanent 
but tran , and, usual Jewi God,1I and c ims 
that the Herzog illustrates this. He f s that 
Herzog emotionally to God (" I I [p. 347]) III ~~~~~~~~
he s God's will (III =-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
'" [p • 347]), and Herzog's ith rests on ..;;;;;.;...'---':....;;;....=....=.J..;....;;.~=-<... 
"an sense I" which ises him: 
"Evidently I cont to bel in God. Though never 
it. But t ins my and my life?" (p. 238). 
Herzog's may disqualify h as a -,,-,,_,--_, but 
there is no doubt that is Bellow's most convincing portrait 
an American Jew the novel is Bellow's most Jewish, 
as Lie Goldman mainta s. A des 
"the stoop-shou sun of the garment dis t" (p. 110), 
" II (p. 125); a awareness 
notes old women buying mea t (p. 186 ) ; 
a sh irony underlines difference Herz IS 
memory of black ines worn in the and 
his vulgar iday Herzogls Hebrew Yiddi te 
grammatical inaccuracies) di lay an with custom 
and ritual. Yiddi influences his speech patterns, its 
word and It is of s as s, "I 
this outing like a hole in head" (p. 182), a 
Its of ci ion, its iomatic directness, 
in icular, the flating quali its humour reflect 
the reali t Herzog nces far more accurately 
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any imitation of the accents and affectations his WASP 
col 
Herzog's humour is essentially Jewish. It is a constant 
against the pain of living. It is lator 
high ser sand sentent moral preaching. Its ironic 
allows his self-analysis a sense 
tipping the against self-indulgent sentimentalism, 
or self­ ness, or self-cast ion. It his 
ing allev ing its seriousness. It is the c 
note in his criticism society and of h f. Realism 
is its 
II (p. 9). It in ~~~~==.~~~~~-=~~~~~ 
cal viv s. Its matter-of­
sanctimoniousness: "he might think ist but 
the of a woman's sts matter II (p.22). 
employs humour with ic i : "With 
me, money is not a medium. I am money's medium" (p. 38). 
His ss with words suggests both Americanization 
himself, (p. 22), II 
.........;;--'"-----"­
=-=--=..::::.=:::.-:::.....:=~::..==_.,.._=.::.:." (p • 26) and s I at the 
absurdi of the aims of the American dream, "--how I rose 
from humble origins to disaster" (p. 159). 
quality of his wit g his pronouncements a flippancy which 
masks their moral ser sness: II ==~~~~~-L~~~~~~~~~~ 
(p. 26). It elevates his 
condemnation his llow ings from vindictive sp 
to an objective c rity which s rather than cheapens 
its validity: Gersbach is likened to Putzi Hansfs 1, 
Hitler's private pianist ( th culture), whi women 
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like Madeleine "eat green salad and drink human blood" (p. 48). 
Herzog's humour is often self-directed. It underlines 
the difference between lofty intention and actual behaviour: 
"Moses wanted to do what he could to improve the human 
condi tion, at last taking a sleeping pill, to preserve 
himself" (p. 113). It punctures the pomposity of grandiose 
ambition: "Herzog, responsible to civilization in his icy 
outpost, lying in bed in his aviator's helmet" (p. 133). 
It tauntingly qualifies the tone of sermonizing he sometimes 
adopts: "A man is born to be orphaned, and to leave orphans 
after him, but a chair like that chair, if he can afford 
it, is a great comfort" (p. 35). 
The indomitable buoyancy of the humour, its colour and 
sparkle, its everyday pragmatism as well as its bitterness 
and pathos infuses the subject matter of the novel with a 
particularly Jewish brand of optimism. The fate of a grief­
stricken Jew reviewing the failure of his life is immanently 
tragic. The civilization he has become a part of is 
inglorious, soulless, cruel, cold. But the attitude towards 
personal and private despair inherent in the humour suggests 
a wider perspective. Both the individual and the human race 
have endured similar eclipses of the spirit. Herzog can 
survive, if not with a smile, with a grimace. 
Four 
liThe soul wanted what it wanted. It had its own 

natural know It sat unhappi on super­
structures of exp , poor t not 

which way to fly." 

Introduction 
S ra DeKoven Ez scussing difficulties 
employ ing the Ho t as a theme in American-Jewish literature, 
to ass of writer, 
whose psychological and cultural links with the Jews Poland, 
Russia, and become very sli by neteen­
forties. Lack direct experience f from a 
II ing sense enormity the event, II 
writers itated to the theme. 2 Ez cites 
wi its concentration on 
self, not on protagonist's connectedness with his 
as insu ion the American-Jewi 
writer in the nineteen- ies. ing 
neteen-fifties, writers were to a g row i n g 
by s historians, while the te 
Eichmann trial (1961) provided both ts and a near-personal 
contact with survivors. In nineteen-sixties, 
Ho t literature was being trans ted into lish and 
novels of survivors writing in English were published, 
supp ing ional logical, as well as factual 
.c;;...;;:.:';;';::"'.L.:;;;...=C-L-";;";;';:::'= , 
i t 
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In the te nineteen-sixt , twenty five years after 
event, low's engagement wi theme indicates h 
desire to confront ng some meaning 
it. In ie Citrine observes t 
in America, 
We weren't starving, we weren't bugged 
pol , up in our s, 
arrested, , s sent to 
in concentration camps. We were spared the holocaus 
and nights terror. With our we 
be ting for 
mankind. 3 
II II not having been 
Bellow not only certain questions, but provides 
tentative answers to them in Of central 
tance is the zation of man, evident in 
conscience 11 of millions during the Holocaust. 
If ificance is nullif , are not the lives 
the victims meaningless? With grim humour, 
a f kind tion the ind 1 
in ca as a practical result of Enl 
philosophies. How is the single self to assert its 
individuali , its humani , to protest an inviolate faith 
in the continuation Ii in the of so much self­
truct listic i ? 
cas Mr Samm as st survivor, Bellow 
to a va a to " new ic 
tions. II Other survivors in the novel are as 
victims, broken by their past, but not Mr In 
survivor as tness, he bears silent testimony 
to Ho st. As survivor as , he 
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the disintegration of moral standards in New York. But it 
is primarily as the survivor as hero that Mr Sammler symbolises 
the possibility of an enduring nobility and dignity for 
humankind, presented in the growth of his ethical and spiritual 
awareness. 
The Survivor as Victim 
Mr Sammler's interpretation of Hannah Arendt's theories 
of how the Nazis thought and felt may be only partially 
accurate, as Edward Alexander points out, but Sammler's 
explanation serves to underline a preoccupation in Bellow's 
thinking. 4 Bellow is dismayed at the idea of a break between 
the metaphysical and functional parts of man, a split which 
allows people's actions to be free of the control of conscience. 
Thus Sammler attacks what he considers to be Arendt's 
justification of evil, her view that, in certain historical 
circumstances, it is impossible for men to know or to feel 
they are committing not only a crime, but a sacrilege against 
humanity (pp. 14-17). Like certain Joseph Conrad characters 
in Heart of Darkness who are oblivious of their spiritual 
sloth, the Nazis were at ease in "the darkness", hollow men 
who unwittingly destroyed their own spiritual, moral, and 
emotional wholeness and who thus allowed a fundamental 
distortion of the human image to occur. 
But what of their victims? How are they affected by 
their inhuman tormentors? There is a tragic irony in the 
fact that many of those who have suffered from the moral 
aberrations of the Nazis exhibit certain abnormalities in 
their turn, and are unable to restore totally their image 
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of the self. Having been treated as sub-human and denied 
the elemental right of self-definition, they find it well­
nigh impossible to re-establish their unique selfhood, and 
are presented by Bellow as fragmented, reduced personas. 
Ezrahi defines the survivor as victim as one who suffers 
death in life, and a "hollowness" is evident where spiritual 
and moral cohesion should be. 5 This is not Mr Sammler's 
lot, but Bellow's awareness of this consequence is used in 
the characterisations of Sammler's daughter Shula, her husband 
Eisen, and a relative, Walter Bruch. The strength of Sammler's 
moral opposition to the diminishment of his own humanity 
can be measured by these characters' failure to oppose the 
contraction of their own. 
Walter Bruch has escaped the worst of the war, yet he 
has not emerged whole. Significantly, his surname is a 
transliteration of the Yiddish noun meaning disaster or break, 
and also suggests the Hebrew word for blessed, baruch, but 
6 
a broken version, incomplete without the first vowel. 
Bruch is a Buchenwald survivor who defines his temporal 
existence in terms of black comedy. He can comprehend the 
Holocaust only as absurd (in comparison to Sammler's refusal 
to make a final judgement [po 222]), and this fractured vision 
is transmitted to his life as a survivor. He treats death 
as comedy, whether it is an actuality (his memory of the 
prisoner who suffocated in the faeces trench because no-one 
was allowed to help him out [po 48]); or his favourite game: 
he and a fellow refugee delight in "playing corpse," and 
he still stages mock funerals (pp. 47-48). His gallows 
humour reveals a desperation to rid death, the unknown, of 
terror, and calls to mind Jean Francois Steiner's similar 
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use of humour in Treblinka. 7 Bruch's presentiment of death 
as something grotesque allows the inference that life, its 
counterpart, is equally so. This is supported by his 
distorted sexual interests, which suggest the loss of the 
ability to love normally. He weeps "because he felt he had 
lost his life" (p. 51), thus according a triumph to the Nazis. 
Yet Samrnler, whose life the Nazis have altered irrevocably 
but failed to destroy, muses: "Would it have been possible 
to tell him that he hadn't?" (p. 51). 
Like Bruch, Eisen, Sammler's son-in-law, employs humour 
to palliate the inhumanity of anti-Semitism. Flung from 
a moving train into a Rumanian winter by fellow World War II 
Russian veterans, Eisen bears them no ill will: "'Oh, they 
were drunk.. Good fellows--tovarischni'" (p. 21). The 
ensuing frostbite necessitated the amputation of his toes. 
Eisen has lost not only his toes, but all compassionate fellow 
feeling, all humane values, in the European war. This is 
made clear in his name, which is the German for "iron", and, 
like the metal, Eisen exhibits properties of hardness and 
strength. In certain respects he has become like his enemies. 
This is evident in his wife-beating (p. 21 )--a Russian, not 
a Jewish pastime, as Lionel Trilling observes-- 8 in the death­
in-life ideology Sammler discerns in his portraits which 
depict the living as corpses (p. 53), and in his conscienceless 
battering of the pickpocket (pp. 232-34). His weapons for 
the assault are metal medallions with the inscriptions hazak, 
"strengthen thyself" (God's order to Joshua before he took 
Jericho), and nahamu, "comfort ye". It is ironic that 
injunctions formulated originally for the spiritual fortitude 
of his forefathers are violated by his iron heart and brute 
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itionally of genti 
Sammler's her r s 
soul sness. Al she s been horror 
the camps, her war experiences her permanent unable 
to define ity. is is in blurri 
and adu r national, soc 1, 
and igious ion. Her name, Shu -Slawa, 
to an unre lism, while is wh she 
fills her rooms is a visible sign of inner bewilderment. 
Child like, seems oblivious the consequences of cr 
stealing manuscript a visit Ind scientist, 
Govinda Lal, to keep Elya Gruner's illi t money. 
But first t is to re-es Ii one of the 
parental ities of her early years, ther's interest 
in H. G. Is, and thus known security Engli 
childhood. Yet simul sly it is a ruse to attract Lal's 
attention. This deviousness, coupl with r i ion 
to E 's money on s to attract suitors (p. 249), 
is lete adult. 
Her ambiguous national ity is sugges in her 
use of ei Polish or English she ta ther, 
while her i ion from those who i into 
American socie her state, is indica by 
similari to the bag of New York. them, she 
ra s dustbins and s a mania col she 
does not relate her past suf ing to a col Jewi 
ence, and vacil s tween a Jewi istian 
reli tity, between rabbi Ip imer priests. 
Jewish orthodoxy is ed in choice of and s 
curls (" sidelocks" [po 160]), whi her ure 
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to Christianity when hidden in a convent during the war 
reveals itself in the smudge of ash on her forehead during 
Lent. 
These three victims suffer spiritual death in life, 
unlike Sammler, who has been literally incarcerated in a 
mass grave. His refusal to die is the assertion of individual 
moral choice which, confronting nihilism, a wasteland of 
the spirit, instinctively rejects it. Instead, the experience 
marks the beginning of his search for inner cohesion and 
sanctity. 
The Survivor as Witness 
Sammler's Holocaust experiences provide a structural 
and thematic unity for the novel. The plot, the three-day 
account of his life in America, where he has found sanctuary 
ever since the war, is pierced by the (apparently) spontaneous 
intrusion of memories of the Holocaust. These recollections 
provide information about his war experiences and suggest 
to the reader possible moral responses to the catastrophe. 
Strategically placed, the graphic flashbacks also present 
possible parallels between the ideologies which inspired 
the Nazi madness and those holding sway in Mr Sammler's 
America, which will be discussed in the section which follows. 
Above all, the Holocaust has destroyed Sammler's early faith 
in Humanism, and Bellow elucidates the changes in his thinking. 
The variety of techniques employed in describing Sammler's 
experience of atrocity indicates Bellow's sensitivity about 
exploiting this theme. For example, Sammler's first 
recollection of his near-death and escape from a mass grave: 
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"When he sixty or s , all stri and 
dug own grave, were fired upon and I in" (p. 75), 
is factual and objective. This assuages the who accepts 
documentation as an a t of novelistic 
art, the critic who would acclaim James T. Farrell's 
Lonigan Trilogy as excel sociological 
documentation. 9 Another memory his positive 
to . " to lift from f. 
Crawling out," and his unmitigated horror at the 
on himself humani "Oh 
Oh vile!" (p. 114). This subjectivi calls forth a s lar 
response from Bellow avoids 
theme of horror by stating t even an accidental catastrophe 
hypothetical fall an Indian into the Grand Canyon) 
is i ce not to cer to 
llen in" (p. 114). 
low s to moral 
inferences about the Holocaust. For example, he places in 
i a comment Eichmann, who h f 
sickened by walking in the fre blood oozing from a mass 
grave (p. 111)- not si he au mass 
death--and the actual horror of having been buried alive 
as a result of Eichmann's orders (p. 114). s i tes 
conjecture about the gap public st sness 
te moral s whi results in inhuman 
In the f matter of fact de ion the mass 
murder, Bellow has Sammler cons his as witness: 
since had lasted- survived • was there an ass 
implicit?" (p. 220). His test is ti by his 
ac I experiences as a Jew in Poland, whi demand that 
II 
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Sammler reconsider the practical consequences of the liberal 
thinking he used to practise. 
In his halcyon prewar existence, Mr Sammler defined 
himself not as an orthodox Jew (p. 69), but as a member of 
Ie genre humain. His former faith in the Enlightenment is 
crystallised in his admiration for H. G. Wells, whose assumption 
that scientific Humanism could create an earthly utopia he 
shared. But now Sammler (echoing Herzog's views)'O wonders 
whether "the worst enemies of civilization might not prove 
to be its petted intellectuals •.• " (p. 2~). His disillusion­
ment with certain aspects of modernity is further indicated 
by his disinclination to continue reading its influential 
shapers, historians and thinkers such as Toynbee, Marx, 
Freud, and Spengler (p. 32). 
As a young intellectual, Sammler, in agreement with 
Enlightenment thinking, believed in man's ability to bring 
about perfection on earth without necessarily relying on 
God's aid. Like the Humanists, he had faith in the individual's 
ability to develop his physical, intellectual, and moral 
powers in order to improve himself and the lot of humankind. 
But Sammler's faith in the goodness of man is shattered by 
the Holocaust. It seems to offer proof of the failure of 
Humanism, of the catastophic consequences of the divorce 
between the natural and spiritual aspects of people, which 
results in their alienation from the divine source of their 
being and their subsequent inadequacy. Molly Mahood discusses 
this failure, and the truth of Nietzsche's ultimate logical 
conclusion that man '"isa shame and a disgrace, and should 
be transcended, '" which, for Mr Sammler, is borne out by 
the Nazis. 11 
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In witnessing their evil, Sammler recognizes the failure 
of a once-esteemed philosophical ideal built round a noble 
idea of humankind. But now it "was certainly possible that 
the historical outlook made it easier•••. to jettison 
most of us" (p. 51). The Nazis l loss of all moral and spiritual 
qualities is implicit in their devaluation of individual 
existence by employing a sophisticated system of "planned 
destruction of the human status of their victims," of degrading 
them "to the extent of losing the last vestige of their self­
respect.,,12 Sammler himself suffers this degradation. After 
his exposure to German inhumanity, and at this stage of his 
life without any religious belief to confirm an idea of the 
sacredness of man, he describes himself as "not entirely 
human" (p. 113), "dispensed from pity" (p. 114), "shooting 
men" (p. 112). 
Having experienced the Nazi evil and an answering 
brutality within himself (his enjo~ment when he shot the 
German [pp. 113-14]) Sammler now has good reason to distrust 
what Jacques Maritain defines as absolute Humanism. This 
is exemplified in Rousseauls theory of natural goodness, 
which posits that man possesses pure goodness, that he is 
naturally (not divinely) holy.13 
Theories which play down peoplels propensity for evil, 
in comparison with the Christian belief in original sin and 
the Jewi sh reasoning that good and evil are not quali ties 
of the mind but relations with reality, that "Imanls heart 
is decei tful above all things and exceedingly weak, 11114 may 
equally dismiss the moral freedom of choice between good 
and evil, or between life and death; a choice which Sammler 
himself has had to make and which begins the painful 
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exploration of his own humanity. Therefore he rejects utterly 
Arendt's thesis of the banality of evil, that because of 
their insignificant historical status in a totalitarian society, 
the Nazi criminals were not imbued with a "spiri t of evil" (p. 15). 
Arendt, according to Bellow, does not condemn the morality of 
the individual German, but argues that personal responsibility 
was swallowed up in a collective decision. The German policy 
which resulted in a collective, not an individual morality 
is explained by Ernst Cassirer, but unlike Arendt, he finds 
15it morally abhorrent, a regression to tribal primitivism. 
Sammler states emphatically that: 
'Everybody .•• knows what murder is •••. The 
best and purest human beings, from the beginning 
of time, have understood that life is sacred•. 
There was a conspiracy against the sacredness of 
life. Banality is the adopted disguise of a very 
powerful will to abolish conscience. Is such a 
project trivial? Only if human life is trivial. 
This woman professor's enemy is modern civilization 
itself' (p. 17). 
To negate individual conscience is to remove the moral dimension 
from life, to deny that man is made in the image of God. 
Sammler declares the Nazi ideology blasphemous, a desecration 
of the sacredness of human life. If the slaughter of millions 
is trite, the death of a single person has no importance 
whatsoever. In Nazism Sammler discerns the return of the 
demonic forces of darkness the Enlightenment believed, erroneously, 
it had routed. His individual act of survival signifies 
a protest against a consequence of Humanist aspirations, 
the historical reality of National Socialism. Sammler the 
intellectual and Sammler the physical survivor both bear 
witness to the translation of certain Humanist ideals into 
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political policies which results in diminishing or negating 
the status of man, instead of elevating it. Ultimately, all 
civilized endeavour is mocked when this occurs. 
Half-blind, frail, uprooted, Sammler serves as a reminder 
of the horror perpetrated within living memory. But his 
testimony is devoid of accusatory bitterness (he withholds 
judgement about the silent complicity of the Western world: 
Churchill's and Roosevelt's decision not to bomb Auschwitz [po 222]), 
or public outcry (he declines to give evidence at the Eichmann 
trial [po 150]). He qualifies his experiences by stating 
that the "individual was the supreme judge of nothing. 
he was necessarily the intermediate judge. But never final" 
(p. 222). Here Sammler suggests the limitations of mere 
rational assessment, and simultaneously Bellow avoids taking 
a conclusive judgemental stand about events from which he 
was geographically and historically distant. It is left 
to the reader to draw his or her own (moral) conclusions. 
The Survivor as Prophet 
Through Sammler, Bellow links certain aspects of American 
civilization in the ninteen-sixties with European life during 
the war. The Holocaust has left Sammler with an acute sensory 
perception foreign to unpersecuted Americans. His nervous 
system registers an involuntary connection between European 
savagery and unhindered criminality in New York, suggested 
when Sammler observes the actions of the black pickpocket 
in New York: "He felt a constriction, a clutch of sickness . 
where the nerves, muscles, blood vessels were tightly interlaced. 
The breath of wartime Poland passing over the damaged tissues 
. " (p. 6). While Bellow presents Sammler as witness, 
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with retrospectively painful but carefully disinterested 
views on what happened in Poland, he also casts him in the 
role of biblical prophet, one who has the right to declaim 
against vice and licentiousness with impassioned eloquence. 
In this role Sammler employs a satiric raillery which links 
him to the prophetic castigators of the Old Testament and 
also places him within a literary tradition of satire. Thus 
Bellow, writing from first hand experience of life in twentieth-
century America, can decry what he considers the degeneration 
of an enlightened Western society . . Sammler's scope, the 
novel's title suggests, is cosmic, but his observations as 
prophet (as valid in London or Amsterdam as in New York [po 28]), 
are drawn from, and apply most cogently to American youth. 
Bellow's "prophetic" style has the directness of rebuke 
and the fierce exaggeration of the Preacher, Koheleth, the 
writer of Ecclesiastes. The Preacher is always disconsolate, 
joyless, with a worldly scepticism and pessimism which deviates 
f rom an a b1'd'1ng J eW1S' h opt"1m1sm, an accept ance of God's w1'11.16 
Sammler's words: liMy days are vanity. I would not live always. 
Let me alone" (p. 202) echo Koheleth's misanthropy, "vanity, 
vanity, all is vanity" (Eccles. 1. 2-3), and invite a 
comparison with the prophet Elijah, who "requested for himself 
that he might die; and said, It is enough; now, 0 Lord, take 
away my life;" (1 Kings 19.4). Sammler refers to the complaint 
in the Book of Job that God requires too much from man (p. 186), 
yet he himself never despairs of society. In his censure 
there is a humorousness, a contemptuous ridicule which gives 
the added dimension of literary satire to his scolding, and 
which echoes the mode of the Roman satirist, Juvenal, who 
was also motivated by ethical convictions and a strong social 
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conscience. (The urbane, oblique style of Horatian satire, 
with its propensity to shun personal engagement or to cause 
d · d ld b . . t h ) 1 7 lscor ,wou e lnapproprla e ere. Satires of a 
prophetic nature, like Juvenal's, pour indignation and wrath 
on their subject, but only because the satirist believes 
implicitly in human beings' capacity for self-correction, 
their free choice to redeem the~selves. Thus Bellow strengthens 
Sammler's prophetic role with lithe act of satire [which] 
becomes, in the face of human depravity, something very like 
a moral obligation." 18 
The following extract illustrates the point: 
He saw the increasing triumph of Enlightenment-­
Liberty, Fraternity, Equality, Adultery! Enlightenment, 
universal education, universal suffrage • . . the 
rights of women, the rights of children, the rights 
of criminals, the unity of the different races 
affirmed, Social Security, public health, the dignity 
of the person, the right to justice--the struggle 
of three revolutionary centuries being won while the 
feudal bonds of Church and Family weakened and the 
privileges of aristocracy (without any duties) spread 
wide, democratized, especially the libidinous privileges, 
the right to be uninhibited, spontaneous, urinating, 
defecating, belching, coupling in all positions, 
tripling, quadrupling, polymorphous, noble in being 
natural, primitive, combining the leisure and luxurious 
inventiveness of Versailles with the hibiscus-covered 
erotic ease of Samoa (p. 28). 
Sammler is irreverent about the sacred cows of the past three 
centuries and employs a sardonic irony to debunk the achievements 
of the Enlightenment. He adds IIAdulterYIl to the hallowed 
passwords of the French Revolution, to undermine its ideals 
of freedom. He is caustically sarcastic about the universal, 
indiscriminate dispensation of rights both to the responsible 
and the irresponsible. He distorts Rousseau's noble savage, 
presenting him as carnal, insisting on his lack of dignity, 
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his Man appears r I an object 
II
contempt, " ing in all ling, 

vulgar, c , with no self- t, "urinating, ting, 

belching. II 
tic tone is viru chastising, littling 

the tenment. The Ie s an out-of 

quali brooks no as adjectives are pil 

on ectives, abstract nouns up other t 

s, and hyperbole is build up iatory 

cres But its pass te eloquence the 

led hysteria of udice, but concern 

of morally indignant, ned to te an answering 

s generalised cri ism is reinf certain 
inc and r ctions. For e, the 
di on of 's on Briti scene in the 
rties by left-wing militants at Columbia Universi suggests 
collective i revol in Vietnam 
19 
era, a counter tural attack on reason itse Bel 's 
ition to lila calism of posture • • • easy and I'" 
his support "'a genuine lism, which truly llenges 
authority, '" which lI'requires -thought,'!! is ted 
20in an interview given to But in s 
novel he s to emphasise t the inc 
is a logical res t Enlightenment thinking which allowed 
not culture, (via Marquis de Sade) 
once sacred of learning. Samm IS chief an ist 
is "a poor man's Jean Genet" (p. 88) who seeks sainthood via 
murder and Ii As moralist, notes 
the , excrement and sex as standards di 
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va systems; that there is a s ion 
outer and inner order; that youth 
Is as well as individual digni in its II sion to be 
But was also brutal" (p. 37). 
As satirist, Bellow expresses his triumph 
Naturalism and the Freudian belief in pr power 
sex in exaggerated statements: "But Nature God, 
elevate creatureliness, and you can count on s results ll 
(p. 	 46). It is also evident in extreme tures, such as 
f-exposure of the ( i cally lIed 
II"a symbol of superlegit [po 46]) in the jeer of 
the heckler who dismisses 's nions because his 
III lIs are dry. He's He can't cornel" (p. 36). 
Satirical distortion is also in depiction of 
the black, whose certain 
popular ideas. Trans into a "great black 
beast • • • seeking whom devour II (p. 14) I he 
the biological a nls of man's a 
ancestry and the surv 1 fittest, but Bellow's moral 
viewpoint censures his act s. His creatureliness is also 
linked to Rousseau's e , suggested by "a certain 
princeliness" (p. 235), it is a superiority ridiculed 
its dis i lity, a megalomania acting 
out a criminal version "idea of noblesse" (p. 236). 
His barbaric power, s ished self-confidence, his 
di rna tate the anarchy of Nietzs IS 
super cr exercises an initial fascinat on 
Sammler. f ing s image supreme s 
in s f might suggest that evil has been 
as Bellow's ri on black as a " t st 
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[who] was ng whom might devour" (p. 14) also echoes 
1 Peter 5.8-9, whi 1 1 to "a roar lion," 
1121
which "wa , seeking whom he may r. 
The presentation of Angela, 's niece, is a mockery 
of emanci ted I of the "urgency to become," which 
t Alter identifies in iferation women's 
. t . t' 22movements in nlne een-S1X less Her is 
"on , on genera 1 ideology, 1 
ion" (p. 129), and is ised by innovation. 
Moralising t her sm, Sammler 
IIrelease long Jewi mental disci train 
in 1 control, was obtai upon 1 appl " 
(p. 60). Her sexual , perhaps "'to 
'liberalize ' human existence and show t nothing t happens 
people is (p. 128) s anIII 
uncurbed and ultimately structive The naive 
stupidi open-mi liberal fails to scern 
the difference a moral conf trick a just 
cause is sugges in her s of black sts and 
murderers, mimicry certain 1 
with romance outlaw (p. 11). (The re 
recalls the e cal and artistic clash between Jonathan 
Swift's s and bee in t 
for riend Horriker, is aesthet 
appearance-- s own -which, li pickpocket 
(p.57), play music while 
he had s hair cut" (p. 56). Her Wallace, a "h LQ. 
moron II (p. 1 43 ) , ses waste of i 11 dissipa 
in self-i t schemes. Bellow is aware his soc cal 
role, he represents counter culture's ection 
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of identifying with "affluent America, whether old Wasp or 
second-generation Jewish," in his repudiation of his father, 
but this does not exempt him from passing a moral judgement 
23 
on both Wallace and Angela. They are presented as ethically 
retarded children, Angela "childishly dressed, erotically 
playing the kid" (p. 237), Wallace "still little brother 
with the curls, the lips of a small boy" (p. 72), evading 
their duties to their dying father, unwilling to assume a 
mature responsibility for their actions. 
The morality that underlies Sammlerls criticism of the 
"out of hand" (p. 29) Enlightenment is rooted in his basic 
assumption that there is a life of the spirit, that the IIspirit 
knows that its growth is the real aim of existence ll (p. 189). 
Conversely, the Enlightenment predicated its interpretation 
of man on the enlargement of his intellect, on "the elevation 
and setting up of man in the centre of the universe. ,,24 For 
Sammler, this interpretation is unsatisfactory. Bewildered 
by the vast variety of explanations available to rational 
man, his soul "wanted what it wanted. It had its own natural 
knowledge. It sat unhappily on superstructures of explanations, 
poor bird, not knowing which way to flyll (p. 5). His 
disillusionment recalls that of Koheleth: "And I gave my 
heart to know wisdom • I perceived that this also is 
vexation of spirit. For in much wisdom is much grief: and 
he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow" (Eccles. 1.17-18). 
Tiresias-like, Sammler interprets the statement of 
Broadway (pp. 224-25), metaphor for the soul of New York, 
as a metaphysical message of spiritual impoverishment and 
despondency for the age. The actual, urban description 
of Broadway, II fuming, heaving, fool-heaped, quivering, stinking" 
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(p. 117) suggests the terror and 1, mental inadequacy, 
itual filth and discomfort its citizens. It "knew 
its own ire And The terror it" (p. 118). 
ion the local popu is "that ity was 
a terri thing, and that f 1 about 
was overwhelming and crushing" (pp. 224-25). Sammler's ection 
"this vulgar, cowardly conclus "(p. 225) which ss ly 
nd, ites s re to 
the Hebrew prophets of 0 whose task was, in Alter's opinion, 
"not to ct to conf man wi al 
sion." Alter quotes Buber, who nts out that spiri 
moral weakness is inherent apocalyptic , 
which hi i 1 wi ng s lye 
In contrast, the prophetic attitude is one of courageous 
25 
, however ominous his 1 may 
Just as prophets bring an 1 message that God works 
man in s , so Sammler s 
because of his basic assumption that there is a Ii the 
rite He s 1 ic hys a in II 
of panic waving" (p. 224) on Broadway, because he 
not general ty (p. 225).II II 
The promise of modern history to release the masses 
into individuality has i The manic models, 
for originality, authentici, indicates that morally 
imaginatively people cannot interpret ir fhood. 
The result is "a liar long non-being" (p. 188), 
a iat the future, Ii itself. To "[ ]r 
human being" (p. 189), through Christian 
trans or popular wasteland inking, contradicts 
prophetic Jewish tradition of historical rontation. 
1 
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1 that to sten to III cane'" (p. 1 an 
ion is to annul the bond between God and man, and he 
refuses to accept that mankind has this depth of 
" Iir: they wish to [life]. Of course 
may be y ic'" (p. 176). ing his idea of 
the real aim individualism, of inner truth 
by moral which al (pp. 188-89), 
Sammler the hollow individuality 
as well as soc and 
The 	Survivor as Hero 
Sammler's iation of the Enli is based 
on the painful s ing off of his persona 
and the growth of a ( y 
moral and historical identity. s 
H. G. Wells, itly that man's i 
could benevolent use s ional, 
scientific intell World War II destroyed s sm, 
and Wells, bitterly disil sioned, died "blast[i 
curs[ing] everyone" (p. 25). Sammler, who actual 
the war, exhibits no tterness. Wells understood 
to Intelligence of s novel 
), 	and his di is with man. What saves 
from despair ns an awareness of "metaphysical 
messages" (p. 73) while being in Mezvinski tomb 
finally asserts itself as a lief in God's transcendence. 
His questions about life are now sical, not functional; 
s ing matter is Meister the Bible. 
is registered in the s se Walter Bruch, when 
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Sammler of to pray for him (p. 52). 
t the is rmanent is conc sive 
in IS ection of Lal's ect to ze 
moon begin a new life , wh of an 
alternative to European ightenment. L Wells, Lal is 
enthusiastic about its a new soc : "'Access 
to I data sms may foster a new (p. 109).III 
IIllt may introduce new III (p. 174). But er, 
a to Lal "was excel II [po 179]), 
as he was to Wells, queries whether ific evolution 
can God? still h even from this ul 
mental brotherhood, still out reach?1I (p.153). For Sammler, 
the bewilders than clarifies 
the IInatural knowledge" of soul (p. 5), and he links 
the "yellow despair" (p. 74), futility he 
in tomb with li hours s 
IIin the "yellow 1 (p. 75) of s longing 
is (p. 75). He is a "depth" not 
a " " man (p. 147), an Orien 1, a Jew (like Herzog), 
ng Faustian departures other worlds. 
Sammler tes a defi tion of IIhuman" t is 
essentially moral and spiritual, while Lal, professor 
biophysics at 1 College, limits his 
to a ical "thing, a creature II which has scarcely begun 
to use resources its (p. 180), that s 
to a species that may 1 fulfill its function in 
(p. 176), desire to live wi t 
is to go aga "f I bio ical governing 
II (p. 173). (The final suggests Lal 
is in favour of a princ Ie of for but 
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not explore its possibilities. Sammler, not Lal, undertakes 
the search for order.) Lal argues that as no example of 
duty or morality is set by biology, why should man wish to 
continue life? 
It is Sammler who insists that man has a moral nature: 
'When you know what pain is, you agree not to have 
been born is better. But being born one respects 
the powers of creation, one obeys the will of God-­
with whatever inner reservations truth imposes. As 
for duty--you are wrong. The pain of duty makes 
the creature upright, and this uprightness is no 
negligible thing' (p. 177). 
To survive is to obey God's will, to live to acknowledge 
His superiority. The longing for non-being is a result of 
an ethical void, a denial of moral duty. In assuming 
responsibility, man begins to define his humanity. The heavy, 
censorious tone employed here is a reminder of the restrictive 
commands of the Old Testament, and an implicit Judaism echoes 
in the first two sentences, the precis of a well known Talmud 
story. The schools of Shammai and Hillel disputed for two 
and a half years whether it was better for man to have been 
born or not. They concluded that man should not have been 
born, but since he did exist, he should ensure that his deeds 
are in accordance with the will of God. 26 
For Sammler, the true status of the human being is bound 
up in a faith in God and an acceptance of a commitment to 
ethical precepts. He believes the moral life to be clearly 
defined, as permanent as a geographical fact: "All mapmakers 
should place the Mississippi in the same location, and avoid 
originality" (p. 183). In affirming life, not death after 
virtual extinction, in expressing faith in God despite all 
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contradictory evidence, Sammler exhibits a moral choice that 
is evidence of his "unconscious ancestral origin" (p. 160). 
The growth of his moral identity can be plotted in his changing 
attitude towards the taking of life which, despite his avoidance 
of formal Judaism, moves towards the Jewish viewpoint. 
The Sammler who, though "nearly a corpse" (p. 113), 
killed the German in the Zamosht fores~was still the liberally 
educated rationalist who recognised no God. No inherited 
Jewish moral code made him hesitate to take life, to obey 
the sixth commandment. Significantly, his sole memory of 
the murder is of an ecstatic, vivifying, visceral warmth. 
But "since Poland, nineteen thirty-nine, [his] judgements 
are different. Altered. Like [his] eyesight" (p. 169). 
His reconsideration of the value of life (regardless of whose 
it is, friend's or enemy's), influences his thinking. This 
is evident in his caustic reconsideration of writers who 
~spired revolutions, thus distributing equally the once 
aristocratic right to kill (p. 116), and particularly in 
his scepticism of Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith. Like the 
Knight, Sammler is "entirely at home in the finite" (p. 52), 
but only before his war experiences. The Knight faces a 
theoretical temptation of crime, but for Sammler, the test 
has actually occurred. His experience of Existential freedom, 
unhampered by any restraining traditional morality, makes 
him sceptical of breaking "humanly appointed laws, in obedience 
to God" (p. 52). Surely Kierkegaard and Bellow now have 
different ideas of God, because the God of the Covenant's 
"humanly appointed laws," which Sammler now heeds, condemn 
the taking of life. 
The change is confirmed by a later action, when Sammler 
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asks Eisen to intervene in a fight on the New York streets 
between the pickpocket and a student, Lionel Feffer, who has 
filmed the thief in action. Eisen, while brutally beating 
the black, is "grinning ••• as though he were doing a very 
amusing thing" (pp. 232-33). His pleasure in violence and 
the black's "puma silence" (p. 226) suggest that both follow 
instinctively the jungle law of survival and ~uffer a total 
absence of restraining moral thought. Eisen is prevented 
from crushing the black's skull only by Sammler's intercession. 
His reasoning is quite logical, practical, the conscienceless 
soldier's: "'You can't hit a man like this just once. When 
you hit him you must really hit him. Otherwise he'll kill 
you. You know .... You were a Partisan. You had a gun III (p. 234). 
But Sammler has been both victim and executioner, and 
regardless of every pragmatic consideration, he identifies 
with the victim. His abhorrence for killing is a developed 
moral response that discerns in the celebration of death an 
absolute evil which is essentially sadistic. To oppose death 
is to affirm the value of all individual life, whether it 
be criminal (the pickpocket) or insane (Eisen is a "cheerful 
maniac" [p. 53]). Sammler's emotional abhorrence for Eisen's 
attitude is immediate. "'I am horrified'" (p. 234), he exclaims. 
The sinking of his heart (p. 234) measures the compassionate 
extension of his sensibilities--inextricably bound to moral 
responsibility--since he, "without pity" (p. 114), shot the 
German. For Sammler, whose family were "not compassionate 
people" (p. 50), who is naturally emotionally cold, aloof 
from people because he chooses to be so, the development 
of the duties of the heart has been difficult. Unlike Angela, 
who thinks that 'everybody was born human, '" Sammler knowsII 
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I 
lI'only the capaci is natural'" (p. 244). His pre­
occu ion with kill which from casual observat 
ev in his concern whether can 
bring himself to slaughter his own flock (p. 22), to 
phi ical , illustra by his di with 
Arendt's of evil (p. 17) and Aris 's choice 
suicide as nobler one (p. 113), is crucial in his 
unconscious self inition as a Jew. His conv t that 
lIa of 's own spirit" (p. 151) is in every man recalls 
Martin Buber's I that divine spark is in every 
thing icates his awareness divine int 
27 
on man. He lieves that y the recognit of this 
sanc ty can murder (p. 151 ) • 
This of many ies, Ii is sa 
supreme va to which all other values are subordinate, 
is indispensable to the struc of Judaism. When asked 
formulate his s on ism Albert E in wrote: 
ism seems me almost exclusively with 
moral atti in Ii Ii essence 
that concept seems to me to lie in an affirmative attitude 
to the Ii all creation.,,28 This attitude, which 
it well si a Jew to life, even 
a cause he ieves in, is reflected in the stories Isaac 
I, 's tion wi II taking life" 
(p. 116) is not the pr te sy he cons it to 
be, but a sure sign he belongs to that Jewi tion 
Babel fails to escape Communism. 
s IS parents almost free thinkers" (p. 69), 
and he himself "had a s disli of 
(p. 189). s it is not surprising to discern in er 
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an inclination towards Christian thought. For example, as 
the survivor who wonders "[w]hat besides the spirit should 
a man care for who has come back from the grave?" (p. 95) he 
is attracted--not to the Jewish mystics--but to the Christian 
29 
message of a thirteenth-century theologian, Meister Eckhardt. 
Eckhardt urges disinterested purity and unity with God and 
promises spiritual security if one transcends a disappointing 
humanity, a concept which is inimical to Jewish thought. 
Christian influence is evident in Sammler's wish to submerge 
his human judgement in God's, by "willing as God wills" (p. 189), 
calling to mind Thomas Becket's definition of the Christian 
martyr who "has lost his will in the will of God" in Murder 
in the Cathedral. But Sammler's and Becket's final 
interpretations of their suffering are radically different. 
Unlike those religious Jews whose faith the Holocaust 
destroyed (in Night, Elie Wiesel's Elisha mourns: "Never 
shall I forget those flames which consumed my faith forever. 
Never shall I forget those moments which murdered my God"),30 
Sammler's adumbrations of God begin with his sufferings as 
a Jew, and they are coupled to his resolution to survive. 
His spiritual awakening is simultaneously an affirmation 
of life, and so it is not surprising that in the "second 
encounter of the disinterested spirit with fated biological 
necessities, a return match with the persistent creature" (p. 95), 
he will ultimately allow himself to be drawn back into hum3n 
affairs, away from the "disinterested purity and unity" of 
Eckhardt's (Christian) idea of God. His choice of life, 
of human involvement, illustrates Joseph R. Levenson's conviction 
that "the Jewish will to survival was a religious will, a 
reaffirmation of the biblical injunction to 'choose life,' 
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an history the commitment to 
II 31
action 
To di oneself from humanity may lead final 
to withholding f from all moral involvement in the 
I world, ically ibit an inert similar 
to t of nihilism. But Sammler's behaviour icates a 
f philosophy_ His IIcommitment to action" asserts 
itself in his condemnation the crowd who use to intervene 
tween Feffer and the "They are not 
are " (p. 232), like 
unea chorus in "living and part 
I If if sees If 
as similarly uninvolved, and power s: "Someone 
between human and non-human states, between content and 
full and , meaning and non-meaning, 
between s world and no wor II (p. 232). Detachment is also 
suggested in his posture, "as strangely leaning, as 
recli ng, and iarly in ile" (p. 232), as if to 
a to confrontation wi respons lity. 
Previously he cared y Eckhardt's mes s Christian 
conviction that who is "poor in spirit is receptive of 
all rit" (p. 203). But for one has " Ii 
(p. 232), who s committed If spontaneously to moral 
action in temporal world, to be "poor in s rit" now s 
on negative interpretations apa thy, of avoiding res lity_ 
I S to Eisen to stop fight s s moral 
insentience, qualifying his assert that " is still 
a thing as a man . are still human qualities" 
(p. 245). This crucial scene, in which the is 
with actual lence, is a recurring one in Bellow1s novels. 
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One remembers Herzog's failure to act after hearing the case 
of the murdered child, while Sammler initiates positive action. 
A moral fortitude is also evident in his earlier report 
to the police about the pickpocket's actions; in his censure 
of his own daughter's thefts, despite his understanding of 
her weaknesses; in his forfeiting of Angela's goodwill and 
possible future beneficence by insisting that she establish 
"some order within [her]self" (p. 183) through seeking her 
father's forgiveness. For Jews, religion is the active 
commitment to morality in everyday life--no specific word 
for "religion" exists in Hebrew--and Sammler has made a personal 
discovery of this, that "man can (and must) remain man, not 
flee to absorption in God out of the conviction that man, 
if only man, is doomed.,,32 
Yet Sammler vacillates between Christianity and certain 
Jewish preoccupations. His attraction to the former reveals 
itself in his first visit to Israel, which resembles more 
a Christian pilgrimage than a Jewish return to the promised 
land. Liela Goldman comments: "And what Jew would go to 
Israel and not visit Jerusalem?,,33 But Sammler is drawn to 
places of Christian interest, to Nazareth, to the sea of 
Galilee, to Capernum "where Jesus had preached in the synagogue" 
(p. 23). He quotes Blake: "And did those feet in ancient time," 
not the Bible, linking Christ with England, so long his spiritual 
and cultural home. 
His second visit, occasioned by the fear of Israel's 
annihilation in 1967 by the Arabs, is prompted by a complete 
identification with Israel as a symbol of historic Jewish 
survival--an immediate, absolute identification--which suggests 
a spontaneous affirmation of his rediscovered Jewish identity. 
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The thought of Israel's political extinction, which recalls 
for Sammler the near-success of the Nazis, causes him to panic, 
to consider suicide, "sleeping pills, poison" (p. 116). If 
Israel were to lose, his wish is to die amongst Jews, the 
"finest death he could imagine" (p. 161). Here Sammler's 
feeling for Israel has an urgency dearly learried from the 
Holocaust, an illusionless quality lacking in Elya Gruner's 
Zionism, which is sentimental. Gruner takes an unthinking 
pleasure in Israel's material and political accomplishments, 
a personal Jewish pride in supporting her progress. This, 
in turn, contrasts strongly with his son's anti-Zionist support 
of Arab culture (p. 134), his ignorance of Hebrew (p. 137), 
his general scorn for his heritage: "Roots are not modern II (p. 197) 
In Israel, certain complications arise for Sammler. His 
reaction to evidence of Israeli violence, the use of napalm, 
the corpses, the wounded prisoners of war (pp. 201-03), is 
not admiration for Israel's military efficiency or applause 
for an Israeli victory. Rather, it confirms his by now fully 
developed moral priorities which include a compassionate 
response for any victim, regardless of historical or political 
necessity. He has to control lithe trembling of his legs 
or the wish to cry" (p. 203). 
This suggests that for Sammler, Israel, in addition 
to providing a political homeland for the Jews, is an ideal 
beyond time and history, existing "in order to cherish the 
vision of God." 34 Bellow's own idea of Israel, as presented 
in To Jerusalem and Back, is a similar one, as Irving Saposnik 
35points out in a review of the book. , The established state 
of Israel is less significant to him than its importance as 
an ideal construction, a symbol of spiritual regeneration 
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the West. The importance of Sammlerls reaction is its 
ty to reI ious c 
Elie Wiesel's isha, whose upbringing was strictly orthodox: 
"To me Zion was a sacred ideal, a messianic af 
a heartbeat, but not a on a map or a political slogan, 
a cause wh men lIed or " expresses 
an ancient Jewish humani in his horror at viOlence and 
, while Eli feels murdered this humanity 
in himself when he is forced, as a of a Jewish resistance 
movement before Israeli independence, to execute a hos 
or John Dawson: 's it•••• It's I've kill 
live killed Elisha.,,36 
f S humanitarian va ind te a igious 
purity that cannot co-exist wi Israeli nationalism. Nationalism 
mili ence, fi i : "It was a real war. 
Jews were tough" (p. 201). "Everybody respected killing" 
(p. 202). Paradoxi continuation of ic 
message which affirms sancti of Ii on the 
national survival of Israel, on violence and death; while 
, like the Israeli author Amos Oz, would 
a world of "spiritual civilizations tied to 
ir lands, thout s of sta 
instruments of war." 37 The critics Edward Alexander and 
Porat (the is an Israeli) 
logic of violence, while Porat discerns the s 
Christianity in she cons Bellow's sal to 
violence. 38 And it is true t Samm retreating from 
Israel, again disinteres sand ri I 
a t wi God, a I istianity 
because, 1 Job, he rs demands too much of man (p. 186). 
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But IS admiration Gruner's super 
moral sensibili pays tri te to the of 
which is inc 1 involved, not wi man's itual 
ion, the improvement his temporal existence. 39 
not a tising Jew, Gruner's standi that 
goodness is achi by the and 
performance of duty is traceable to his orthodox upbri 
S the war, twenty-two years, his 
, aware of his storical s ificance, and 
Shula, whom he invents He sits other 
re t in Israel, his pleasure is undisc charities 
(p. 227). A surgeon by ssion--his wife's choice--he 
disl 	 his kni , blood. He had 
entious. He had his du (p. 68). Sammler praisesII 
Gruner the unresponsive 
He d what he sliked. He had an unsure 
to certain pure states. He knew there had been 
good men before , t were men to 
come, a wanted to be one them. I ink 
did all right. I It come out nearly so well 
f. Till or so I was s an Ang le 
llectual ish Jew and person culture-­
ly use But , by imental 
and by las i you , partly by 
propaganda, has ished 
himself through (p. 243). 
By a devotion to discredi ideas conduct (p. 209), to 
honour, virtuous se, compassion, Gruner has resisted 
modern that smisses li as meaningless, as has 
Sammler by his re 1 to in the mass 
This affirmation creates a human bond them, famil 
to Sammler since Cies iewicz, a Pole, kept him alive in 
the mausoleum (p. 74). Gruner has also confi the covenantal 
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bond between and man, the idea of , by instinctive 
tand lithe terms of his contract" (p. 252) whi 
he trans into a respons ty for s fel man. 
senses that his relative is now open to metaphysical 
ra mere II mechan I s]" (p. 208). 
Gruner needs his uncle's reassurance ritual ion 
he intuits y vaguely, to te a both 
div and to support him death. 
er arrives too late to reassure Gruner, but his 
insistence on liveri a eu over body stresses 
in his nephew's moral His laudation in no way 
sh mourner's which is not so 
a personal intercession the a if ion of 
40God, as Israel Zangwill notes, whi its similarity to 
prayer the , is to its opening 
phrase only: , the soul of ya Gruner" (p. 251).41 
stian overtones are by Dutton, who, 
a knowledge of stian tes, comments t "Sammler 
assumes pries duties here • • he sees himself in 
Meister its ious f 
eulogy, placed as the f I paragraph at end the 
novel, s an on the reader. Once in 
u~"u",~er's salutation Gruner's virtues is at the expense 
s own: "At his st this man was much kinder than at 
my best I have ever been or could ever " (pp. 251 52). 
Is one to concl that Sammler's approbat is e 
(almost ef sive so) in of morals past, or 
are Gruner's ethical Jewish ues meant to suggest 
a model Americans? One 's 
disillus t wi American youth. 
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er refuses Ange 's or 's 
assessment of ir fa , and, a tionable argument, 
he smisses Gruner's offences ( ons 
the Mafia) as "permissible criminality" (p. 62) in a corrupt 
society. But citing Gruner's criminal connect , a 
dubious t, financial speculations and a basically 
in positing the dial of 
C;runer's i (Wallace's money 
Angela's promiscuity--Gruner ) , 
Bel ef ly counters a react to Gruner as a moral 
1 in a secular age. 
In final analysis, is it Sammler, the survivor, 
who emerges as moral and tual Gruner's a ion 
of virtue is unthinking, spontaneous, like that Morris 
in Malamud's e ition 
of a Jewish life is "to do t , to honest, to 
good. This means to other e." This instinct 
grasp of s is by no means to be bel led, t 's 
commitment to virtue is by a different route •. His ief 
in virtue is won, s an active moral ce 
with illus ess ism, in spite a conscious 
rational assessment of human behaviour. It is also tied to 
an invest t of nature God, whose presence 
s corne toacknowl Despite the ev of inhumanity 
(in Poland or in New York) a l: "Try 
to live with a civil Wi • With 
a sense the mystic of Wi an incl tion 
to lieve in archetypes goodness" (p. 110). careful 
wording of this credo suggests a s religious ination. 
The Holocaust brands Sammler as Jew, rega s of 
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national, ish or lish identification. And it is 
as s alien, as Jew, t he, wi 
nat i ("'I was Polish'" [po 167]), not at ease in either 
America or Israel, person" (p • 232), ines himself 
via various roles as a Jew. As tness, the persecuted 
presence Jew s the wor its connection wi 
God, its obI man. The Deutero-Isaiah 
speaks of cosmic role the Jews, a role interpre 
by Mr er, whose is the ritual 
immaturity the world; while Amos remembers Jehovah's 
: "You only I known all lies of 
earth; therefore will I puni all your iniqui 
As prophet, er per it lly Jewish task 
of chastis an errant Bellow, his creator, 
reaps the equally traditional reponse of indignation and 
cri s as John J. C rd Grossman. 44 
As hero, Sammler s survived physi cata raculously, 
what if "[tJoo many were (p. 114)?II 
itual crippling is in the characteri ion 
Eli in Wiesel's novel where his =~...;;..;;:..=.:::::..;;;.=-=~ 
normal Ii as a journalist in Paris a the war s 
s s will to live, consc sly seeks tho 
But Sammler survives, ly and spiritually unmaimed, 
commit to ion. 
Instead of rming God's flictions 
of the innocent Sammler's ief his 
acceptance a will that is beyond his comprehension, Ii 
Job's, is final. He is to rdt's mysticism, in 
which the impersonal Godhead comes to "birth" in the human 
45
soul. But his final fulfi is for 
187 
whole man, not the disembodi spi t only, without 
any cIa to exclusivity, s a definition God \l'J hiL h 
calls to mind the sh of morali , a 
Person, not a metaphys I principle. (The of ism 
is the morali .,,)46 This is evident in his assumption 
of "the yoke of the kingdom," in his to , 
however painful (his rebuke to Angela may jeopardise his 
financial sec ); in s,of :::....:;;===' 
in sown (pp. 37, 94, 180), thus reversing s former 
aim of transfi9uring s ective reac heartache, lIinto 
often ing ervat (p.38). It 
i f in his praise of Gruner, one the 
compassionate sons of compassionate, in 
s admiration IS moral affirma by 11 and 
which mani s igation. 
this ily ttingly upholds 
the sanctification of IS name, is evident in veneration 
him by ly (p. 75) 
in of s. For , the opportunist, he is 
"practically " ( p. 88) , while even Wal (whose 
prescri ion for a goodn 's s is to IIgo a 
whole lot people call them all swine. . ne, 
swine, swine!'" [po 149]) s opi (p. 196). 
the of Isaiah, Robert s notes that 
Isai of nat 1 suffering occurring not as 
consequence national sin, but as "an indispensable e 
in the process the moral education o£ race" (Isaiah 52.13; 
55.3,4,5(12). 47 Sammlerls moral lopment, measu in 
tering his intellec 1 comp and growth 
of compassion, in his lding of the sancti ty indiv 1 
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life, il trates this in individual terms. (The moral 

deterioration of Jews, because of rejection of a 

it I sh ti , can into Wal and 

Angela's support of all Jewi causes, whi Emil 

L. im wou inter as "internali antisemiti 
Finally, by combining the of man and 
wise man, Sammler es of , the 
reI ious sage ty, and virtue, not ical 
49
valour or material wealth, command universal respect.
 
, a con ry sm is discerni in s 

IIaffirmation of luxury of non-intimidation by doom" (p. 108). 
Having surv what can· interpreted as a total dis tion 
all virtuous instinct, ing timate evil, having 
o p p 	0 sed meaninglessness, his I to broken morally 
and ritual has a relevance the present world, 
s namesake Arthur Schopenhauer's definition of 
Jewi optimism as "vulgar" (p. 167). The clear-s ted 
optimism wi whi he the ure highlights a fference 
between a Jewi ect and certain Christian attitudes 
e, by Louis , who that IIISwift 
probably would thought an imist divine a contradiction 
in terms. 11150 's own s towards 
a ic nihilism, but IS affirms life, not dea 
after virtual extinction, and expresses fai in 
a st universal pess sm, in i of 

individual conscience. 

This read , that may a I of 

itual and moral regeneration, is 

it s onset of spr dur time span 

of novel (pp. 38, 94, 222). The connotations of 
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and change and rth that are automa cally linked to s 
season are positive, encouraging, with none reluctance 
to resume life the 1 spring reveals in opening 
lines of T. S. Eliot's Feffer observes that 
III [i]t's spring. I mean it's ture change •• 
Even youth is suscepti to that!1I (p. 102). Bellow 
allows the 1, eternal rhythms of nge 
the wi gloom irI 
so 	much writing may be lifted and purifi 
fresh 
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